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Abstract 
Representational Redescription and the Development of 
Cognitive Flexibility 
Karmiloff-Smith (e.g. 1986, 1992) has suggested that 'cognitive 
flexibility' is the result of a series of three representational 
redescriptions. These redescriptions are carried out by endogenous 
metaprocesses operating directly on the representations. 
Representational redescription accounts only for development beyond 
'behavioural success', the stimulus to the redescription being stability at 
a previous level. 
Many features of the Representational Redescription theory are 
criticised, but the underlying idea that cognitive flexibility is associated 
with representational level is maintained. This point is supported by a 
review and study of planning development argUIng tha t 
representational development, rather than process development 
explains increasing flexibility. 
Data from children's drawings and block balancing, along with a 
theoretical analysis of the model indicate that the details of the 
Representational Redescription theory are not consistent or plausible. 
In particular the concepts of initial procedural representation, 
endogenous metaprocesses, behavioural success, stability as the spur to 
development, and implicit information \\'ithin representations, are 
rejected. 
Removing the constraints of behavioural success suggests a ne,,' 
recursive model, which is proposed as a general developmental 
mechanism. 'Recursive Re-Representation' views representational 
redescription as a creative process, and builds on Boden's (1992) 
computational approach to creativity. Cognitive flexibility is 
determined by a limited cognitive capacity, the level of 'chunking' in a 
domain and the possession of an overview of the relevant conceptual 
space. Chunking is achieved through a re-representation of behaviour 
and the environment, rather than a direct operation on representations. 
The BAIRN system (Wallace, Klahr & Bluff, 1987) is suggested as 
providing the basis for an implementation of Recursive Re-
Representation. 
It is argued that the Recursive Re-Representation account which 
views Representational Redecription as a recursive, creative process 
provides a more parsimonious approach to representational change 
throughout development. 
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Chapter 1 
Thesis overview 
1. Introduction 
This research began with an interest In understanding 'reflective' 
processes in adults, and a desire to clarify the concept of 
'metacognition'. It became apparent that the key to understanding 
adult functioning was to understand the developmental history of such 
abilities. This thesis combines both developmental and computational 
approaches, taking a cognitive science perspective; a strategy advocated 
by both Karmiloff-Smith (1992) and Rutkowska (1987). The aim of the 
research was to explore the concept of and to provide some explanation 
for the development of cognitive flexibility in adults as well children, 
rather than a description of child development per se. 
The title of this thesis refers to the development of 'cognitive 
flexibility', a term coined by Karmiloff-Smith (1992). Karmiloff-Smith is 
concerned with the ability of humans to go beyond successful task 
execution, to be aware of and to reflect on their performance. This is 
what differentiates humans from other animals allowing them to be 
" ... creative, cognitively flexible and capable of conscious reflection, 
novel invention, and occasional inordinate stupidity." 
Kanniloff-Srnith 1992 (p.l) 
'Cognitive flexibility' is used in this thesis as the most inclusive of these 
1 
ill-defined terms. Use of the term is meant to include various related 
ideas: reflective thinking, awareness of knowledge, conscious reflection, 
and metacognition. 
The development of 'cognitive flexibility' has not been central to 
most theories of development. There was a lot of interest in 
'metacognition' in the 1980's, but this was not linked to any broader 
developmental theories. Karmiloff-Smith is one of the fe\\, 
developmental psychologists to investigate cognitive flexibility and to 
adopt a cognitive science approach. She has proposed a theory of 
'Representational Redescription' (RR) to explain the emergence of 
cognitive flexibility after behavioural success (Karmiloff-Smith, e.g. 
1984, 1986, 1992, 1994). This thesis will argue for a representational 
redescription1 account, although Karmiloff-Smith's (1986) model will 
be reformulated as a recursive, creative process and proposed as a 
general developmental mechanism. It will be argued that the concept 
of representational redescription is a useful one, but that Karmiloff-
Smith's (1986) particular model is neither theoretically consistent, nor 
empirically supported. An alternative model called 'Recursive Re-
Representation' (3R's) will be proposed, as a more parsimonious 
account. In the following sections, the thesis will be outlined chapter by 
chapter. 
2. Chapter 2 
Cognitive flexibility has been studied under many different headings, 
principally 'metacognition', but also 'awareness' and 'reflection'. In 
1 Representational Redescription with initial capital letters will be used to refer to 
Karmiloff-Smith's theory, representational redescription in lowercase will refer to the 
more general concept. 
2 
chapter 2, the concept of metacognition is discussed, in particular the 
widely quoted account of Flavell (1979). An initial analysis of the 
concept finds that there is nothing 'meta', in terms of 'higher order', 
about metacognition. 'Metacognitive knowledge' and 'metacognitive 
experiences' differ from other know ledge and experiences only in their 
domain of concern: the mind. This is reflected in the concern of current 
researchers with 'theory of mind', rather than 'metacognition'. The 
processing aspect of Flavell's account 'cognitive monitoring' remains 
less clear, although it seems to involve awareness and ev al ua tion 
processes. Although ill-defined it does not seem to be distinct from 
other 'higher cognitive processes', and no account of its development is 
offered by Flavell (1979, 1987). 
Vygotsky has proposed that 'higher cognitive processes' develop 
through the internalisation of social regulation processes. Wertsch, 
pursuing Vygotsky's theory, has described a shift of regulation process 
from mothers to children in a puzzle completion task. Wertsch's 
experiments illustrate the argument, but do not explain the 
mechanisms; 'internalisation' remains an ill-defined process. 
Karmiloff-Smith (e.g. 1986) has provided the most formal account of 
the processes involved in the development of cognitive flexibility. She 
has, over a number of years, and in a number of domains, developed a 
detailed model of Representational Redescription, The RR model 
begins with successful performance in a domain, and suggests that 
cognitive flexibility results from a series of redescriptions of the domain 
knowledge into increasingly accessible formats. Four levels 0 f 
representations are described, culminating In a linguistic 
representation, the redescriptions being carried out by endogenous 
metaprocesses. The metaprocesses operate directly on the 
3 
representations, extracting implicit regularities and representing them 
explicitly in a new format. The RR model is outlined in more detail in 
chapter 2. 
Karmiloff-Smith (1986) provides the only Cognitive Science 
approach to cognitive flexibility. The RR model held the promise of a 
formal account of cognitive flexibility, and thus provides the focus for 
this thesis. The RR model is specified in considerable detail and makes 
a number of falsifiable claims, some of which are tested in this thesis. 
The RR model is described in detail in Karmiloff-Smith's 1986 paper. 
The portion of the model which has been developed in the most detail 
is the series of representational formats. One specific detail from this 
account - the initial representational format - was then empirically 
supported in a later paper (Karmiloff-Smith 1990) with evidence from 
children's drawing. The 'metaprocesses' which perform the 
redescriptions are less well formulated. The evaluation of the RR 
model begins in chapter 3 by examining Karmiloff-Smith's (1986, 1990) 
claim that the initial representations, which produce successful 
performance, are 'compiled procedures'. These 'compiled procedures' 
provide the basis for further redescriptions to higher, more accessible 
levels. In a study of children's drawings, Karmiloff-Smith (1990) 
demonstrated that young children could not produce certain types of 
modifications to their standard drawings to produce a 'strange' drawing. 
She claimed particularly that modifications which required 'operating 
on a procedure' were not possible for younger children, they were only 
able to add or delete elements at the end of executing a complete 
procedure. 
3. Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 describes a partial replication of this study, \vith greater 
controls and concludes that the initial representations are neither 
compiled nor procedures. The representations are more flexible than 
that. However, the difference in types of modifications bet\\'een age 
groups was replicated. It is concluded that these differences could either 
reflect differences in planning ability or differences in inventiveness 
between age groups. Both explanations, the development of planning 
and creativity, are followed up later in the thesis. 
RR theory is only concerned with development beyond 'behavioural 
success', however, this point of 'success' was shown to be hard to define 
in the drawing domain, and will be shown to be a fundamental 
problem for the RR model. Chapter 3 licences the rejection of the initial 
representational format suggested by the RR model, but this is only a 
small part of the RR theory. It is arguable that the problems identified 
in chapter 3 might relate specifically to the drawing domain. The 
complete RR account is supported with data from a number of domains 
(Karmiloff-Smith 1992), so a broader view needed to be taken and 
different tasks investigated. 
One of Karmiloff-Smith's most quoted examples is her 'block 
balancing' task (originally Inhelder and Karmiloff-Smith 1974). In this 
task, subjects are required to balance a selection of evenly and unevenly 
weighted blocks across a narrow bar. Some of the the unevenly-
weighted blocks have obvious weights and others contain hidden 
weights and are visually identical to the evenly weighted blocks. 
The block balancing domain as described by Karmiloff-Smith (1 QS4) 
seemed to provide some of the clearest and strongest support for the RR 
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model. The domain allows a clear distinction between success and 
failure: a block either balances or it doesn't. It is also reported as 
producing a V-shaped behaviour, which provides behavioural evidence 
of underlying representational changes which follow initial successful 
performance. Karmiloff-Smith (1984) suggests that initial successful 
performance is produced by an uninsightful proprioceptive procedure 
(phase 1) which leads to success with all the blocks. Subsequent failure 
(phase 2) is produced by an over-general dominating 'theory' that 
everything balances in the middle. The final success (phase 3) is 
accompanied by awareness and produced by a flexible procedure. 
4. Chapter 4 
A replication of the block balancing task was performed and is reported 
in chapter 4. It included the collection of some quantitative data 
(balance time), which had not been reported by Karmiloff-Smith. The 
prediction was that the different representational phases would produce 
different patterns of balancing times. Phase 1 subjects should produce 
equal times for all blocks, as there should be no preference for a centred 
balancing position. The phase 2 subjects should fail on all but the 
evenly-weighted blocks, due to their centre-fixation. Final successful 
performance should reflect longer times for the off-centre balances, as 
the centred position is tried first. However, the replication did not 
produce unequivocal support for the 1986 model. There was some 
evidence of the rigid 'phase 2' performance, but there were also 
intermediate patterns of block balancing which were not accounted for 
by the model. There was no difference in the pattern of timings 
between age groups, which indicated a 'central tendency' in all subjects. 
Case studies, presented in chapter 4, more closely resembled the results 
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of the original observational study (Inhelder and Karmiloff-Smith 1974) 
than later descriptions of the task (e.g. Karmiloff-Smith 1984). The 
former study reported a wider range of balancing behaviours. The case 
studies highlighted the importance of the encoding of the problems 
which, it is argued, reflects developing knowledge of the problem. It 
was the ability to analyse the blocks on the relevant dimensions "which 
characterised flexible performance. Knowledge development seems to 
account for performance, an explanation which accords in general terms 
with Karmiloff-Smith, although the specific RR model is not supported. 
5. Chapter 5 
In chapter 5 the RR model is analysed further in purely theoretical 
terms. The evaluation described here provides the basis for a new 
account to be developed in chapter 9. The RR model (Karmiloff-Smith 
1986) was presented as a computational account of development, so an 
implementational approach is adopted. The details of the initial 
representations, as compiled procedures, were rejected in chapter 2. But 
beyond the specific representational formalism, there are also 
fundamental problems with the idea that the initial representations are 
inaccessible. Karmiloff-Smith (1986) suggests that (to use her terms) 
information which is 'implicit' in a 'plethora' of initial procedures, is 
extracted by the redescription metaprocesses, and then explicitly 
represented. The concepts of 'implicit' information and a 'plethora' of 
procedures create the problem of an information explosion. There 
must be some limit to the information which is encoded in the initial 
procedures. Some access to content is also required in order tha t 
'domains' can be delimited, and 'stable success' recognised, both of 
\vhich are prerequisites of redescription in the RR model. This problem 
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is confounded by the endogenous nature of the redescription processes, 
operating directly over the representations. It is suggested tha t 
extracting regularities from behaviour rather than from 
representations relieves part of the problem, and this approach is 
pursued in the 3R's model (presented in chapter 9). 
The operation of the 'metaprocesses' is underspecified in the model, 
and the stimulus to redescription, 'stable success' is also hard to define, 
computationally. The case studies in chapter 4 suggested the possibility 
that 'surprise' might be an alternative candidate for the latter. The 
metaprocesses' are replaced by a 'perceptual analysis' mechanism which 
operates over behaviour and the output of representations, rather than 
the representations themselves. 
The issue of 'behavioural success', which was raised as a problem in 
chapters 3 and 4, is rejected in chapter 5. It is argued that 'success' puts 
an unjustified barrier between representational redescription and more 
general theories of development. However, dropping the constraint of 
behavioural success has serious ramifications in various parts of the 
model. Significant reformulations are required; a fundamental change 
is that the limited series of 3 phases and 4 representational formats 
needs to dropped, as a recursive approach is adopted. The 3R's model 
(presented in chapter 9) employs a recursive redescription mechanism, 
operating over a single representational format. Eliminating 
'behavioural success' broadens the applicability of representational 
redescription, allowing it to be considered as a general developmental 
mechanism. 
6. Chapter 6 
Karmiloff-Smith's RR model 1S left 1n chapter 5, and attention IS 
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focussed on an alternative approach to the development of cognitive 
flexibility. Vygotsky's idea that it is the higher cognitive processes 
which develop is introduced in chapter 2, and chapters 6 and 7 focus on 
one particular example: planning. The development of planning is 
suggested as a potential explanation of the empirical results presented 
in chapters 3 and 4. In chapter 6, a number of approaches to planning 
development are reviewed. No detailed account of developmental 
mechanisms are found, although the general consensus seems to 
favour process development explanations. 
7. Chapter 7 
Chapter 7 introduces Magkaev (1977) and Isaev's (1985) model of 
planning development. This provided the most detailed account of a 
developmental progression in planning. The account was developed in 
the Soviet tradition, and is assumed to incorporate Vygotsky's 
'internalisation' mechanism. Isaev's model proposes three 'post-
success' behavioural stages, and it seemed to provide an interesting 
basis for a comparison with Karmiloff-Smith's RR theory. 
Isaev's model suggests four phases of planning development: 
manipulative; step-by-step; short-range; and theoretical. The 
manipulative subjects are not really engaged in 'planning'. The task 
goal cannot be held in memory as well as the task rules, and although 
the subject moves within the rules, she does not succeed in reaching the 
goal. Step-by-step planning indicates a lookahead of a single step, \\'hilst 
short- ra nge planning has a larger lookahead. Both approaches are 
successful, but they are not able to produce optimal (minimum move) 
solutions. The most advanced level of planning, the theoretical 
approach, involves the consideration of alternative plans, and the 
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selection of the optimal one. 
Isaev (1985) supports his model with evidence from a train-shunting 
task. The task involves re-organising a numerically-labelled sequence 
of train carriages by moving and leaving carriages on certain tracks. The 
problem involves analysing the problem space, to eliminate the 
redundant tracks from consideration. A partial replication of Isaev's 
train task with both children and adults, is presented in chapter 7. Here, 
as in the block balancing task, the results are not as clear cut as predicted 
by the initial study and quantitative analyses were not applicable. Case 
studies, provided evidence of manipulative, step-by-step and short-
range planning, although there was no evidence of theoretical 
planning. The results from the adult case studies (interpreted from a 
cognitive science perspective), indicate that planning level is not a 
general developmental stage of the individual, but is the result of the 
interaction between an individual's encoding2 and the cognitive load of 
the task. The results are taken to implicate the development of domain 
knowledge rather than the development of planning processes per se. 
Representational redescription as a general account of development, 
will claim that representational change, rather than the development of 
new higher cognitive process will explain development. The results 
from chapter 7 are consistent '\Tith this view. 
8. Chapter 8 
Chapter 8 marshals further supporting evidence for the 'kno,,'ledge 
development' approach, to justify the extended re-formulation of 
2 The word encoding will be used to refer to the representational process: the perceptual 
encod ing process involved in interpreting a stimulus. This will be distinct from the 
simple term 'representation' which will used to refer to knowledge structures in memory. 
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representational redescription \\Thich is presented in chapter 9. It is 
argued that apparent developmental differences in processes can be 
explained by differences in knowledge. The apparent development of 
higher cognitive processes, is a feature of the interaction between the 
processes and the child's knowledge base (e.g. Chi and Ceci 1987). The 
complementary evidence of 'early competence' indicates that children 
do possess higher cognitive processes at an early age, but they can only 
use them where they understand the knowledge content of the 
questions. Identifying the analogy between two instances of 'grasping', 
for example, will not appear as complex as recognising analogous 
problems in physics, but the basic comparative processes are the same -
the differences relate to content. 
9. Chapter 9 
In chapter 9 a new account of representational redescription, called 
'Recursive Re-Representation' (3R's) is developed. It is a recursive 
model, incorporating the theoretical and empirical concerns raised 
earlier in the thesis. The differences between the 3R's model and the RR 
model are substantial enough that the 3R's model cannot be considered 
a variant under RR theory (Karmiloff-Smith 1992). However, \\Thilst 
many features of the RR model are criticised in this thesis, the 
underlying principles are maintained and provide the basis of the 3R's 
account. 
Cognitive flexibility is attributed to the contents of \\Torking memory, 
which has a limited capacity in terms of 'chunks'. Awareness \\'ill 
access \\'hatever is contained in \\'orking memory. In absolute terms, 
the amount of information contained in \\Torking memory \\Till increase 
\\Tith kno\,\'ledge development and the associated developn1ent of 
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encoding capabilities. Flexibility in any limited domain, '\Till be 
dependent on what can fit within the limited central capacity, the 
quantity of knowledge being fixed in terms of 'chunks'. 
Recursive Re-Representation produces new 'chunks', ,\'i th 
'chunking' envisaged as starting with the most basic sensations in 
infancy. As a recursive process its operations continue into expertise, 
which is a more common domain for the chunking concept. The 
hierarchical knowledge structure is related to awareness in a way 
comparable to that suggested by Activity Theory. However, the 3R's 
account draws on the insights of Activity Theory, without adopting the 
theoretical perspective. 
In place of Karmiloff-Smith's four representational formats, and 
redescription metaprocesses, the 3R's model proposes a recursive 
process of 'Re-Representation', where the encoding processes which 
create the most basic representations, can also create the higher level 
representations. Mandler's (1988, 1992) 'perceptual analysis' 
mechanism provides a general description of the type of processes 
involved. Chunking is achieved through a re-representation of 
behaviour and the environment, rather than a direct operation on the 
representations. It is suggested that Re-Representations are triggered by 
affective responses, e.g. surprise. It is argued that this account is more 
parsimonious than Karmiloff-Smith's, providing a consistent approach 
to representational change throughout development. 
The basic principle that cognitive flexibility is associated "Tith 
representational level is maintained. This point is supported by the 
revie"r and study of planning development (chapters 6 and 7) arguing 
that representational development, rather than process development is 
explanatory . 
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Having dropped the constraint of behavioural success, the 3R's 
account proposes a recursive representational development process 
which is operative from infancy to expertise. RR theory has been used 
to explain creativity (Karmiloff-Smith 1993 and Boden 1992, 1993). 
However, it is argued, representational redescription is itself a creative 
process. The 3R's account draws on Boden's (1992) computational 
approach to creativity. She does not elaborate her model in the 
cognitive development domain, although her insight that 'creativity 
allows thoughts that could not have been thought before', is 
particularly helpful in understanding development. Her approach 
explains creativity with reference to processes which it is shown are 
present in infants. 
Boden characterises creativity as the mapping and transformation of 
conceptual spaces. Knowledge elaboration, accounts for the mapping of 
a domain, and representational redescription accounts for the 
transformation (re-conceptualisations) of the conceptual spaces, which 
create new perspectives on knowledge. 
The BAIRN system (Wallace, Klahr, and Bluff, 1987), a rare 
developmental program, is described and compared with the 3R's 
model. It contains many of the relevant components identified in 
Recursive Re-Representation: it is recursive, creative, and progresses on 
the basis of evaluating performance. It is presented as a promising basis 
for developing the 3R's model. 
10. Chapter 10 
This thesis argues that representational redescription, vie"Ted as a 
creative, recursive process is a general developmental mechanism. The 
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thesis ends with suggestions, presented in chapter 10, for further 
developing the approach and the 3R's model. 
1-+ 
Chapter 2 
Cognitive Flexibility and Cognitive Development 
Chapter Abstract 
In this chapter a number of accounts of cognitive flexibility are 
reviewed, in an attempt to clarify the concept, and to discover its 
developmental origins. There is little clarity surrounding discussion of 
what develops; the concept of 'metacognition' in particular is examined 
and rejected. The focus of the latter half of the chapter is on how 
cognitive flexibility might develop. The Soviet approach of 
internalisation is reviewed, and this is discussed further in chapter 7. It 
is argued that Karmiloff-Smith (e.g. 1986, 1992) has provided the most 
promising account from a cognitive science perspective. This account is 
presented in detail, and forms the focus of this thesis. 
1. Introduction 
Cognitive flexibility, Karmiloff-Smith (1992) argues, is what 
differentiates human cognition from that of animals. What is special 
about human cognition is our ability to go beyond using knowledge to 
reflecting on knowledge. The general term 'cognitive flexibility' 'will be 
used as a general term to refer to reflective thinking, a\vareness, and 
metacognition. Cognitive flexibility is ill-defined, the vagueness of the 
term reflecting the confusion in the definition of the subordinated 
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concepts, some of which will be discussed in this chapter. In the thesis 
Karmiloff-Smith's distinction between using and reflecting 0 n 
know ledge will be clarified. 
There are two general approaches possible in discussing the 
development of 'cognitive flexibility'. Firstly the definition of what it is 
that develops, and secondly defining how that development takes place. 
The what will not be well tied down in this chapter, but various 
descriptive approaches will be reviewed. The vague nature of the 
concept of 'cognitive flexibility' means that a lot of descriptive rather 
than explanatory developmental work has been done. The chapter 
begins by considering the popular concept of 'metacognition' which 
includes both knowledge and process, as a possible explanation of what 
develops. Metacognition will be shown to be an unhelpful concept and 
consequently, it will be left without reviewing any accounts of how it 
might develop. 
There are three basic types of explanations for how cognitive 
flexibility develops: the development of knowledge, the development 
of structure or the development of processes. Domain general 
structural accounts (e.g. Piaget's 1983) have largely fallen out of favour, 
and will not be considered in detail, but both process and knowledge 
development approaches will be considered in this thesis. The 
knowledge development approach appeals to changes in the structure 
of knowledge, these changes explain differential access to pre-existing 
higher cognitive processes. In the process development approach, it is 
a,vareness and the higher cognitive processes themselves '\\'hich 
develop. 
The process development Vle,,,,, typified by Vygotsky (1962), and 
'Vertsch (1985) suggests that the development of domain general 
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cognitive processes explains increased cognitive flexibility. Higher 
cognitive processes, e.g. planning, reasoning, which require cognitive 
flexibility, are believed to be undeveloped in young children. The 
developmental mechanism which will bring them into being, is the 
internalisation of social-regulatory processes. 
It is clear that older children ceteris paribus know more than 
younger children. It is also obvious that flexibility in a domain pre-
supposes the possession of knowledge in that domain. No-one argues 
against the idea that knowledge is acquired during development. This 
thesis will be concerned not simply with the mere accumulation of 
knowledge, but with the development of the structure of knowledge, as 
well as the content. This approach is typified by Karmiloff-Smith (e.g. 
1986) whose 'Representational Redescription' model explains cognitive 
flexibility as dependent on representational format. Karmiloff-Smith's 
model is outlined at the end of this chapter, and forms the focus of this 
thesis. 
2. Cognitive Flexibility 
Cognitive flexibility refers to what it means to think about something, 
or to understand something, to take some area of knowledge, as the 
object of cognition. This clearly includes and requires 'consciousness', 
but consciousness will be assumed rather than explained in this thesis. 
There are a wide variety of terms that will be subsumed under the 
umbrella of cognitive flexibility. These terms are mainly used 
descriptively, ,vith no account of developmental mechanisms. A fe,,,' 
terms are briefly reviewed in this section, ,\Tith the most '\'idely used 
concept 'metacognition' being discussed in the next section. 
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Johnson-Laird (1988) has produced a 'taxonomy of thinking' in 
which he identifies 'self-reflection' as the higher order element of 
thinking. 
"We have the capacity to reflect upon what we are doing - our own 
process of thought becomes itself an object of thought at a higher level""" 
self-reflection does not stop here. It too, can be the object of itself: you 
can think about your own metacognitive thoughts." 
Johnson-Laird 1988 (p. 450-451) 
Johnson-Laird admits that his analysis is at Marr's (1982) computational 
level (what the mind is doing) rather than at the algorithmic level (ho,,, 
it is doing it). However, even the computational analysis is not very 
detailed. He places 'self-reflection' outside of the taxonomy, stating that 
'self-reflection' is a higher level of operation applicable to all other 
thought processes. It is a 'meta' level process, and no account of its 
interaction with the lower levels nor of its development are offered. 
However, Johnson-Laird has created a problem with a potentially 
infinite number of levels of reflection. The concept of 'meta' levels of 
thought are discussed further in the next section on meta cognition 
Awareness and reflection are often implicated in the regulation of 
cognition. Brown and De Loache (1983), stress predicting, checking 
results and monitoring progress and Yussen (1985) includes planning in 
his list of 'metacognitive' skills, which are used to monitor and control 
our performance. These 'skills' are general higher cognitive processes 
which are required for flexible performance in a domain. What is less 
clear is their developmental origins: ,yhether they are features of 
cognition which apply ,,,hen knowledge is in the correct format (see 
Karmiloff-Smith section 6), or ,yhether they are general skills. Bro,vn & 
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De Loache (1983) argue that metacognitive skills are both broadly 
applicable, and also that they are domain specific. 
"Novices often fail to perform efficiently, not only because they may lack 
certain skills but because they are deficient in terms of self-conscious 
participation and intelligent self-regulation." 
Brown and De Loache 1983 (p. 139) 
Self-conscious participation and intelligent self-regulation are not 
defined further. An account of development is required to clarify if, or 
to what extent, these abilities develop independently of any particular 
knowledge domain or are linked to a specific knowledge domain. The 
studies of teaching metacognitive 'skills', has generally shown a failure 
to transfer between domains, which might be taken to argue for the 
latter position. The development of planning is considered in detail in 
chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis. The issue of whether there is anything 
essentially 'meta' about 'metacognition' is discussed in section 3. 
2.1 Self regulation and Cognitive monitoring 
Brown and De Loache argue that metacognitive skills are a function of 
expertise in a domain. Children are novices on many tasks, and it has 
been argued that they also lack general metacognitive skills (Flavell and 
Wellman, 1977; Brown 1978). An explanation for this is that the 
experimental tasks tested are new and difficult for children. "This does 
not mean that children are incapable of self-regulation, only that they 
tend not to bring such procedures to bear immediately on ne,,,' 
problems. " 
Brown and De Loache (1983) suggest the follo,ving developmental 
pattern 
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"First the absolute novices show little or no intelligent self-regulation. 
then as the problem solver becomes familiar with the necessary rules 
and sub-processes, he enters into an increasingly active period of 
deliberate self-regulation. Finally, the performance of the expert would 
run smoothly as the necessary sub-processes and their co-ordination have 
all been overlearned to the point where they are relatively automatic." 
This is not a function of age - but one of expertise. This progression is 
also shown by Simon and Simon (1978) and has been illustrated in 
various fields e.g. Chi (1977) in chess; Markman (1977) with young card 
players. 
An essential part of the regulation of cognition involves the 
awareness of cognitive processes. But awareness itself is not a process, 
but a feature of cognition. We are always 'aware' of something, but it is 
not clear how awareness is implicated in development. 
Robinson (1983) has looked at the role of awareness in development. 
She has framed the following questions: 
"Is awareness of inadequacy in one's current way of thinking responsible 
for advances? On the other hand, is awareness of one's thinking activity 
a relatively late development which allows that activity to become more 
planful and regulated? Does one become aware of how one is thinking 
when problems arise, or when one is coping easily with spare cognitive 
capacity to watch what one is doing?" 
Robinson 1983 (p.l07) 
These provide a useful framework, but Robinson does not suggest any 
answers to these questions. Instead she concludes that little is kno\\'n 
about hCH\T a\vareness interacts with knowledge, or \\'hether it facilitates 
or results from cognitive development. Robinson equates 'a\\'areness' 
20 
with 'metacognition' which will be discussed further In the next 
section. 
Markman (1977) presented 5 to 8 year-old children ,,,ith incomplete 
instructions for solving a performing a magic trick, or playing a game. 
The youngest children, when probed, are not aware of the inadequacy of 
the communication until they attempt to play the game or perform the 
trick, and find that they cannot proceed. Robinson (1983) makes a 
further distinction between a child's knowing that, for example, there is 
a problem in understanding an ambiguous message, and with locating 
the problem in the message. She identifies this as the difference 
between knowing that you don't know and knowing why you don't 
know. Brown (1978) describes a similar progression from knowing how 
to use strategies, to knowing that you are using strategies. She describes 
the case of a 7-year-old boy who sorted cards into categories without 
being aware that he was sorting into categories, he claimed he was just 
looking at them. However, no explanation of this progression in 
awareness is offered by either author. The experiment demonstrates an 
increase in the contents of awareness, but this could be equally well 
explained as increased domain knowledge, or as an expansion of 
awareness, analysing processes, or the increase in processing capacity. 
There is general agreement that children's awareness of tasks 
increases with age, and that 'awareness' is a constituent of the 
monitoring process, but, there is no account of ,,,hat it means, in 
representational or processing terms to be 'a'\Tare' of one's knowledge. 
Brown (1987) has argued that there is much confusion in the terms 
that have been used to describe 'understanding', and advocates that 
attention is directed to''\Tards the mechanisms of change. This is the 
approach adopted in this thesis. The use of the term 'cognitive 
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flexibility' will remain ill-defined, the idea is captured by Karmiloff-
Smith's distinction between using knowledge and reflecting 0 n 
knowledge. 
3. Metacogni tion 
A number of psychologists have the abiding intuition that metacognition 
is an extremely important topic, eminently worthy of further theoretical 
and experimental investigation. However, none of us has yet come up 
with deeply insightful, detailed proposals about what metacognition is, 
how it operates, and how it develops. 
Flavell 1987 (p. 28) 
Cognitive flexibility has been widely researched under the heading of 
'metacognition'. Flavell's initial use of the prefix 'meta-' (Flavell, 
Freidrichs, and Hoyt 1970) stimulated a lot of research on metacognition 
in the seventies and eighties. His conclusion, quoted above, is rather 
depressing following, as it does, 17 years of research. This section 
reviews the concept, as defined by Flavell (1979) and questions whether 
there is any need to posit a 'meta-level' of functioning to explain 
reflective thinking. It concludes by arguing that 'metacognition' is not a 
useful concept in explaining cognitive flexibility. 
3.1 Defining the 'meta' in metacognition. 
Flavell (1979; 1981; 1987) defines metacognition very broadly as 
knowledge and cognition abollt anything cognitive or psychological. 
The Concise Oxford dictionary does not list, amongst the various 
meanings of the prefix 'meta-', a sense meaning 'about'. A more usual 
interpretation of the prefix 'meta', in 'metacognition', ,,'ould be "of a 
higher or second-order kind" (Concise Oxford dictionary). This ,,·ould 
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clearly distinguish 'metacognition' from 'cognition', in a "Tay 
comparable to the use of 'meta' in the concept of a 'metalanguage' in 
formal semantics. Here logic is used as a metalanguage, in \vhich to 
describe a natural language, although it is not itself a part of that 
language. The term 'metal-cognition suggests (second-order) processes 
which operate on cognitive knowledge or processes, rather than directly 
on data from the outside world. 
Flavell's broad definition of 'metacognition' as 'cognition abou t 
cognition' has been widely used within the field (e.g. Baker and Brown 
1984; Weinert and Kluwe 1987; Yussen 1985), and although the 
emphases within these accounts do vary, they all lack the 'second-order' 
idea. To avoid confusion a new term 'supercognition'l will be used to 
refer to the conception of second-order cognitive processes. This is not 
to imply that a distinction between cognitive and supercognitive 
processes is useful or important. It merely serves to distinguish this 
specific conception of 'metacognition' from the various other 'meta-' 
terms that will be discussed. Hereafter, we will only use terms with the 
prefix 'meta-' when describing the work of researchers who have 
themselves employed that terminology. Supercognition refers to a 
higher level of cognitive processes, and not to hierarchical 
representations or knowledge content. 
3.2 Flavell's taxonomy 
Flavell (1979) proposed a taxonomy of metacognition as a first step in 
studying the domain, but has not made any claims for its 
exhaustiveness and limited claims for its usefulness Flavell (1987). As 
1 The prefix 'super-' comes from the Latin, on top (of), above, beyon~. As 'cog~ition' is 
also of Latin derivation, 'super-cognition' is, in fact, a more etymologIcally conSIstent 
term than 'metacognition' which mi\.es Greek with Latin. 
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it has been widely used as a basis (e.g. Brown, Robinson 1983; Yussen 
1985) and was the first and most general attempt to map the complete 
domain it provides a focus for discussing metacognitive research. 
Flavell (1979, 1981, 1987) divides his broad conception of 
metacognition as 'cognition about cognition' into two specific categories 
which are: metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive experience. He 
describes metacognitive knowledge as knowledge about cognitive 
processes. Metacognitive experiences are also broadly defined as 
"any conscious cognitive or affective experiences that accompany and 
pertain to any intellectual enterprise" 
Flavell 1979 (p. 906) 
These are the feelings that automatically accompany cognition, such 
as the feeling of confusion when you haven't understood something. 
3.3 Metacognitive Knowledge 
Metacognitive knowledge is very broadly conceived, the term covering 
any knowledge relating to cognition. It can relate to cognitive processes 
in the self (e.g. I have a terrible memory for faces) and others (e.g. Fred 
has a problem remembering number sequences), knowledge about 
cognitive tasks (e.g. that recall is more difficult than recognition) and 
about cognitive strategies (to remember something, you should 
rehearse it). The concept includes both procedural and declarative 
knowledge, it includes self-referential knowledge, specific knowledge of 
other people, and generalised knowledge about cognitive abilities. 
Flavell is not concerned to provide a developmental account, but clearly 
the accumulation of knowledge about cognition is central, both domain 
general and domain specific knowledge. 
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Metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive experIences, Flavell 
(1979) claims, interact with goals and actions (strategies) in "interesting 
ways". However, he did not advance any speculations as to the nature 
of those interactions. The goals - the objectives of a cognitive enterprise 
- and actions (or strategies) - the behaviours employed to achieve the 
objectives - form the essential framework for the operation of 
metacognition, but are not in themselves metacognitive. 
Flavell (1979, 1981) states that both metacognitive knowledge and 
experience do not differ from non-metacognitive knowledge and 
experiences in terms of form or quality, but only in terms of content and 
function. Thus, they are not 'meta' in any second-order sense. The 
question then becomes one of whether there is anything to be gained by 
labelling a certain do m a i n of knowledge or experience as 
'metacognitive'. It is trivially true that the content of knowledge differs 
between any two domains e.g. a person's knowledge of babies differs in 
content from their knowledge of computers. Similarly, the function of 
that knowledge differs in a straightforward sense, in terms of the 
contexts in which the different knowledge bases are useful. The 
knowledge of computers will not help a woman decide whether her 
baby is ill enough to call out a doctor. If there is anything special about 
knowledge of cognition (rather than knowledge of anything else), it 
must be demonstrated. Many of the researchers who were interested in 
'metacognition' seem to be following such lines of reasoning, by 
looking at the implications of a knowledge of mind, under the 'theory 
of mind' umbrella (e.g. Flavell 1988, Wellman 1988). 'Theory of mind' 
will be discussed further in section 3. 
If 'metacognitive' knowledge itself is not privileged in any \\'ay, it is 
possible that the processes \\'hich use that kno\l\rledge may utilise it in a 
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distinctive way. Flavell mentions 'cognitive monitoring' in this regard, 
and this process will be discussed further in section 3.4 below. 
3.4 Metacognitive experiences 
Metacognitive experiences are the feelings that accompany cognition, 
and, in general, cognitive psychologists have very little to say about 
feelings and emotions. It is not clear how 'metacognitive experiences' 
fit in with many information processing theories, but it is not clear that 
anything is gained by describing them as 'meta'. The feeling of hunger 
could be described as a 'meta-digestion' experience, but this is not 
particularly helpful. It is merely an 'about digestion' experience, just as 
'confusion' is an 'about cognition' experience. 
There is plenty of evidence that children have cognitive experiences 
before they are able to use such experiences to improve their 
performances. For example, Flavell, Speer, August, and Green (1981) 
have shown that young children experience puzzlement when asked to 
build a tower, by an experimenter who gives them only vague 
instructions. They do not correctly locate their problems as emanating 
from the speaker's inadequate messages and they are unable to use their 
'metacognitive experiences' of uncertainty to improve their 
performance by asking for clarification (see also Markman 1977, 
Robinson and Robinson 1977, Robinson 1983). However, this pattern 
seems to be equally true of other, non-cognitive feelings. Young 
children generally fail to understand the significance of their feelings. 
A toddler will become fractious because they are hungry, but ,,,ill not 
request food although this is ,vi thin their linguistic capabilities. They 
presumably have the unpleasant stomach sensation, but do not kntH\' 
,,,hat is causing it or ho\\' to deal \\Tith it. Here again, there has been no 
special status demonstrated for 'about cognition' experiences. 
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The crucial development seems to be in the understanding of the 
experiences. This requires both the awareness of the experience and its 
connection to the domain specific knowledge which explains the 
significance the experience. 
Merely identifying domains of knowledge and experience as 'meta', 
as Flavell has done, does not seem to be interesting or illuminating. 
The concepts described by Flavell could equally well be referred to with 
the simple adjective 'cognitive' which would mean simply 'about 
cognition'. Nothing super-cognitive has been demonstrated. 
3.5 Distinguishing the cognitive from the metacognitive 
"Cognitive strategies are invoked to make cognitive progress, 
meta cognitive strategies to monitor it ... your store of metacognitive 
knowledge is apt to contain knowledge of metacognitive strategies as 
well as cognitive ones" 
Flavell 1979 (p. 909) 
Flavell (1979, 1981, 1987) has argued that it is often difficult to 
distinguish the cognitive from the metacognitive. This should not be 
the case if the concept of 'metacognition' was clearly defined, and 
distinctly different from cognition. Flavell (1987) states that the same 
activity might be cognitive in one context and metacognitive in 
another. For example, a cognitive strategy might be to add up a list of 
numbers to achieve the goal (the total) and a metacognitive strategy 
would be to add them up for a second time to achieve a total. Bro\\'n 
(1987) provides an example \vhich, she claims demonstrates the 
interchangeability of cognitive and metacognitive functions. She 
argues that asking yourself questions about a chapter might serve either 
27 
to improve your knowledge (cognitive function) or to monitor it (a 
metacogni ti ve function). 
This lack of clarity indicates, for us, that the cognitive-metacognitive 
distinction is not a useful one for understanding these strategies. There 
would be not interchangeability between the cognitive and the 
supercognitive. The same activity could never be both cognitive and 
supercognitive, as they would not be part of the same system. 
The adding of numbers must always be a cognitive activity, a learned 
procedure for achieving a goal, the goal being to find the total. This 
may be supplemented by the additional knowledge that a certain 
category of addition problems are complex, and are thus prone to errors. 
It is this awareness that prompts the subject to repeat the (cognitive) 
activity and invoke the additional (cognitive) procedure to check that 
the totals are the same for both operations. The goal here being to 
confirm the result. There will be declarative knowledge available 
within the brain of the proficient arithmetician about the addition 
processes e.g. that it is prone to error; and that repeating an addition is a 
good way of checking the result. However, this knowledge is not 
supercognitive, and not qualitatively different from the basic 
knowledge of addition. By its very nature, though, it must follow 
knowledge of addition developmentally: it is not possible to have 
knowledge about a process when you are not able to use the prerequisite 
process itself, and to which the former makes reference. This point will 
be raised again in chapter 9. 
3.6 Flavell's cognitive monitoring. 
Flavell included the term 'cognitive monitoring' in the title of his 1979 
paper, but then failed to describe fully "'hat ,,'as meant by it in the text. 
The bulk of the paper is devoted to describing the knowledge and 
experiences outlined above. Cognitive monitoring immediately sounds 
like a second-order process (although the 'meta-' prefix is not used 
here). It sounds like a monitoring process \vhich operates over 
cognitive processes. However, Flavell (1979) merely states that 
cognitive monitoring occurs 
"through the actions and interactions among four classes of phenomena: 
(a) meta cognitive knowledge; (b) metacognitive experiences; (c) goals (or 
tasks); and (d) actions (or strategies)." 
Flavell 1979 (p.906) 
This account, unfortunately, provides little explanation of how the 
developing (meta)cognitive knowledge might be used by the 
monitoring process. 
In a later paper Flavell devotes a \\7hole chapter to describing 
examples of cognitive monitoring (Flavell 1981). However, the 'model' 
presented simply involves four boxes (relating to the four phenomena 
in the above quote) with bi-directional arro\vs linking each one to all 
the others. This again explains very little. It is clear that all these types 
of cognition interact, but the model does not explain how they are 
controlled and co-ordinated, or how they develop. 
The question must again be raised as to \\'hether 'cognitive 
monitoring' is different from 'monitoring' of performance in general. 
There is clearly an aspect of cognition \\'hich controls, directs, and 
evaluates activity. It has not been demonstrated that there \\'ould need 
to be a different process operating for the domain of cognition. 
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3.7 Concluding summary 
This section has argued that there is nothing essentially 'meta' about 
metacognition, and that the concept does not further the understanding 
of 'cognitive flexibility'. The differences between (meta)cognitive 
knowledge, and (meta)cognitive experiences, and other non-cognitive 
knowledge and experiences have not been shown to be qualitative, 
relating only to different domains. The 'cognitive monitoring' process, 
has not been shown to use (meta)cognitive knowledge in any special 
way, and may therefore be a general higher cognitive monitoring 
process. 
The term 'metacognition' has largely fallen out of use, current 
theorists pursuing some of the (meta)cognitive knowledge issues under 
the 'theory of mind' umbrella. This will be outlined in the next section. 
4. Metarepresentation and the Development of 'Theory of Mind'. 
4.1 Theory of mind 
'Theory of mind' demarcates a body of knowledge about mind, which 
children acquire at around the age of 4. This knowledge is integrated 
into a 'theory' \\'hich allows the child to reason about things \vhich a 
younger child calU10t (although see Johnson 1988 for arguments against 
the attribution of theoretical status to early knowledge about mind). 
The classic task used to identify the possession of a 'theory of mind' is 
the false belief task. A 4-year-old child with a 'theory of mind' can 
recognise that another person \\'ill hold a false belief, if a situation (e.g. 
the location of a hidden s\\'eet) changes in that person's absence. A 3-
year-old child \vill typically claim that the absent person \\'ill be a\vare of 
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the changed location of the sweet, if the child themselves is a,,~are of the 
change. 
The possession of a theory in any domain \\Till allo\\' a person to 
make predictions and explanations, basically to understand that domain 
knowledge. It is a measure of the organisation of that kno\\~ledge. 
Olson, Astington and Harris (1988) argue that the repercussions of this 
new knowledge are so \\Tidespread, that developing a theory of mind 
could be considered to form a stage in cognitive development. The lack 
of a 'theory of mind' has been used to define autism (Baron-Cohen, 
Leslie, and Frith 1985). Autistic children \\Tith a mental age well above 
4-years-old do not distinguish their own beliefs from those of others, 
and fail on the false belief task. Hovvever, the autistic's deficit may be 
more than the lack of a theory mind. The inability to conceive of other 
minds may be consequence of earlier, more fun dam e n t a I 
developmental problems (see Sheila Spensley 1995 for an alternative 
vie\\' of autism). 
It is trivially true, that it is not possible to reason about a domain if 
you do not have the relevant concepts. 'Belief' is an 'about mind' 
concept, which requires a\vareness by the child of mental states. This is 
\vhat Karmiloff-Smith (1992) has characterised as going beyond using 
kno\\Tledge to reflecting on knowledge, and is characteristic of many 
other domains, other than mind. A child \\'ill have had beliefs, and 
operated on the basis of them before she \\Tas a\\Tare that she had beliefs. 
She would need to have an awareness of beliefs in herself before she 
could generalise them to other minds as \\Tell. 
It is possible that the normal acquisition of the 'theory of mind' 
could be explained by the same kno\\?ledge acquisition and theory 
development processes as are operative in other knoV\?ledge domains. 
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This argument was made 1n relation to Flavell's concept of 
(meta)cognitive knowledge, and is equally applicable here: the 
knowledge itself is not represented in any qualitatively different '\Tay. 
However, it has been argued that the development of 'theory of mind' 
relies on the development of a capacity to 'metarepresent'. This 
approach will be discussed in the next section, to analyse whether 
'metarepresentation' is a component of cognitive flexibility. 
4.2 Metarepresentation 
Olson, Astington, and Harris (1988) argue that 'theory of mind' 1S 
necessarily a 'meta-representational system'. 
"Because these concepts represent such states as beliefs, desires, 
intentions, and feelings, they constitute representations of 
representations and in this sense constitute a recursive or meta-
representational system." 
Olson, Astington, and Harris 1988 Cp.3) 
This position is argued because verbs such as 'believe' only have a truth 
value relative to the individual, rather than a truth value in the 
external world. The truth of the proposition "e.g. there is chocolate in 
the fridge" is either true or false depending on the state of the external 
world (and whether someone has got there first). In contrast, the 
proposition "I believe that there is chocolate in the fridge" is true or 
false regardless of the state of the world. It refers only to my mental 
state. This is the philosophical distinction between propositional 
attitudes / propositional content. 
In the 'theory of mind' context, this line of reasoning confuses the 
representational format \\Tith the representational content. The fact that 
the content of the concepts refers to the mind, does not mean that they 
32 
require a qualitatively different format to contain that knowledge. The 
content is self-referential, but this does not in itself require 
supercognitive representations. 'Beliefs, desires, and intentions' are 
representations about representations, they do not have to be second 
order representations of representations. 
Pemer (1991) defines metarepresentation, as the ability to represent 
the 'representing' relationship. That is, not just to have a 
representation of an object, but to have a representation of the 
connection between the representation and the object. This is obviously 
quite an advanced form of knowledge, but here again, the 'meta' relates 
to content and it relates to a specific knowledge domain. 
The child will be aware of the contingent relationship between the 
personal mental state, and the external state of the world, but there is no 
need to posit an awareness that this is what she is doing. At this stage 
the child is using a new level of awareness within a domain, that does 
not mean that we need a different representational system to explain it. 
Knowledge about the mind will obviously be crucial to understanding 
and reasoning in many domains. In order to acquire knowledge about 
the mind, there must be access to internal mental states, and some basis 
for attributing these perceptions to a 'self'. Basically, the knowledge 
acquisition process for knowledge about mind requires access to the 
contents of mind, i.e. consciousness. However, in terms of creating 
representations, this process, it will be argued (in chapter 9) is one of 
observing and encoding in a comparable way (given this access), to the 
encoding of visual information (given eyes). The representational 
format of the 'theory of mind' itself, will not differ from theories about 
other domain kno,vledge. 
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4.3 Conclusion 
Acquiring awareness of the content of mind may be fundamental to the 
child's relationship to the social world. However, such a shift may be 
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an emergent property of a more general knowledge acquisition process. 
Nothing has been demonstrated which differentiates this knowledge 
domain from any other, either in terms of knowledge format or 
cognitive process. 'Theory of mind' research largely pursues the 
implications of the content, which is tangential to the aim of this 
chapter which is searching for difference in representational format 
and/ or cognitive process. 
5. The Socio-Cultural approach 
Vygotsky (1978) originally proposed a theory of the 'internalisation' of 
psychological processes. Vygotsky views 'self-regulation' as internalised 
'other regulation', the processes originally used to control the child's 
behaviour come to be used for self-control. Higher psychological 
processes and even consciousness, have their roots in social relations, 
or as Leont'ev (1981) developed the concept: in activity. The 
internalisation process is the method by which control and awareness 
are created by the individual. 
Underlying this argument IS Vygotsky's distinction bet\\'een 
elementary and higher cognitive functions. The elementary process are 
not under conscious control and respond to stimuli from the 
environment. Higher psychological processes are under voluntary 
control and are self-regulated. Vygotsky vie\ys development, as a shift 
from environmental regulation to voluntary regulation. 
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Elementary cognitive processes are automatic, or unmediated. For 
example, basic perception and memory will be directly stimulated by the 
environment. There is no way one can refuse to hear or see something 
or choose not to remember. In contrast, it is possible to refuse to think 
about something, refuse to solve a problem or refuse to plan. However, 
part of development is the bringing under voluntary control of parts of 
the elementary cognitive processes, for example, creating voluntary 
attention, and logical memory. 
The development of regulatory, and higher cognitive process is 
supplemented with conceptual development. New concepts will allow 
thoughts which could not have been possible before to be thought, and 
will bring old concepts into a different light. 
"The new higher concepts in turn transform the meaning of the lower. 
The adolescent who has mastered algebraic concepts has gained a 
vantage point from which he sees arithmetical concepts in a broader 
perspective" 
Vygotsky 1962 (p. 115) 
From an information processing perspective, this relates to top-down 
processing, in that additional knowledge will affect what is perceived 
and encoded. 
The development of cognitive flexibility seems to be domain specific 
in Vygotsky's account (although his theory contains domain general 
elements as well, e.g. the complex-concept shift). 
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"consciousness and control appear only at a late stage in the 
development of a function, after it has been used and practiced 
unconsciously and spontaneously. In order to subject a function to 
intellectual control, we must first possess it." 
Vygotsky 1962 (p. 90) 
The progression from the ability to carry out an activity to the ability to 
reflect on that activity, is a theme to be taken up with Karmiloff-Smith 
in the next section. 
Consciousness, for Vygotsky, develops in a comparable way to other 
domains. It is bringing into awareness the functioning of the mind. 
"... awareness of the activity of the mind - the consciousness of being 
conscious. " 
Vygotsky 1962 (p. 91) 
This progression allows for knowledge and functions to be used as tools. 
5.2 Developmental mechanisms 
Self-regulation emerges through the internalization of social processes. 
This occurs in the 'zone of proximal development', which is 
"the distance between the actual developmental level as determined by 
independent problem solving and the level of potential development as 
determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in 
collaboration with peers." 
Vygotsky 1978 (p. 86) 
In the zone of proximal development a more capable other acts as a 
vicarious form of consciousness, until the child can master her 0\\'11 
action through her own consciousness and control. Once conscious 
control has been achieved, the function or conceptual system can be 
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used as a tool. Prior to this, the more capable other performs the critical 
function of "scaffolding" the learning task which makes it possible for 
the child to internalise the external knowledge and to convert it into a 
tool for conscious control. 
Wertsch and his colleagues have carried out an experimental study, 
and various analyses of the shift from other-regulation to self-
regulation. Wertsch, McNamee, McClane and Budwig (1980) carried 
out an experiment with mother-child dyads solving a copying task. The 
task used in this study provided the basis for a series of analyses 
presented in Wertsch's subsequent papers (e.g. McClane and Wertsch 
1986, Wertsch and Hickman 1987). The copying task involved a truck 
puzzle with six square cargo pieces. The cargo pieces were of different 
colours, but were interchangeable as they were all the same size and 
shape. The task was to complete the puzzle with a particular 
arrangement of cargo pieces with reference to a completed copy of the 
puzzle (the model). The truck portion of the puzzle could be 
constructed without reference to the model. However, to successfully 
complete the cargo portion reference had to be made to the model, as 
the cargo pieces differed only in colour. The cargo-copying problem was 
compounded by the provision of additional redundant pieces consisting 
of duplicates of all the correct cargo pieces plus red and green cargo 
pieces (colours not used in the model). Mothers were instructed that 
the child should complete the puzzle, with the mother providing help 
whenever she felt the child needed it. 
Wertsch et al (1980) video-taped eighteen mother-child dyads split 
into three age groups: 2:6, 3:6, and 4:6 year-old children. Their 
interactions were transcribed, and the transcriptions supplemented "'ith 
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notes of the child's eye gazing, the mother and child's pointing gestures 
and the mother's and child's handling of the pieces. 
Wertsch et al (1980) found no overall difference in number gazes at 
the model (the strategic component) between age groups. Although 
when these were subdivided into "self-regulated" and "other regulated" 
gazes there were significant differences. The gazing behaviour of the 
2:6-year olds was significantly more "other-regulated" than the 
behaviour of either the 3:6- or the 4:6-year-olds. A further analysis of 
the behaviour following a gaze at the model, indicated that 2:6 year old 
required more 'other regulation' to achieve a successful piece 
placement. Three-and-a-half year-olds and 4:6 year olds were more 
likely to follow a gaze at the model with correct piece placement. These 
results indicate that only the older children appreciated the strategic 
significance of the gaze at the model and spontaneously followed it by 
the complete action sequence culminating in correct piece placement. 
They also indicated that the older children had extracted the correct 
information from the model. 
The results provide general evidence for a shift from 
interpsychological regulation to intrapsychological regulation 0 f 
strategic problem solving with age (Wertsch et al 1980; Wertsch and 
Hickman 1987). However, no account was given for mechanisms 
involved, to further the argument that there was a causal connection 
between mothers' behaviour and children's development. 'Vertsch 
looked for these mechanisms in the structure of the mother-child 
dialogues. In particular he has looked at "referential perspective" 
(Wertsch 1985). 
'Vertsch (1985) has analysed the interaction of t\\TO mother-child 
dyads, in detail, in terms of 'referential perspective'. This refers to the 
38 
type of linguistic expression used by mothers to successfully refer to an 
object. The presuppositions of the utterance then reflects the ability of 
the child. With the older child, the mother's interactions involved 
strategy dependent referring expressions indicating that the child 
understood the the strategic component of the task. For the younger 
child, the use of 'common referring expressions' indicated that the 
objects were being dealt with in isolation from the task. The difference 
in perspectives was interpreted as indicating that the model never 
existed as a model for the younger child. The dyad progressed on the 
basis of simple direct instructions made with no presupposition of the 
task strategy. In contrast the older child appeared to recognise the role 
of the model as he produced the correct behaviours following strategy-
related utterances. 
The examples indicate that adults can manipulate referential 
perspective to successfully regulate the behaviour of children. This has 
important implications for studies of the zone of proximal 
development as both children in this study successfully completed the 
task with adult assistance, but the level of assistance in each case was 
not comparable. 
Wertsch claims that referential perspective is probably one of the 
mechanisms involved in the transition from interpsychological to 
intrapsychological processes. The fact that the adult is able to involve 
the child in the task at a simple behavioural level, providing non-
strategic reference to the objects in the context of the task provides the 
child with the basis for understanding the strategic motivation 
(although it is not clear how this is achieved). If adults initially try 
strategy-based referential perspectives \vhich fail they s\vitch to the 
simple reference approach, but' Vertsch claims (no evidence provided) 
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they periodically return to try the strategy-based perspective again. This 
forms an implicit tutorial mechanism for the child's understanding of 
the strategy. Referential perspectives allow for a range of regulatory 
levels by adults, right up to referring expressions such as "the next one" 
which leaves the strategic behaviour totally in the hands of the child. 
Wertsch also notes that the change from using strategy independent to 
strategy dependent referring expressions occurs while the task is still 
being completed with interpsychological regulation. Changes between 
these levels gradually require changes in the child's understanding of 
the task and the amount of strategic reasoning the child has to engage 
in. 
While this referential perspective account is plausible and 
interesting it is not supported by more than anecdotal evidence from 
two episodes from two case studies. A more detailed within subjects 
analysis would provide statistical support for his conclusions. His claim 
about the periodic introduction of advanced referential perspectives 
into interactions with children who had previously failed with those 
perspectives was not supported by any evidence, although such 
evidence would add support to his argument. In particular it would be 
interesting to look at the ways in which such perspectives were 
introduced: for example, if a strategy dependent verbal reference 'vas 
associated with non-verbal deictics, such a pointing to the appropriate 
piece which might facilitate transition. 
5.3 Conclusion 
Vygotsky's approach to development emphasises the interactive nature 
of cognition, an approach which will be seen to be lacking in Karmiloff-
Smith's (e.g. 1986) account (see section 6). From a cognitive science 
perspective, there is little formality in the socio-cultural approach, in 
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particular the developmental mechanism 'internalisation' IS 
underspecified. It would currently be difficult to produce an A.I. system 
~ 
that was sufficiently 'interactive'. However, there are many insights to 
be gained from the approach, although interpreting the work from a 
cognitive science perspective will necessarily involve interpretation2. 
In chapter 7, this approach to development will be studied further, 
when Isaev's (1985) account of the development of planning is 
presented and evaluated. 
6. Representational Redescription 
6.1 Introduction 
In this section Karmiloff-Smith's theory of Representational 
redescription is discussed as the most detailed and formal account of the 
development of cognitive flexibility. There are similarities between 
Karmiloff-Smith's account and that of Vygotsky, in that awareness is 
seen to (effectively) develop within domains. Behaviour occurs first 
without awareness and flexibility in that domain follows initial 
successful performance. However, for Karmiloff-Smith this is an issue 
of representational change, rather than the creation of awareness. In 
some sense awareness is a function of content. 
6.2 Karmiloff-Smith's model of representational redescription. 
Representational Redescription (Karmiloff-Smith 1984; 1986; 1987; 1991; 
1992; 1994) explains the emergence of awareness through the 
redescription of knowledge. Awareness is attributed to certain 
representational formats and redescription between formats is achieved 
2 This is, of course, a second level of interpretation, in addition to the translation of the 
work from the original Russian te\..t. 
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by endogenous metaprocesses. Representational Redescription is not 
proposed as a complete model of cognitive development, it only 
explains development beyond successful performance. Karmiloff-
Smith's model begins with successful but un-reflective performance, 
and ends with flexible, reflective performance. (Note however that this 
limitation to 'post-success' development will be rejected in chapters 5 
and 9). 
It is rather an isolated theory, as no-one else is concerned to offer a 
detailed alternative for this specific area of development. However, the 
theory has been used by others, e.g. Boden's (1992; 1993) account of 
creativity. Karmiloff-Smith (1992) has also provided a wide range of 
examples from domains as different as language and physics. 
A distinctive feature of the theory is the level of formality with 
which it has been specified (Karmiloff-Smith 1986). Karmiloff-Smith is 
one of the few developmental psychologists who has attempted to 
specify her theory at the algorithmic level (Marr 1982). For this reason 
the theory forms the focus of this thesis. Karmiloff-Smith (1986) has 
prod uced a detailed account, which, it will be argued is flawed in 
various ways (see chapters, 3, 4, and 5), but it has the merit of being clear 
enough to be falsifiable. In this chapter the theory of Representational 
Redescription (RR theory) will be outlined. 
6.3 Beyond success 
Representational redescription is not proposed as a complete theory of 
cognitive development, it particularly explains development after the 
child has achieved behavioural success. However, Karmiloff-Smith 
(1986; 1992) believes it to have general applicability across all domains. 
The theory suggests that awareness, and the ability to use kno\\'ledge 
flexibly is associated \\'ith the level of description of that kno,yledge . 
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The child moves from being able to merely perform a task to awareness 
of, and access to that performance. Endogenous 3 metaprocesses 
redescribe the knowledge at one level into a more accessible format 
(Karmiloff-Smith 1986). This redescription is required for the 
knowledge to be used flexibly, allowing the children to 'operate on their 
own procedures' (Karmiloff-Smith 1990). 
The idea of representational change beyond successful performance 
is controversial. Most accounts of cognitive development end \,'ith 
successful performance rather than starting there. Clearly, skills 
develop and Improve with practice, but the representational 
redescription account claims that the identical overt (successful) 
behaviour can be produced from quite different underlying 
representations (Karmiloff-Smith 1986). The clearest behavioural 
support for this claim is the existence of u-shaped behavioural curves in 
development. V-shaped behaviours (Strauss 1982) are those behaviours 
which are performed correctly by a child, who subsequently performs 
them incorrectly before once again producing correct performance. 
These 'u-shaped' behavioural changes are seen by Karmiloff-Smith 
(amongst others) as the external manifestations of underlying 
representational change. 
Whilst the existence of spontaneously-occurring u-shaped 
behaviours may have provided the initial motivation for the model, 
they are not a necessary concomitant of the process. Representational 
redescription is presented as applying to 'post-success' cognitive 
development in general. In the majority of domains the first 
3 Karmiloff-Smith does not rule out the influence of social processes in development, 
but argues that it is the internal processes that are crucial to development beyond 
behavioural success. 
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representational reorganisation will not have a detrimental effect on 
performance, and there will be no evidence of a u-shaped behaviour. 
Karmiloff-Smith provides the most detailed account of her model in 
her 1986 paper, and supports it with evidence from linguistic repair 
data. In chapter 5 when the model is criticised, in theoretical terms, 
reference will be made to her language acquisition examples. However, 
for the time being I will concentrate on the model's applicability to non-
linguistic domains. 
Karmiloff-Smith's model of representational redescription has three 
phases. Interpreted in terms of U-shaped behaviours these correspond 
to the three behavioural phases i.e. phase 1 - initial success; phase 2 -
performance decrement; phase 3 - new success. Spontaneous V-shaped 
behaviours are rare, but they are useful for expository purposes. In 
most domains these three hypothesized phases of representational 
redescription would not be accompanied by obvious behavioural 
changes. 
Karmiloff-Smith's model is a phase, as opposed to a stage model. 
Stage models, such as Piaget's, are global descriptions of the child's 
ability and are age related. The particular stage a child is at is 
characterised as globally affecting all her activities. Karmiloff-Smith's 
phases relate locally to specific tasks. The phases are always passed 
through in a strict order for all tasks, but at any particular age a child 
will be at different phases on different tasks. Underlying these three 
behavioural phases are four levels of representation. The first level is 
the original representation associated with successful performance, and 
the other three levels reflect repeated redescriptions of the original 
(Karmiloff-Smith 1986). 
Karmiloff-Smith emphasises the distinction between behavioural 
change and representational change in cognitive development. Other 
accounts of development (e.g. Marshall and Morton 1978) have taken 
behavioural success as evidence of underlying competence (in the 
Chomskian sense) and do not account for a child's development beyond 
the achievement of successful performance. Karmiloff-Smith (1984, 
1986, 1987, 1992, 1994) provides many examples of children developing 
beyond successful performance, particularly in their linguistic 
behaviour. Children who successfully used words such as "went" later 
produce the incorrect forms "go-ed" and "went-ed" before they once 
again produce the correct word. She argues that competent 
performance does not necessarily indicate an adequate underlying 
representation and that, in general, representational development 
continues beyond the initial appearance of successful behaviour. 
However, the only evidence for the idea of representational 
development beyond behavioural success (in the form required by the 
model) is provided by examples of u-shaped behaviours. The claim that 
this 3-phase process is general to all of cognition seems to be an, as yet, 
unsupported hypothesis. However, Karmiloff-Smith (1992) has related 
her model to a broad range of domains, and claims generality. 
An example Karmiloff-Smith (1984, 1992) uses to illustrate the 
model is her block balancing task4. This task produces a u-shaped curve 
in performance in 4- to 9-year-old children. In this task the children 
were provided with a number of blocks which they were asked to 
balance on a metal bar. The blocks were of three types, illustrated in 
figure 1. Type A blocks were symmetrically weighted and balanced in 
~ The account of the block balancing task provided in the 1984 paper is a concise version 
of the findings of lnhelder & Karmiloff-Smith 1974. 
their centre. Type B blocks w ere obviously weighted at one end and 
therefore balanced off centre. Type C blocks were inconspicuously 
weighted with lead implants, so that they looked like type A blocks, but 
actually balanced off centre. 
r 
LV 
o 
Type A block 
r o 
Type B blocks 
LV 
r ::::::::i:::i:::::::::::::8 LV 
Type C Block 
Figure 1. Examples of blocks used in the block balancing task. 
Karmiloff-Smith (1984) reports that the youngest children could 
successfully balance all the blocks, whilst slightly older children failed 
on all but the type A blocks. The oldest children could again balance all 
the blocks. 
According to the model, the behaviour in the first successful phase 
reflects data-driven processes. During this phase the child trea ts each 
block as an isolated problem and successfully balances the blocks 
46 
through a process of positive and negative proprioceptive feedbacks, 
moving the blocks backwards and forwards along the bar until balance 
is achieved. The underlying knowledge is represented as isolated, 
compiled, procedures. Karmiloff-Smith is not concerned to account for 
the process by which the knowledge associated with initial success is 
acquired, she just claims that once acquired it is represented in terms of 
compiled procedures. 
The second phase reflects the involvement of metaprocesses, a 
purely 'top-down' operation. Children's behaviour in this phase is 
dominated by a 'theory' that things balance in the middle and phase 2 
children are only able to balance type A blocks. They only try to balance 
blocks at their geometric centres and those blocks that do not balance are 
discarded as 'impossible' to balance. Children in phase 2 do not use the 
proprioceptive feedback that had proved successful in phase 1, as they 
are dominated by their 'theory'. If asked to balance the blocks with their 
eyes shut children revert to proprioceptive methods, indicating that the 
performance decrement is not due to a loss of the ability to use feedback 
mechanisms. In terms of the underlying representation, unconscious 
'metaprocedural operators' have been used to redescribe the original 
isolated procedures. This operation produces additional organisation-
oriented procedures which reflect the common components present 
across procedures. These new procedures may be over-general. Where 
over-generalisations occur a decrement in performance can be seen and 
the child's behaviour exhibits a u-shaped growth curve. This 
behavioural evidence of redescription will not be available for the 
majority of tasks, where the redescribed procedures continue to produce 
correct performance in phase 2. 
S Proprioceptive feedback involves the use of information directly gained from the 
movement and orientation of the body. 
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At the third phase children again manage to balance all the blocks. 
Initially they try the geometric centre, but then use proprioceptive 
feedback if this approach does not succeed. Phase 3 may produce similar 
(or even the same) outward performance as phase 1, but the underlying 
representations are different. The rigidity of the initial redescription 
into generalised procedures (at phase 2) is lost as these procedures are 
modified by external data to cope with exceptional cases in a flexible 
way. The child's behaviour in this phase is neither dominated by top-
down control mechanisms nor environmental stimuli. There is a 
dynamic interaction between them. At this phase the procedures have 
been redescribed to allow for conscious access, although maintaining 
the original code in which the skill was acquired. Procedures may be 
further redescribed from this original code into an abstract code or 
"mentalese". This uniform code enables generalisations to be made 
across codes and allows easy translation into a linguistic code facilitating 
verbal report. This fourth level of representation will not always occur, 
and there is no spontaneous behavioural evidence associated with this 
redescription. 
The motivation for representational redescription beyond successful 
performance cannot be negative feedback as the behaviour is already 
correct. Although negative feedback may account for development 
prior to success, Karmiloff-Smith argues, further development must be 
endogenously motivated. The initial redescription is driven by the goal 
of 
"control over the organization of internal representations" 
Karmiloff-Smith 1986 (p. 105) 
The internal stability of the successful phase 1 procedures allo\\'s the 
child to become sensitive to competing and / or inconsis ten t 
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representations (this process does not imply consciousness). Later 
redescription is also motivated by the stability of the successful 
representations, but this time at the metaprocedural level (Karmiloff-
Smith 1986). 
6.4 Conclusion 
Karmiloff-Smith considers her account to be a general model of 
cognitive development following successful performance rather than as 
a specific explanation of tasks which give rise to u-shaped behaviour 
patterns. Although, as we mentioned earlier, the only evidence 
supporting the specific 3-phase-form of the model is provided by the 
existence of u-shaped behaviours. U-shaped behaviours themselves are 
controversial: Klahr (1982), amongst others, has argued that they are 
mere artefacts of the measurement techniques and therefore 
unin teres ting. 
To side-step this debate on the status of u-shaped behaviours6 and to 
support the claim of generality for her model, Karmiloff-Smith's needs 
to find supporting behavioural evidence in a task where it would not 
spontaneously occur. Karmiloff-Smith (1990) has extended her analysis 
to children's drawings which form just such a domain. In the next 
chapter we will describe this study and then describe our 0 \V n 
experiments which call aspects of her model into question. 
Representational redescription provides an interesting approach to 
cognitive development, and it will be argued that it is a more general 
developmental application than Karmiloff-Smith envisages. 
(1 Karmiloff-Smith has not to our knowledge entered the debate on U-shaped behaviours. 
She is at pains to stress that her model accounts for more than this limited set of 
behaviours (personal communication, appendi:\. 1). Howe\Oer, she should perhaps 
address these issues if they are the motivation for proposing the 3-phases of her model. 
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7. Summary 
In this chapter we have introduced the idea of 'cognitive flexibility' 
which is generally the ability to apply higher cognitive functions, such a 
planning, to a specific knowledge domain. The chapter began by 
rejecting the concept of 'metacognition' as a useful avenue to pursue 
'cognitive flexibility'. The definition of what develops is still somewhat 
vague, but the chapter described two accounts of proposed 
developmental mechanisms, the how. Vygotsky's account of the 
internalisation of social process will be pursued in chapter 7, in relation 
to Isaev's account of the development of planning. Karmiloff-Smith's 
Representational Redescription theory will form the focus of the thesis, 
as it is a testable 'Cognitive Science' model. 
The RR theory will be explored in more depth in the next 3 chapters. 
In chapter 3 an experimental study in the drawing domain will question 
the initial representational format assumed by the RR model, namely 
that successful performances are represented as compiled procedures. 
Then in chapter 4 the block balancing task (outlined in this chapter) will 
be looked at in depth (also described below) and a replication attempt 
reported. The block balancing task is claimed to illustrate all the 
hypothesized stages of the RR theory (Karmiloff-Smith 1984), and 
should provide a sound basis for any reformulation of the RR theory. 
In chapter 5 the RR model will be evaluated from a theoretical 
standpoint in terms of its internal consistency and completeness as a 
formal system. 
Throughout the thesis, and particularly in chapter 9, it will be argued 
that representational redescription is a more general developmental 
mechanism than Karmiloff-Smith has suggested, although it has to be 
significantly reformulated to achieve this generality. 
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Chapter 3 
Representational Redescription and the lack of evidence from 
children's drawings 
Chapter Abstract 
Karmiloff-Smith (1986) has provided a detailed model of 
Representational Redescription, which explains the development of 
cognitive flexibility. In a recent paper she has supported one feature of 
the model: that the initial representations, are compiled procedures, 
with evidence from a drawing task. She asked children to draw a 
'strange man' and argued that young children could not produce any 
modifications to their man drawings which required them to 'operate 
on their procedures'. This chapter replicates the difference in 
modification types between age-groups, but demonstrates that this is not 
due to a procedural representation. The representation is far more 
flexible. The explanation for the difference in modification-types is 
suggested to be explained either by the development of planning or the 
development of creativity. 
1. Introduction 
In the last chapter Karmiloff-Smith's theory of Representational 
Redescription (RR) ,vas presented and it ,,'as sho,,,rn to provide the most 
formal account of the development of cognitive flexibility. This chapter 
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will look in detail at some of the data she has used to support one aspect 
of the model, that is, the initial representational format. Karmiloff-
Smith's most recent experimental work concerns children's dra\ving 
(Karmiloff-Smith 1990) and in this chapter that data is examined and 
some studies presented which fail to support her analysis. 
2. Evidence from children's drawing 
Karmiloff-Smith's (1990) study of children's drawing addresses only one 
part of her model, specifically, the issue of representational format. The 
study sought to show that the representations associated with initial 
successful performance, i.e. phase 1, were isolated, compiled, 
procedures. The task involved asking children to draw a man and then 
"a man that does not exist" (also a house / "house that does not exist" 
and an animal/"animal that does not exist"). The rationale was that the 
ability to draw "a man that does not exist" requires children to operate 
on their representations to make some kind of alterations to their usual 
drawing of a man. In terms of the Representational Redescription 
model, this kind of flexibility does not emerge before the initial 
procedural representation has been redescribed twice, i.e. in phase 3 
In keeping with her model Karmiloff-Smith (1990) took 
'behavioural mastery' as the starting point and looked at children 
between the ages of four and ten. By the age of four to five children can 
normally draw a simple house and man. She hypothesized that these 
early competent drawings are represented as "compiled and 
automatised" procedures (Karmiloff-Smith 1990, p. 63) that can be run 
easily and consistently by the young child. The child has no access to 
the constituents of the procedure and the procedure can only be run in 
its entirety (consistent ,\Tith the notion that it is compiled). 
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At this level of representation children supposedly expenence 
difficulty with the task of drawing "a man that does not exist", due to 
the fact that "they are forced into operating in some "Tay on their 
internal representations" (Karmiloff-Smith 1990, p. 61). Almost all the 
children she tested were able to complete the task, but the 4-6 year old 
children fulfilled the task requirements in a significantly different ,,'ay 
to the 8-10 year olds. The younger children were only able to modify 
their drawings by altering the shape of elements, the overall shape of 
the outline, or by omitting elements. Karmiloff-Smith argued that at 
the first level of procedural success children can only execute a complete 
drawing procedure (composed of a number of elements) and then stop. 
Where omissions were made Karmiloff-Smith "asserted with some 
assurance" (Karmiloff-Smith 1990, p. 66) that these must have been 
made at the end of the sequence, i.e. the procedure had just been 
prematurely terminated, omitting the final element. However, this 
claim was only made on the basis of the finished drawings and a few 
unsystematically collected notes. In contrast, the eight to ten year olds 
produced all these types of modifications and, in addition, were able to 
produce variations that involved interrupting their procedures, such as 
deleting elements in mid-sequence, moving or transposing elements 
and adding additional elements (either from the same category, e.g. 
adding extra arms or legs to a man, or cross-category, e.g. adding wings 
to a house). 
In a subsidiary experiment Karmiloff-Smith countered the possible 
claim that this age difference could have been caused simply by a lack of 
inventiveness on the part of the younger children. She asked eight 5-
year olds to dralY "a man "\Tith h\TO heads" and "a house "'ith "Tings". 
Seven of these children \vere apparently unable to dra,,, "a man ,vith 
hvo heads", and ,,\Tere only able to copy an example slo,,'ly and 
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laboriously. This tortuous success was only achieved, Karmiloff-Smith 
claims, by creating a completely new procedure 1. Children \vere 
successful in drawing "a house with wings" as this could be achieved by 
adding wings to a completed house procedure, \yhile the man \\'ith t\\TO 
heads supposedly involved interrupting the drawing procedure after 
the production of the first head to repeat the head drawing phase. 
3. Drawings are not compiled procedures. 
By using the computational metaphor of "compiled procedures" (1990, 
p. 62) Karmiloff-Smith is making very strong and specific claims. A 
procedure is a sequentially fixed series of operations. A compiled 
procedure is a procedure that has been re-coded (for speed of execution) 
in such a way that there is no access to the constituent parts of the 
original procedure. The compiled procedure forms a new unanalysable 
whole (in a lower level code) which can only run in its entirety. The 
constituents of the original procedure do not exist as units within the 
new compiled procedure. 
The modifications that Karmiloff-Smith found in the 4-6 year old 
children's drawings are not consistent with the analogy of a compiled 
procedure. These children were able to change the shape of elements 
which implies that the elements were accessible at some level, to be 
modified. This would not be the case with a compiled procedure. 
Similarly, deletion of an element, even if it is only the last element in 
the sequence, presupposes the existence of identifiable elements. The 
un-insightful interruption of a compiled procedure \",ould not 
necessarily leave the picture cleanly missing one complete element. 
l it is not clear from the model what this 'creating a completely new procedure' means, 
but we will return to this point in chapter 3. 
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The procedure could as easily be terminated halfway through dra\ving a 
leg, for instance, although this kind of modification \vas not reported. 
It is not essential to Karmiloff-Smith's model that the procedures are 
compiled, so this issue will be dropped in favour of testing the \\Teaker 
claim that drawings are (un-compiled) procedures. This leaves the 
predictions of strict ordering in the production of elements, and the 
non-interruptable nature of the execution of the procedure. 
4. Experiment 1: Are drawings procedures? 
It is possible to test the hypothesis that 4-6 year old children execute 
procedures when they draw stereo-typed objects. If the hypothesis is to 
be supported the children must consistently produce all the 
components of all their drawings of a particular object in a strict order. 
For example, if a child draws a man in the sequence: head, face, hair, 
body, legs, arms, then for every man drawing that this child executes, 
these elements must be produced in that same order. If children do not 
produce exactly the same set of elements in each drawing the procedural 
account could be taken to apply only to the 'core' aspects of the drawing. 
In this case any non-essential modifications, such as hats, must be made 
independently of the execution of the main procedure. That is, after (or 
before) all the core elements have been produced in their strict 
sequence. Children should be unable to add new constituents or non-
core elements in the middle of their procedures. 
Karmiloff-Smith (1990) did not record the order of production of 
elements within the children's drawings, or routinely note \\Thether 
omissions were made at the end of the sequence. These predictions can 
be checked \vith a simple replication of her experimental task of 
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"drawing a man"/"drawing a man that does not exist" and consistently 
noting the order of production of elements. 
A further prediction of the procedural account is that the execution 
of a procedure should be un-interruptable. Karmiloff-Smith supported 
this aspect of the procedural account with the claim that young children 
did not produce any modifications of their drawings which involved 
interrupting their procedures. She argued that all the modifications 
they made could have been made at the end of a drawing. However, 
the "drawing a man that does not exist" task is complex and involves 
more than just the interruption of a drawing procedure. The un-
interruptable nature of drawing procedures could be demonstrated 
more clearly with much simpler interruptions. 
If, as Karmiloff-Smith claims, 4-6 year old children cannot interrupt 
their procedures then any disruption to the execution of their drawing 
should force the child to start again. A simple interruption was created 
in my experiment by knocking a jar of pens onto the floor and asking 
the child to help retrieve them. If young children have absolutely no 
access to their 'procedures' then this interruption should force them to 
restart their drawings. 
For children to insert elements into their drawings they have both to 
suspend their 'procedure' and to insert something new. It is possible 
that children might be able to re-start a procedure in the middle before 
they could alter it to insert an additional element. That is, they might 
succeed with the simple interruption task before they could succeed 
with Karmiloff-Smith's more complex task. 
The concept of a "man that does not exist" ,,'ould involve more, 
cognitively, than conceptually simpler modifications. If the procedural 
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account is to be supported, asking children to make a conceptually 
congruent modification should prove just as difficult as the "man that 
does not exist" task. However, the actual change would not have to be 
invented by the children. This distinction was tested by asking the 
children to draw "a man with a beard", a conceptually congruent 
modification which is outside their normal stereo-type. If 4-6 year old 
children do not have the ability to modify their procedures they should 
only be able to succeed on the 'beard' task by adding a beard to a 
completed man. 
To summarise, the following experiment involves a replication of 
Karmiloff-Smith's 'draw a man' / 'draw a man that does not exist task' 
with two additional conditions: draw a man (interrupted) and draw a 
man with a beard. This allows the order of production of elements to be 
analysed across four examples of a drawing of a man. If the drawings 
are produced by executing procedures, then all the elements common to 
all the pictures should be drawn together, in precisely the same order. 
Further predictions would be that a simple interruption should disrupt 
young children's performance and that, in their drawings of bearded 
men, the beard should always be drawn last. 
4.1 Subjects 
Twenty-eight children from Bozeat Primary school (Northamptonshire) 
and Olney First school (Buckinghamshire) were tested. Their ages 
ranged from 4 years 8 months to 9 years 4 months. There were 16 
children in the younger 4-6 year-old group (mean age: 5:8), and 12 in the 
older 7-9 year old age group (mean age: 7:11). 
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4.2 Procedure 
The children were tested individually in a private room. They \\Tere 
initially presented with an A4 sheet of paper and asked to select a pen 
from a plastic jar containing twelve pens. 
The children were given three drawing tasks containing the four 
experimental conditions. In the first task children were asked to dra"w a 
picture of two men. They were allowed to dravv one man \\'ithout 
distraction (simple) and were interrupted in the middle of executing the 
other drawing (interrupt). This interruption involved being asked to 
help pick up the jar and pens that the experimenter had 'accidently' 
knocked onto the floor. This invariably involved them leaving their 
seat and crawling on the floor. The interruption was not specifically 
timed but occurred when the experimenter judged that a child was in 
the middle of her drawing. The task was not sub-divided into two tasks 
of drawing a single man to avoid asking children to repeat a task that 
had already been completed satisfactorily. In the second task children 
were asked to draw a man with a beard. In the third task the children 
were asked to draw a "man that does not exist". Several different 
phrasings were used to enable children to understand what was 
required: "a strange man","a man with something funny / odd about 
him", "a make-believe man"; "a man you invent"; "a pretend man"; "a 
man we have never seen before". Subjects were asked to describe their 
man when it was completed to ensure that all their modifications were 
identified. 
The order of presentation of these three tasks "was randomised and 
within the "draw two men" task the order of 'simple' and 'interrupt' 
conditions was also randomised. 
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The order of production of elements \\Tas noted \\Thilst the child "Tas 
drawing and their performance was video-taped. The notes "Tere cross-
checked with the video-tapes to ensure accuracy. 
4.3 Results and Discussion 
None of the children showed any difficulty in recommencing their 
drawings following a simple interruption, they immediately picked up 
where they had left off, without hesitation. Two children were not 
interrupted because they did not draw the two men in strict sequence. 
One girl (5:1) drew the head and face of the first man, then drew the 
head and face of the second man before returning to complete the first 
man and then completing the second man, effectively interrupting her 
own 'procedure'! Similarly, a boy (5:7) was not interrupted after he 
began by drawing the two heads. 
None of the children had any problems drawing a man with a beard. 
All but two of the children drew the beard in conjunction with their 
drawing of the face (that is, either immediately before, immediately 
after or in the middle of drawing other facial features). The two 
children who did not draw the beard along with the face did leave the 
beard until the end, but these were not the youngest subjects as 
Karmiloff-Smith would have predicted. One of them (5:11) paused for 
an extended period while drawing the face, asked "Shall I do a mouth?" 
and then decided to postpone the problem. The other (9:2) finished his 
drawing, turned to look at the experimenter, then, with a cry of "oh!", 
appeared to remember that the man should have had a beard. 
Drawing a 'man that does not exist' did prove more problematic. 
Many of the younger children had difficulty understanding "That \vas 
required of them. A number of subjects asked questions such as "\\'ha t 
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do you mean?" and "what has to be strange about him?" Only one 
subject (5:10) refused even to try the task, but three children (5:4, 5:10, 
6:0) failed to modify their drawing in any way, and then refused to 
comment on their drawings. These cases will be discussed further in 
section 9. Children also seemed to latch on to specific words or phrases 
in the instructions and a number of subjects drew "funny" 
modifications such as funny faces and funny hats. 
Karmiloff-Smith's categorisation of the modifications children made 
to their drawings was based on the analysis of the finished dra,'Vings. 
The changes children made in the present study were not always 
obvious from the finished product. Nine subjects did not modify their 
drawings in ways that would have been obvious from just viewing the 
final drawing. For example, figures 2 and 3 show drawings of "men 
which do not exist" which, without the child's explanation, could be 
mistaken for 'normal' men. All the drawings of 'a man that does not 
exist' were grouped using Karmiloff-Smith's categories, where possible. 
For example, Ian's drawing in figure 3 above was categorised as having 
changed the shaped of the mouth. The categories were: deletion of 
elements; changing shape of elements; changing shape of whole; 
changing position or orientation of elements; adding new elements 
from the same or cross-category. No drawings fell into the 'changed 
shape of the whole'2 category, and there was only one cross-category 
addition so the two categories of adding new elements were merged. 
The results are shown graphically in figure 4. 
2 This difference between the data and Karmiloff-Smith's original study mily have been 
due to the restriction of the present study to the 'draw a man' task. It is not clear how 
'changed shape of whole' applies to a man, it may be more applicable to the house 
drawing version. 
60 
simple man that does not exist: 
"Jason Donovan" 
Figure 2. Idiosyncratic dr(:nving of a "!non that doesn't exist". D<lni el 5 vrs 11 mths. 
simple man that does not exist: 
"Its sunny outside and he's not smiling" 
Figure 3 ldiosy ncr<ltlc dr<l wing of il "man thilt doesn't exi st". [iln 7 yrs 7 mths. 
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Analysis of the results in terms of the modification-types made b 
the two age groups clearly replicates Karmiloff-Smith 's (1990) results. 
Changing the shape and size of elements, was found right across the 
range of subjects (n = 11). However, all except one child (7:7) made their 
modifications 'mid-procedure'. Deletion of elements was also found 
across the age range (n = 7), but with all of these omissions being made 
mid-procedure (subjects usually indicated to the experimenter w hen 
something was being omitted, e.g. by looking at the experimenter and 
giggling). Only the older subjects inserted extra elements (n = 3), and 
only one child (9:1) introduced a 'cross-category' element (pig's trotters 
for arms). Only one child (8:3) changed the position of elements by 
transposing the nose and mouth. 
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Figure 4. Types of modifications made to drawings 
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In the critical 4-6 year-old age group twelve of the six teen children 
(75%) made modifications to their dra,,,,"ing of a man in the "man that 
does not exist" condition. All but one of these made their modification 
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in the middle of their 'procedure'. This supports the results from the 
'beard' condition, showing that young children are able to interrupt 
their 'procedures'. All the 4-6 year-old children produced at least one 
modification (either the beard or their 'strange' modification) 'mid-
proced ure'. 
The children did not produce an identical set of elements in every 
drawing, so the order of production of elements was analysed for just 
the core components. Core components were defined for each child as 
those elements which were produced in all four draWings. So, for 
example, if feet were only produced in three of the drawings they were 
not taken to be core components. However, if buttons were added to all 
drawings these were seen as 'core' see figure 5 for an example. The 
definition of 'core' has been criticised because it includes elements like 
buttons, which are not conceptually 'core' (Karmiloff-Smith, personal 
communication - in appendix 1). This definition was adopted because 
there was no suggestion that the contents of the 'procedure' should be 
the same across individuals. This formula was believed to allow for 
individual differences in production across age groups, by accepting 
what was apparently 'core' to that individual. 
The order of production of 'core' components, ignoring non-core 
components, was then compared across drawings. Although 21 of the 
28 children consistently started by drawing the same component 
(usually the head) in each of their drawings, only three subjects went on 
to draw all the common components in the same order in each dra\\'ing 
and only one of these was in the 4-6 year old age group. Typically, a 
child would add the feet as the last element in their first dra\\'ing and 
then produce them in conjunction with dra\\'ing the legs in all 
subsequent productions. Again, these results do not support a 
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Seth 4 years 8 months. 
beard strange 
head head 
face face ("funny mouth") 
beard body 
body stripes on body 
legs legs 
buttons 
Christopher 5 years 0 months. 
simole interruoted 
. . 
head head 
face face 
body body 
legs arms 
arms legs 
interruDted 
i 
head 
body 
legs 
face 
buttons 
beard 
head 
face 
beard 
body 
legs 
arms 
• 
-
• 
• 
• 
• 
simDle 
i 
head 
face 
body 
le os 0 
buttons 
strange 
head 
face (no mou th Y 
body 
legs 
arms 
figure 5 Example of the analysis of drawings into core components for produc 'on 
order comparison 'Core' components in italics . 
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To summarise, there was no evidence to support Karmiloff-Smith's 
hypothesis that young children are executing a simple procedure "Then 
they are drawing a man. The evidence from the finished products 
replicates Karmiloff-Smith's results, but by looking more deeply at the 
production processes it can be seen that the procedural explanation 
cannot be supported. 
5. Experiment 2 - 'Behavioural success' in drawing 
A possible criticism of the previous study would be that the subjects 
tested in this experiment were more advanced than those studied by 
Karmiloff-Smith (although they were the same chronological age). 
That is, they could already have progressed beyond phase 1 procedural 
representations. So, in this study experiment 1 was extended to a group 
of younger children. This highlights a different problem with 
Karmiloff-Smith's account: defining what constitutes 'behavioural 
success' in drawing. This is a problematic issue in many other tasks as 
well, and will be discussed further in chapters 4 and 5. 
Karmiloff-Smith's theory crucially explains representational 
development beyond 'behavioural success'. However, it is not obvious 
what constitutes 'success' in the drawing domain, unlike the block-
balancing task where a child either could or could not balance a block. 
Karmiloff-Smith (1990) does not define 'success' or 'behavioural 
mastery' beyond the "capacity to draw familiar objects \vith 
automaticity" (p.60). If 'successful' drawing of a man is taken to be a 
recognisable likeness of a specific individual, then 'success' is achieved 
by only a minority of adults. If 'success' is taken to be the point at ,,"hich 
others (adults) spontaneously recognise that the marks on the paper 
represent a man, then this is achieved by children younger than those 
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studied by KarmiloH-Smith. The definition of 'success' does not 
include any characteristics of the finished drawing. In the previous 
studies two of the children did not include arms on any of their 
drawings, one did not draw a body for any of her men and none of the 
4-6 year olds consistently drew a neck. However, they all produced 
drawings on request and thus perhaps fulfilled the 'automaticity' 
criterion. 
Three year olds commonly produce identifiable 'tadpole' people. 
Most children do produce tadpoles, although the stage may last only 
days or a matter of months (Cox and Parkin 1986). Tadpoles may simply 
comprise of a head with two stick legs, however the intention to depict 
a person is clear. In terms of communication, they are 'successful'. 
Initially, the tadpole formalism may not be produced consistently 'on 
demand', and thus may fail to fulfil Karmiloff-Smith's 'automaticity' 
criterion. However, Karmiloff-Smith does not make any attempt to 
define a criterion for 'automaticity', and it is possible that the initial 
'success' in figure-drawing, represented by unanalysable procedures, 
occurs earlier in development. 
There are reasons to hypothesize that 'automaticity' might occur at 
this earlier stage. Previous research has indicated that there may be an 
atypical rigidity in representation at the tadpole stage. There is also 
some evidence of a 'u-shaped' performance on related tasks suggesting 
that the tadpole stage might be associated with the representational 
change that KarmiloH-Smith is looking for. Cox and Parkin (1986) have 
argued that tadpole drawers are resistant to attempts to improve their 
drawings, and Taylor and Bacharach (1982) have shown ho\v the 
tadpole representation dominates the child's perception of schematic 
figures. 
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Figure 6. Examples of 't<1d pole' people (Lucy, <1ged 3:2) 
Cox and Parkin (1986) tried to in1prove the productions of pre-
representational dra'wers (2:0 - 4:11) by decreasing the task dem.ands. 
They identified five (age-related) categories of children based on their 
free dra\vings: those \I\'ho produced (a) scribbles; (b) distinct £or111s; (c) 
tadpoles; (d) transitional figures; and (e) conventional figure s. They 
tried to get children to in1prove on their free-drai\-ing category " 'ith 
three tasks designed to rem.ove proble111s of recall. The tasks ,,-ere: (a) to 
copy a conventionally drawn figure (fig ure 7); (b) to assenlble a jigsa " 
of simple pieces (figure 7) ; and (c) to dra,,' fr0111 a dicta tion of bodily 
parts , 
0'1 
Figure 7. Pre-dr(lwn figure for copy ing tl1 sk, lind jigSll W pieces for jigSll\\' tll sk ((0 \ 
(Ina P(Jrkin 1986) 
Cox and Parkin (1986) did find that \\'h ereas 1110 t of th e children 
in1proved on at least one of these tasks, only 33 :'7.. of the tad p 1 nd 
transitional dra\vers improved on any of the task, They concluded tha t 
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whatever the representation is underlying the production of tadpoles, it 
seems to be a stable and resistant form. 
"It seems likely that as children develop a system of formulas and rules 
for representing information in drawings, other cogniti ve processes 
might be affected, as suggested in theories proposed by Arnheim (1974) 
and Harris (1963)." 
Taylor and Bacharach 1981 (p. 373). 
Meili-Dworetski (cited in Taylor and Bacharach 1981) found that 
children who could not yet produce representational drawings could 
name more body parts than children who drew tadpoles. 
Taylor and Bacharach (1981) argued that the child's metaknowledge 
for drawing humans interferes with their ability to name body parts, 
such that they named only the parts they represented in their drawings. 
They presented children with three drawings characterising three levels 
of children's figure drawing: (i) a tadpole; (ii) a figure with a small body, 
and arms extending from the head; (iii) a figure with the sam e 
proportions as figure (ii) but with the arms correctly located. 
Figure 8 Drawings presented for preference decision (Taylor and Bacharach 19 1) 
Children ,,,,ere first asked to select the figure that looked mo t like a real 
man and then they were asked to draw a picture of a man, u ing the 
most accurate representation as a model. They cIa ifi d childr n' 
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productions into three categories: (i) abstract (scribbles); (ii) tadpoles (no 
body); and (iii) complete (with body). They found that the selection of a 
figure was significantly associated with the child's type of dra"Ting 
production. On closer examination it was shown that the selection 
behaviour of abstract and complete drawers was comparable (the 
majority selecting the most complete figure) while the largest 
proportion of tadpole drawers selected tadpoles as the best example. 
To test the hypothesis that children younger than those previously 
tested, may operate with procedural representations, experiment 1 \\'as 
repeated with younger subjects. 
5.1 Subjects 
Eight children aged between 3 years 6 months and 4 year 11 months 
(mean = 4 years 4 months) were tested. They all attended a creche on 
the Open University campus (Buckinghamshire). 
5.2 Procedure 
As experiment 1. 
5.3 Results and Discussion 
The youngest three children did not produce recognisable men on each 
of the trials, so could not be said to have achieved the necessary 
consistent behavioural success. For the older children the results \\'ere 
similar to those of experiment 1. Only one of the children exhibited the 
same production order for the common elements in all of her drawings, 
and this child produced the beard in the middle of this sequence. All 
the children inserted either the beard or their 'strange' element mid-
procedure. There is again no evidence of a procedural representation. 
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There was also evidence of spontaneous metacomments made bv 
-
these children who seemed to be very self critical, and sure of "That they 
were and were not capable. For example, "I can't draw men, only 
women", this being prompted by an inability to draw short hair. "I can't 
draw one of those on top of that" on having drawn a line (body?), 
referring to problem of situating a circle (head?) on the top of it. There 
was also a level of ongoing criticism of their production: "That looks 
like his head" on having drawn a rather rounded body. Far from 
executing an unanalysable procedure children were critically evaluating 
every stage. 
6. Experiment 3 The effect of imagination 
Karmiloff-Smith's account of children's behaviour on the drawing task 
cannot be explained in terms of the representational component of her 
model. Another explanation must be found for the highly significant 
difference between age groups in the types of modification children 
made to their drawings. As was mentioned earlier, Karmiloff-Smith 
has argued that this result was not due to a lack of imagination. She 
claimed that 5 year old children were unable to draw a man with two 
heads because this involved interrupting a procedure. In theory, the 
children who succeeded on the "house with wings" task by adding 
wings to a completed house could just as easily have added a second 
head to a completed man, but clearly they did not do this. 
Karmiloff-Smith's explanation is not satisfactory, but the replication 
of the difference between age groups leaves an unanswered question. 
Are young children incapable of producing certain types of modification 
to their stereotyped drawings? To answer this question children "'ere 
asked explicitly to draw men with each of the modification-typl'~ 
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Karmiloff-Smith had identified in spontaneous productions. To make 
the instructions absolutely clear the first eight children 'were briefh' 
shown an example drawing. It was stressed that they did not have to 
produce the modification shown in the example, but that they were free 
to make up their own variant. As this visual example seemed 
superfluous, a further seven subjects were not shown the visual 
example although the same example was presented verbally. 
6.1 Subjects 
Fifteen 4 to 6 year old children (not involved in the previous studies) 
were tested individually in a private room. The first eight attended 
Bozeat Primary school (Northamptonshire) and the other seven 
attended Olney First school (Buckinghamshire). Their ages ranged from 
4 years 10 months to 6 years 2 months (mean age: 5:8). 
6.2 Procedure 
Subjects were asked to make a series of six drawings starting with the 
simple drawing of a man to provide a baseline for comparison, and to 
allow them to relax and succeed at a task. Children were then asked to 
draw a series of 'strange' men with very specific modifications. After 
each instruction the first eight children were shown an example 
drawing, which was removed before they started their dra\\'ing. . \ 
further seven children were given the example only verbally. All the 
children were told that they could think of their own variant or 
reproduce the example as they wished. The categories and examples, in 
order of presentation, were: 
(i) a man \vith some part of his body the \vrong shape (e.g. a 111an 
\'vith a square head); 
(ii) a man \vith too many of something (e.g. a Ulan \vith hyo hedd~); 
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(iii) a man with something missing (e.g. a man \\'ith no arms); 
(iv) a man with some part of his body in the wrong place (e.g. a man 
with legs coming out of his arms); 
(v) a man with some part replaced with part of an animal (e.g. a 
man with wings instead of arms). 
Subjects were encouraged to describe what they were doing ",hile they 
were performing the task or to describe their "strange man" after they 
had completed it. 
The order of production of elements was noted whilst the child 'vas 
drawing and their performance was video-taped. The notes ,,,ere cross-
checked with the video-tapes to ensure accuracy. 
6.3 Results and discussion 
The children in this experiment were clearly happier 'with these tasks 
than the children presented with the less specific "draw a man that does 
not exist" task. The younger ones particularly found the requests highly 
amusing, indicating that they had not previously thought of making 
such modifications themselves. The youngest four children (4:10 - 5:3) 
did exhibit some lack of imagination in that they simply reproduced the 
examples given. Older children produced their own manipulations and 
tended to make multiple alterations to their drawings rather than being 
satisfied with the minimum, e.g. adding an extra head, h\'o extra arms 
and an extra leg. Drawing sequence was again analysed and it 'Y d S 
found that all the children made some of their modifications mid-
procedure. 
Only one child, ~Iichelle (5:1) failed on any of the tasks. ,\~ the '\'orst 
case her performance will be described in detail. Her dra"'ings are 
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reproduced in figure 9 overleaf. Michelle was easily able to perform the 
first two manipulations, changing the shape of an element - she dre,,' a 
man with a square head and triangular arms; and omitting an element _ 
she drew a man with a missing arm and missing buttons. This is 
consistent with Karmiloff-Smith's predictions for her age group. She 
had problems with the man with two heads task, and the finished result 
shows, as Karmiloff-Smith would have predicted, that attempting to 
produce a man with two heads resulted in a drawing of t,,'o men. 
Michelle showed a tendency to copy the example given, in this case a 
man with two heads, but the task requirements were simply to dra\v a 
man with too many of something. Although she may have failed in an 
attempt to draw a man with two heads, she actually succeeded on the 
task by adding an extra set of arms to both men. When asked to describe 
her finished drawing she made no mention of the two heads, nor did 
she think that she had drawn a single man: 
E: 'That's lovely. Can you tell me about it? 
Michelle: "He's, they've only got two arms and no legs" 
The order of production of the elements in this drawing was. A head 
and a body, then second head followed by a second body. The face was 
then completed on the second body and four arms were added to it. She 
then returned to the first body drew the face and then four arms on it. 
This does not fit with Karmiloff-Smith's idea that having completed a 
normal man, a child draws a second head and then, having started a 
procedure is compelled to complete a second man. \ lichelle's dra\\'i ng<..; 
were executed in parallel which indicates that she was not just running 
a procedure. The problems she had "'ith her production may have been 
due to a lack of plaIUling. The body element needed to be enlarged to 
allow for the attachment of an extra head, and ha\'ing dra\\'n the l''\ tra 
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head Michelle was faced with a problem of attachment to the pre-
drawn, but inappropriate body. This problem is aggravated by the fact 
that her standard 'successful' drawings of men did not include the 
drawing of necks - the simple solution to the attachment problem. 
However, these potential explanations are speculative - her production 
was fluent, providing no behavioural evidence of pauses in production, 
and as her drawing was video-taped over her shoulder there is no data 
from facial expressions. 
Michelle completely failed on the relocation task. Here her 
production order was: head; body; legs; arms; face; hair; displaced legs. 
Her post-drawing comments indicated that she realised her problem, 
but again, it could be argued, that this was due to a lack of planning: 
when she came to draw the misplaced legs she found that she had 
already drawn some in the correct location. 
E: "Can you tell me about that man?" 
Michelle: "He's got some legs, but he's lost some." 
Michelle's final drawing, which on the procedural account should have 
been of comparable complexity to the two problematic dra"'ings, ,,'as 
executed perfectly. The order of production was: head; face; body; wings; 
legs; hair; buttons. It is important to note that the ,,'ings ,,'ere not the 
last element added, and that they replaced the arms rather than being 
added to a completed man which would include arms. 
Two children had to restart one each of their dra\\'ings, although 
they were successful on the first attempt "'ith all their other drawings. 
Andrew (4:10) had to restart his dra"'ing of a man \\'ith "'ings after his 
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(a) simple (b) shape change (c) deletion 
(d) insertion (same category) (e) re-Iocation (f) insertion (cross category) 
Figure 9 Problems in drawing men which do not e:\ist, \Iichelle :; ~l'ars 1 month. 
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first attempt began with wings which completely filled the page. On his 
second attempt he began with the head and dre\\T the \\'ings last. :\ eil 
(5:3), who normally began his drawings with the legs, had a problem 
drawing the example of a man with legs extending from his arm. He 
began by drawing the legs in the usual place, and when he came to dra,',' 
the legs from the arm he realised that he had already dra\\Tn them "I 
done the legs there!" On his second successful attempt he started \\'ith 
the body and drew the legs last. These problems could again be 
explained in terms of a lack of planning. 
7. Experiment 4 - The effect of copying 3 
Karmiloff-Smith has further claimed that 5-year-old children had 
difficulty even copying a drawing of a man with two heads. They 
succeeded only slowly and laboriously by, on her account, creating a 
new procedure rather than operating on an existing one. Copying in 
general is a slow and laborious task. This experiment sought to test the 
claim that copying a man with two heads would be more difficult 
(slower) than copying a comparable drawing which did not involve 
interrupting the normal drawing routine. In this case, a man with a hat 
and a bow tie - which on Karmiloff-Smith's account could be added to a 
finished drawing of a man. These extra elements controlled for the 
additional length of line involved in copying an extra head, making the 
two copying tasks comparable. The simple dra"'ing of a man ,,'a~ 
included for comparison although it ,,'as anticipated that this ,yould be 
completed faster than either of the copying task~. 
3 I would like to thank Prof. M. Boden for drawing my attention to the need to account 
for this aspect of Karmiloff-Smith's results. 
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7.1 Subjects 
Ten children from Olney First school (Buckinghamshire), not used in 
previous studies, were tested individually. Their ages ranged from :;:3 
to 5:10, mean age: 5:6. 
7.2 Procedure 
All the children were first asked to draw a picture of a man. Half the 
children were then given the picture of a man with h\'o heads and 
asked to copy it followed by the picture of a man "\r\Tith a hat and bo"\\' tie. 
The others were presented with these tasks in reverse order. This 
procedure was videotaped and time taken to complete each dra\\'ing 
was extracted from the video-tapes. 
7.3 Results and Discussion 
simple hat & tie two heads 
65.5 98.9 99.7 
Figure 10. Mean time (in seconds) for simple drawing and copying tasks 
An analysis of variance indicated a significant effect of task type: F(2,18) = 
5.953, P < 0.01. A Scheffe F-test showed that there \vas no significant 
difference between the two copying tasks, but that both copying tasks 
took significantly longer than the simple man dra\ying task. These 
figures illustrate that copying is a long laborious process relati Vl' to 
I d . b t that this process is not different for t<lsks "'hich do norma rawlng, u 
and do not involve "operating on procedures". Children will spend dS 
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much time getting details such as the number of buttons right, as In 
noticing how the second head attaches. 
8. Conclusions from the drawing task 
Karmiloff-Smith (1986; 1990) provides a detailed model of 
representational redescription which was outlined in chapter 2 and will 
be analysed further in chapters 4 and 5. The model involves a basic 
underlying representation in terms of computational procedures and a 
mechanism for repeatedly redescribing these basic procedures first into 
more general and then into more accessible representations. The 
motivation for these redescriptions is stable successful performance. By 
employing the computational metaphor, Karmiloff-Smith has made 
very specific and testable claims, some of which, it has been shown in 
this chapter, cannot be supported. 
In her drawing task Karmiloff-Smith sought evidence of the rigidity 
of a basic procedural representation in children's performance. It has 
been argued in this chapter that this type of rigid behaviour is not 
evident in children's drawing. Children do not produce the elements 
of a drawing of a man in strict sequence and they are easily able to make 
modifications to their productions in the middle of executing the 
drawing. Dra,,yings are not produced by executing procedures or a 
fortiori compiled procedures. It has further been shuwn that Karmiloff-
Smith's finding that younger children did not spontaneously produce 
certain type of modifications to their dra"\\Tings, could be explained 
simply in terms of children's difficulties in understanding the 
requirements of the "draw a man that does not exist" task together "\\'ith 
a lack of inventiveness. By giving explicit instructions it "\\'as found that 
young children were able to make all the types of modifications to their 
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drawings which, on Karmiloff-Smith's account, should have been 
possible only for older children with 'redescribed representations'. 
Considering the normal development of drawing skill, children In us t 
be able to make some modifications in the middle of their 'procedures'. 
For example, drawing a neck is a late development which could never 
be tacked on at the end of a pre-existing procedure. 
The development of drawing skill seems to involve constant 
monitoring and adaptation of the production process, and it seems 
essential that the child should have access to that process. The children 
in our studies were not instructed to give protocols, but a few 
spontaneous comments were made (particularly by the youngest 
children) indicating that verbalisable 'metaprocesses' were involved. 
These comments indicated both advance planning e.g., "I'll have to 
draw the head bigger" (Leigh 5:7, anticipating problems with fitting in a 
beard), and on-going monitoring such as "that looks like his head" 
(Neil, 5:3, on having drawn a rather rounded body). These comments, 
often made during the execution of a drawing, are not consistent with 
Karmiloff-Smith's idea that 4-6 year old children do not have verbal 
access to, or awareness of the production process. On the contrary, there 
were indications that children were using language to control and 
monitor their productions (consistent with a Vygotskian account -
Vygotsky 1978). 
The drawing data addresses the issue of the representational format 
associated with Karmiloff-Smith's model, rather than the notion of 
representational redescription per se. It could be argued that dra,ving 
skills are not represented as procedures, but in some other format 
consistent with the representational redescription model. Ho\\'ever, 
many of the characteristics of computational procedures are essential to 
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Karmiloff-Smith's model of the redescription process. Any candidate 
representation would need to be inaccessible - othendse there would be 
no need for a redescription process, and it would need to produce 
consistent performance over repeated executions - otherwise there 
would be no motivation for the redescription process. Neither of these 
characteristics were found to be consistent with the observations of 
children's performance: a flexible, accessible production process \vas 
found. This argument is developed in chapter 5. 
The problem of defining 'success' in the drawing domain was 
outlined (in section 6) and this concept is, at best, under specified in the 
model. Children's drawing abilities obviously do continue developing 
beyond the achievement of an initial recognisable depiction. The lack 
of any recognisable point of 'behavioural success' means that it is 
impossible to apply the 'representational redescription' model, as it 
stands, to development in this domain. Indeed, from the child's 
perspective there may be a series of 'successes' on the way towards their 
final depiction formula. For example, when they manage to draw a 
clothed person, when they manage to draw hands with five fingers etc. 
This point, again, is elaborated in chapter 5. 
The hypothesized mechanism for stimulating the redescription 
process, the concept of 'stable success' is another fundamental problem 
for the model. The 4-6 year old children at the focus of Karmiloff-
Smith's account are still developing their drawing skills and their 
progress would seem to involve a continual series of minor 
modifications to successive productions rather than a stage of 'stable 
success'. Many of these changes are based on observations of more 
capable peers, for example ''I'm going to do hands like Julie does". It 
may be that external factors have a more central role to play 111 
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representational development 'beyond behavioural success' than 
Karmiloff-Smith's account allows. The role of the environment and 
the concept of 'stable success' will be discussed further in chapter 5. 
Karmiloff-Smith has outlined a detailed model of Representational 
Redescription, which allows specific claims to be tested. Unfortunately, 
the domain of children's drawings does not provide the required 
support for the model. Karmiloff-Smith (1992, and personal 
communication, appendix 1) has accepted the points made in this 
chapter (Spensley 1990) and with hindsight believes that children's 
drawings is a particularly problematic domain. This is due to the 
external trace which drawings leave during production. This effectively 
cues the children as to where to restart4. However, she does not wish to 
drop the idea of sequential constraints in initial representations prior to 
representational redescription. 
In chapter 5 the RR model is examined in detail in terms of its 
internal consistency. The concern, in this chapter, with the lack of 
behavioural evidence for the initial representational format, will be 
supplemented with an analysis of its theoretical plausibility as a part of 
the overall model. More experimental data will be examined in chapter 
4, where the classic 'block balancing task' is re-examined. The drawing 
data will be reconsidered in chapter 9 when an alternative to the 
representational redescription account is proposed. 
9. Towards a new a model of Representational Redescription 
Whilst rejecting the conclusion of Karmiloff-Smith's drawing studies, 
the difference in spontaneous changes to dra\vings ,,"ith age \\Tas 
4 Thanks also to Dr. S. Draper for making this point in a personal communication. 
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replicated. The conclusion that the younger children were 'less 
inventive' than the older children does not explain the processes 
behind the differing levels of inventiveness. Being inventive clearly 
involves cognitive flexibility, and thus the difference requires 
explanation. There are two possible explanations which will be 
proposed at this stage. The first is that the difference relates to 
processing capacity and secondly that children lack the ability to plan 
their drawings. 
9.1 Creativity and capacity limitations 
The age-related sequence in types of transformations on drawings was 
replicated in this experiment. Younger children spontaneously changed 
the size or shape of a drawing partS or deleted parts of their drawing, but 
only the older children were able insert parts either from the same or 
different categories, or to change the orientation of constituent parts. 
There was nothing preventing the younger children from executing the 
alterations when they were specified for the children, i.e. the creative 
part had been removed, but then they would follow the instructions, 
but they did not appear able to generate their own variant. 
The types of spontaneous creativity shown by younger children 
relate to individual parts of the drawing, and alterations to those parts. 
These changes could be made at a local level, with the specific part being 
the focus of attention either for change or for deletion. In contrast, the 
changes made by the older children involved an overview of the 
complete drawing (or at least more than one element of the dra"'ing). 
Inserting an element from the same category requires reorganising the 
S The category of 'size or shape of the whole' was previously queried. In this conte,t, it 
will again be subsumed under 'size and shape of part', although this category ma~' 
involve more than one part. 
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normal pattern of relating between, for example, body and legs to insert 
an extra pair of legs. Changing the relationship between parts of the 
drawing requires attending to the relationship between those parts and 
holding both locations in mind at the same time. The last developing 
category, that of cross-category insertion requires relating the complete 
relationship between the part of the man drawing and comparing it 
with the relationship between the parts of a pig drawing, for example, 
and then generating the transfer of one element e.g. trotters, from its 
position in the pig drawing to the same relative position in the man 
drawing i.e. legs. It thus involves comparing relationships. 
The differences here indicate that more information needs to be held 
in central processing for the creative process to operate. In the earliest 
modifications, only a single element of the drawing needs to be 
manipulated. In the most advanced modifications, the whole man 
drawing plus a representation from another category must be 
manipulated together. A possible explanation for these differences, will 
be elaborated in chapter 8. 
9.2 Drawing and planning 
Making modifications to stereotyped drawings may be more amenable 
to an explanation based on planning. The children tested did have a 
few problems in executing certain modifications, and it is possible that 
these problems involved failures to plan. It is possible that Karmiloff-
Smith was providing children with a planning problem rather than a 
drawing task per se. As all the children were able to dra,v a simple man 
the ability to 'operate on a drawing procedure' could be dependent on 
the development of an independent ability to plan Alternatively, the 
lack of an ability to plan ,vi thin the dra"ring task could reflect 
inadequately redescribed knowledge, consistent in general terms with 
Karmiloff-Smith's account. 
There are few references to planning in the literature on children's 
drawing and nothing which is more than descriptive. However, there 
is some evidence that young children, of the ages studied by Karmiloff-
Smith, do spontaneously plan while executing their drawings. Thomas 
and Tsalmi (1988) have argued that children typically draw a person's 
head disproportionately large because they are planning for the 
inclusion of facial details, rather than because they have an anomalous 
conception of the human figure. Henderson and Thomas (1990) have 
supported this contention in a study of 4 to 7 year olds. They found that 
the relative proportions of the head and trunk were varied when 
children were asked to make different types of modifications to their 
drawings. Henderson and Thomas (1990) asked their subjects to draw a 
man and then asked them to draw either a man with teeth, a man 
wearing a jacket with buttons and pockets, a man viewed from the back 
(no face) or the twin brother of the first man. The twin brother 
condition produced similar head-trunk proportions in both drawings, 
the jacket condition produced significantly larger bodies, and the rear-
view condition resulted in significantly smaller heads. The teeth 
condition did not produce a significant increase in head size, but 
Henderson and Thomas argued that as the head was already drawn 
over-large it may have reached a ceiling. 
This study provides evidence that children do plan when executing 
drawings once they are capable of 'behavioural success'. It does not 
throw any light on the issue of how planning develops, or "'hen it is 
applied to drawing tasks. It is generally accepted that children's early 
drawings are not planned - initially they name their dra"'ings after 
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execution, rather than before. However, there are no studies on the 
transition from unplanned to pre-formulated drawings. This study 
provided anecdotal evidence that children have explicit knowledge of 
their own drawing abilities, and are able to anticipate what their efforts 
will produce. For example, a 4 year old girl who stated that she could 
not draw men, only girls because she could not draw short hair. This is 
evidence of anticipation of the likely outcome of the activity, but not 
actually of planning the activity. 
Drawing is a difficult domain in which to study planning, because 
there will be problems in drawing execution due to a lack of drawing 
skill which will interact with planning problems, particularly for the 
younger subjects. A comment, such as "I've drawn his head too small" 
could indicate either a lack of planning or a problem with the motor 
execution. The problem of isolating production difficulties from 
problems of inadequate planning means that drawing does not provide 
an ideal domain for studying planning development in young children. 
The topic of planning development will be discussed further in chapter 
6 and 7. 
10. Summary 
In chapter 1, it was argued that Karmiloff-Smith's (e.g. 1986, 1992) model 
of Representational Redescription provided the most promising 
approach to understanding cognitive flexibility. In this chapter one 
specific detail of the model was tested, the claim that initial successful 
representations are compiled procedures. In the dra\ving domain, at 
least, this aspect of the model was not supported as the children's 
productions were shown to be far more flexible, and accessible than 
predicted by the RR model. Two additional problems \vi th the R R 
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theory were also discovered, namely the concepts of behavioural 
success, and of stability as the stimulus to redescription. These will both 
be discussed further in chapter 5. Karmiloff-Smith's (1990) observation 
of a difference in modification type with age was replicated, and 
planning and creativity development were suggested as potential 
explanation. These will be pursued in chapters 7 and 9 respectively. In 
the next chapter, consideration is given to the broader RR model, and a 
different knowledge domain, with a replication of Karmiloff-Smith's 
(1984) block balancing task. 
Chapter 4 
Representational Redescription: evidence from a block 
balancing task 
Chapter Abstract 
The data from children's drawing presented in chapter 3 has cast doubt 
on the representational detail of Karmiloff-Smith's (1986) model. In 
this chapter a partial replication of Karmiloff-Smith's (1984) block 
balancing task is reported, which should produce evidence of all three 
phases of the RR theory. The theory predicts different block balancing 
behaviours in each of the three phases, and an additional quantitative 
prediction in terms of 'time to balance' the blocks was made. There was 
evidence of a rigidity in performance with some 'phase 2' subjects, but 
overall there was a broader range of performances than predicted by 
Karmiloff-Smith (1984). The times taken to balance the blocks showed 
that subjects of all ages had a preference for central placement, The RR 
model Case studies indicated that success, even in this clearly defined 
domain ,vas not an unitary state. 
1. Introduction 
his chapter will report an analysis and partial replication of 
Karmiloff-Smith's enduring block balancing task (Karmiloff-Smith and 
Inhelder 1974, Karmiloff-Smith 1984; 1986; 1987; 1992). Karmiloff-Smith 
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and Inhelder's (1974) block balancing experiment provides the earliest 
data which Karmiloff-Smith has related to her RR theory. The original 
paper pre-dates the RR theory, but Karmiloff-Smith has referred back to 
this paper frequently to illustrate her RR model (e.g. Karmiloff-Smith 
1984; 1986; 1987; 1992). The example was also quoted earlier in chapter 2 
when describing the RR theory. 
1.1 Karmiloff-Smith's Block Balancing Task 
Block balancing should provide a clear illustration of the RR theory, 
because the distinction between failure and 'behavioural success' is 
absolute: a block either balances or it doesn't. In addition, it is claimed 
to produce a spontaneous 'u-shaped' behavioural curve which provides 
behavioural evidence of the proposed underlying representational 
change. The block balancing task is quite unlike the drawing task 
(discussed in chapter 3) in both of these respects. 
Karmiloff-Smith (1984) provides a clear-cut description of her block 
balancing task which is a slight simplification of the task described in 
the original paper (Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder 1974). It was this 
simplified version of the task which was quoted in chapter 2. 
Karmiloff-Smith (1984) has also simplified the developmental 
progression outlined in Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder (1974). She 
describes the children's behaviour as fitting clearly into the three 
distinct levels of the RR theory, which is (presumably) a re-analysis of 
the original observations which were durably recorded in written and 
audio-taped form. However, there are no quantitative data from the re-
analysis ,vhich would allo,v an evaluation of the ne,rV interpretation to 
be made. The original paper ,vas written in a discursive 'Genevan' 
style, and so did not contain any quantitative data either, it ,\'as an 
interpretation of detailed observations. "\Thilst such an approach may 
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provide useful insights, the only way to evaluate such accounts is to 
replicate the findings and a partial replication of the study will be 
reported in this chapter. Karmiloff-Smith's 1984 'redescription' of the 
1974 experiment extracts the elements of the study 1Nhich clearly fit the 
RR theory. As the focus here is on the RR theory, the replication design 
will focus on this later account. However the experimental details have 
been taken from the 1974 paper (in so far as they were provided). 
u 
Type A - evenly weighted 
g Type B - conspicuous weighting 
u 
2ZZZJ Type C - hidden weighting 
~----------~U~~ 
Figure 11. Examples of blocks with their points of balance. 
Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder's (1974) original study involved 4:6- to 
9:5- year-old children who were presented with a selection of wooden 
blocks to balance across a narrow metal bar (1 cm wide) fixed to a block 
of wood. There were three main types of block with several variants 
within each type. The three categories of block were: Type A blocks 
which had their weight evenly distributed so that their centre of gravity 
corresponded with their geometric centre; Type B blocks which were 
conspicuously-weighted at one end; and Type C blocks which were 
inconspicuously-weighted at one end with a metal implant (see figure 
11). The extent of the weighting, and thus the point of balance, varied 
between exemplars for both categories of 'weighted block. Children were 
presented ,d th the complete selection of blocks and could select them in 
"Thichever order they "Tished. The order in ,tVhich blocks ,,'ere selected 
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was noted, as were the types of blocks which the children ,r\Tere able to 
balance successfully. 
Karmiloff-Smith (1984, describing Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder 
1974) found three levels of 'successful' balancing performance. The 
youngest subjects studied (phase 1) were entirely successful. They 
simply moved each block backwards and forwards across the bar, until 
through proprioceptive feedback processes, they achieved a balanced 
position for the block. Each block was treated as an isolated problem, 
and the blocks were selected randomly. In terms of the RR theory, they 
had an inaccessible balancing procedure. 
Phase 2 children were only able to balance the type-A blocks. That is, 
those blocks whose centre of balance corresponded with their geometric 
centre. They did not engage in the adaptive manipulations of the 
younger children, they repeatedly placed each block with its geometric 
centre on the bar. When the type Band C blocks repeatedly failed to 
balance, they labelled them as "impossible to balance". Even if the 
experimenter placed and left an identical block in balance on the bar, 
they still attempted to balance their block in the centre. 
Karmiloff-Smith (1984) argues that this consistent approach to the 
problem was due to the phase 2 children using a 'single unified 
procedure' for balancing. There was no problem with the children's 
proprioceptive feedback processes, as they reverted to using them if they 
'"ere asked to carry out the task with their eyes closed (they then 
succeeded on the task). 
At phase 3 the children began by placing the blocks on the bar at their 
geometric centres, but quickly adapted the balancing position (using 
proprioceptive feedback) ,\'hen the bar fell. Their success differed from 
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phase 1 subjects in that they began by trying the geometric centre of each 
block (indicating a geometric centre 'theory in action'). They also 
displayed a unified approach to the whole experimental task, rather 
than treating each block in isolation. Having successfully balanced a 
block of a particular type, they then selected a similar block and used the 
information gained from their previous success to assess the point of 
balance of the new block. They did not try the geometric centre first for 
the subsequent blocks. 
1.2 Siegler's block balancing task 
Karmiloff-Smith is not the only person to study the development of 
balancing skill, nor the only one to discover aU-shaped performance in 
balancing. Siegler (e.g. Richards and Siegler 1982) has used a balance 
scale task, which is, of course, a different problem than that studied by 
Karmiloff-Smith. In many ways it is an easier task, as the relevant 
variables are more obvious than the hidden weights used in the 
Karmiloff-Smith variant. Siegler's problem involved the prediction of 
the behaviour of a balance scale where the number of weights and the 
distance from the fulcrum could both be varied. His explanation of the 
u-shaped behaviour was in terms of the interaction of the specific 
problems with the underlying rules. Only certain problems with 
conflicts of weight and distance would produce a u-shaped behavioural 
curve. He demonstrated how a constant development in terms of rules 
could therefore produce a u-shaped behavioural curve in performance 
(on a particular problem set). 
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Rule I 
Same number of 
weights on each side? 
Resoonse: Resoonse: {!Teater 
balance weight will go down. 
Rule II Same number of 
weights on each side? 
Same distance 
on each side? 
Resoonse: Resoonse: {!Teater 
Resoonse: e-reater 
weight will go down 
balance distance will go down 
Rule III Same number of 
weights on each side? 
Same distance 
on each side? 
Resoonse: Resoonse: e:reater 
Same distance 
on each side? 
balance distance will go down 
Resoonse: e:reater 
weight will go down 
Resoonse: 
guess 
Rule IV Same number of 
weights on each side? 
Same distance 
on each side? 
yes no 
. /" .............. 
Resoonse: ResDonse: e:reater 
balance distance will go down 
Same distance 
on each side? 
yes no 
./" ............ 
Resoonse: {!Teater Resoonse: e:reater 
weight will go down torque will go down 
Figure 12. Increasing balance rule sets, from Richards and Siegler (1982) 
The balance scale problems used by Siegler are of a type encountered by 
children in their school \\Tork. They \vould therefore be more familiar 
v'lith the task than Karmiloff-Smith's subjects. Siegler also required a 
verbal prediction, basically a forced choice of three clearly defined 
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responses (tip left, tip right, balance). The response required from the 
Karmiloff-Smith task is far more open ended, the subjects are required 
to achieve a state of balance, by ill-defined means. There is no scope for 
guessing! 
The problems in the two experiments are different, ho,vever, success 
will requires a similar amount of knowledge: how to compensate for 
weight and distance differences. However, the relevant factors weight 
and distance are highlighted in Siegler's experiment in the equipment. 
Karmiloff-Smith's task requires children to identify the relevant 
dimensions. Siegler's rule acquisition approach provides a useful, 
formal, account of similar behaviour, with which to compare 
performance on Karmiloff-Smith's task. Block balancing could be 
explained as gradual rule development, isolating the relevant factors, 
initially weight and then distance (in Siegler's task), and then 
understanding how these factors interact to affect balancing. 
1.3 Experimental hypotheses 
The present experiment is concerned with analysing the RR model. 
Karmiloff-Smith's (1984) description of three phases quoted above, 
provide a clear hypothesis in terms of phase-related success at the 
balancing task. Phase 1 children should balance all the blocks, phase 2 
children (around 6 years old) dominated by an overwhelming top-do,\'n 
theory, should fail to balance any but the type A (evenly-weighted) 
blocks. If persuaded to persist they should spend a long time failing to 
balance all of the oth~ blocks. Phase 3 children should, like phase 1 
children, balance all the blocks. The relative time taken to balance the 
different blocks should vary between phase 1 and phase 3 children 
(absolute times will clearly differ according to manual dexterity). Phase 
3 children ,\rho start in the centre, should balance type A. blocks more 
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quickly than the other blocks, and the time taken to balance should be 
proportional to the distance from the centre of the point of balance. 
Phase 1 children, on the other hand should take equal amounts of time 
to balance all of the blocks as, according to the theory, they should just 
place the block at a random point and then use proprioceptive feedback 
to achieve a balance. 
A pilot study of 8-year-old children, were presented with the 
complete selection of 12 blocks, as 'block selection' was to be a 
dependent variable. However, these children (who were expected to 
select blocks systematically) simply chose the block nearest to them on 
the table. This may have been due to the layout of the blocks, the 
limited space in the experimental room or the fact that the children 
were seated at a table. However, a lack of information on the layout 
used by Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder (1974) meant that this feature of 
the original experimental design was not pursued with younger 
subjects. 
The experiment reported here was flawed by changes in the 
procedure between age groups (as the experiment progressed). The 
quantitative data must, therefore, be treated with caution. However, 
enough useful data and qualitative observations were collected to 
justify reporting the work. Identified weakness in design and procedure 
will be reported in footnotes1. The primary aim was to replicate 
Karmiloff-Smith's findings as the basis for pursuing the RR model and 
to collect some quantitative data to test the model. The secondary aim 
was to analyse the performance of subjects to check the accuracy of the 
1984 re-interpretation of the original 1974 observational data. 
1 The first weakness being that the experiment should have been re-run! 
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2. Method 
2.1 Subjects 
30 children were tested, covering the age range 4:3 to 8:3. The youngest 
five subjects were tested at Bozeat2 Community playgroup (mean age = 
4:5, hereafter referred to as '4-year olds'), the others were drawn from 
the first four classes at Bozeat primary school. Class 1 (n = 8, mean age = 
5:2); class 2 (n = 8, mean age = 6:2); class 3 (n = 5, mean age = 7:1; class 4 
(n = 4, mean age = 8:1). Hereafter referred to as 5-, 6-, 7- and 8-year-olds, 
respectively. Subjects were tested individually in a private room. 
2.2 Materials 
Three sets of hollow cardboard blocks were used: large and small blocks 
both with a rectangular cross section, and triangular with an equilateral 
triangle cross-section. The proportions of the blocks were as fo11o,<\1s: 
small - 17.2 ems x 2.8 cm x 3.5 cm; large - 29 cms x 3.7 cm x 4.2 cm; 
triangular - 20.8 ems x 3.6 em equilateral triangle cross-section. For each 
shape of block there were four weighting-types: evenly-\\reighted, 
conspicuously-weighted, and two types of inconspicuously-weighted 
blocks slightly-weighted and very-weighted3• 
As a measure of how 'off-centre' the blocks centre of balance ,,'as, an 
index was calculated for each block as follows: 
distance of balance point from centre x 100 
length of block x 0.5 
2 Bozeat is village in Northamptonshire, with a mixed population var\'ing from manual 
workers to professionals in an area of low un employment. 
J The weightings were largely random within these categories. It would have been 
better to have been systematic in the degree off-centre of the centre of balance. 
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This expresses the point of balance as a percentage of the distance 
between the centre and the end of the block. These measurements are 
summarise in table 1. 
evenly slightly conspicuously very 
weighted weighted weighted weighted 
small 0% 22% 42% 49(';) 
large 0% 18% 27% 41% 
triangular 0% 12% 33<;;) 47 (,' I I' 
average 0% 170:;) 34% 46(';, 
Table 1. Relative point of balance for each block type. 
The blocks were balanced on a wooden bar 0.8 em wide (1.9 cm wide for 
4 year-old subjects)4 and 30 cm long, on a wooden base. 
2.3 Procedure 
All children were pre-tested by asking them to balance an evenly-
weighted block (208 x 27 x 18 mms) across the bar, to check manual 
dexterity. The pre-test block had a different appearance from the 
experimental blocks. 4-year-old subjects who were not able to pass this 
pre-test were then given the broader bar. All then succeeded. Two 5-
year-old subjects were dropped from the experiment after failing the 
pre-test, due to a complete lack of interest and perseverance \\'ith the 
task. 
4 Ideally this should have been 1 cm wide for all groups, as in Karmiloff-Smith' & 
Inhelder's study. 
Five-, 6- and 7-year old subjects ,,~ere presented \\'ith the set of four 
small blocks, to balance in any order they vvished. They ,,'ere only 
presented with one set of blocks, due to the time taken by some children 
to achieve a balance (or to give up). Children 'were free to balance the 
blocks in any orderS, and to change blocks ,-vhenever they \vished. All 
the children were encouraged to persevere "'ith balancing the 
problematic blocks. If they were losing patience children ,,'ere 
encouraged to try a different block and the experimenter demonstrated 
that the problematic block could be balanced. A.s each block "~as 
successfully balanced it was removed by the experimenter to a 
'completed' group, still visible to subjects. Unsuccessfully balanced 
blocks were returned to the subject's block pool for a subsequent 
balancing attempt. The session ended with the successful balancing of 
all the blocks, or with the subject 'giving up'. 
The 4-year old and 8-year-old subjects were tested after the 5- to 7-
year olds, and they received a more formal presentation6, to allow for 
more accurate timings. These children ,-vere presented ,,~ith each of the 
twelve blocks individually and asked to balance them across the bar. 
Subjects were allowed 4 minutes to balance each block, after ,-vhich the 
trial was terminated. The time limit was imposed to encourage subjects 
to persevere when they encountered initial difficulties "rhilst ensuring 
that subjects who could not achieve a balance did not become bored 
\\'ith the task before all the trials ,,'ere completed. After each trial the 
block ,,'as removed from sight. Blocks from each set \\'ere presented in 
sequence in a counterbalanced order (e.g. all the small blocks, then all 
the triangular blocks, then all the large blocks). The order of 
5 This introduced an order effect, in that children tended to avoid the conspicuously 
weighted block, and it was tried last b~' 11 of the 19 children. Onlv 2 of the children 
selected it first. 
b \ V ith hindsight, this design should have been used for all subjects. 
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presentation within these sets (e.g. conspicuously-\\Teighted, very-
weighted, evenly-weighted, slightly-weighted) \\Tas also 
counterbalanced. 
All subjects were video-taped and the time taken to balance each 
block extracted from the tape after the experimental session. Timings 
were recorded to the nearest second 7 and they were measured from the 
point at which a subject's hand first touched a block until her hand left 
the block either on achieving a balance, or when replacing the block on 
the table. Where more than one attempt was made with a specific block 
the times for each attempt were totalled8. 
3. Results 
Due to the different experimental procedures, data on all twelve blocks 
are available for the 4-year-old and 8-year-old subjects, and data for the 
small block set only are available for the 4-, 5-, 6-, and 7 -year olds. One 
5-year old child, having passed the pre-test, failed to balance any of the 
experimental blocks. This was due to a lack perseverance with the task, 
and his session will not be included in any of the analyses. 
7 Timings to any smaller units would provide a spurious impression of accuracy. 
However, differences were large enough for units of a second to discriminate easily 
between conditions. 
8 The timings are only a rough indication of problem difficulty, due to this summation 
process. However, the differences in times between. blocks were large enough ~o be 
worth reporting. The timings for the playgroup subjects and the 8-year old subjects are 
more precise as they relate to a single balancing attempt. 
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evenly slightly conspicuously very 
weighted weighted weighted weighted 
4 year olds 100% 100% 60(:(, 20~ 
5 year olds 83% 33% 17% 0% 
6 year olds 100% 100% 75~ 630;, 
7 year olds 100% 100% 80% 80er;, 
8 year olds 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Table 2. Percentage of children balancing blocks successfully: small blocks. 
evenly slightly conspicuously very 
weighted weighted weighted weighted 
4 year olds 93% 80% 60% 27% 
8 year olds 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Table 3. Percentage of children balancing blocks successfully: all 12 blocks. 
The general pattern of results, in terms of balancing success, indicates a 
drop in performance at the 5-year old level, consistent with Karmiloff-
Smith and Inhelder's (1974) observations (see table 2). None of the 5-
year-olds could balance the very-weighted block, and only 33% could 
even balance the slightly-weighted bar. This result is slightly 
confounded with the use of the wider bar by younger subjects \vhich 
might have led to improved performance, particularly on the slightly-
weighted block. Another confounding factor was a clear difference in 
effort between the 4- and 5-year olds, reflected in the fact that, in total, 
three subjects had to be dropped from the experiment for not 
persevering ,v-ith the task, and they \\"ere all 5-year-olds. Ho,v-ever, 
there were clear behavioural differences \\Ti th evidence of an overt 
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'centre-fixation' in the 5-year-old children, which provides a counter to 
these confounds. This evidence will be discussed further in section 4. 
As Karmiloff-Smith's (1986) representational phases are not age-
related, it was more important to categorise subjects by their 
performance than by their age. It was straightforw ard to categorise the 
children in this study into 4 performance levels according to the 
number of small blocks they could balance. There was a clear sequence 
in terms of which of the four blocks could be balanced. If children 
managed to balance only one block, it was the evenly-weighted block 
(performance level 1). If they balanced two, it was the slightly-weighted 
block (22% off-centre) as well as the evenly-weighted one (performance 
level 2). If they could balance three, they only failed to balance the 
highly-weighted (49% off-centre) block (performance level 3). 
Performance level 4 was successful balancing of all the blocks. The 
distribution of children into the 4 levels by age can be seen in figure 13. 
Percentage of children 
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Figure 13. Percentage of children a t each bala ncing leve l, by age gro up _ 
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The absolute time taken to achieve a balance was found to vary 
between individuals, more than between performance levels or age 
groups. The time taken to balance the evenly-weighted block could be 
taken as a baseline of manual dexterity, and there was no correlation of 
this timing either with age (r = 0.009, n.s.) or with performance level 
(rs = -0.143, n.s.). 
Times to balance each of the off-centre blocks were converted to 
ratios of the baseline time for the relevant individual. This procedure 
elimina ted the problems of indi vid ual differences and allowed 
performances to be compared. The relative time taken to balance the 
blocks, within each performance level, reflected the degree off-centre of 
the balance point: it took subjects of all performance levels significantly 
longer to balance a block if its point of balance was further from the 
centre. (Level 2: Wilcoxen signed ranks, W = 2 (p < 0.05), Level 3 
Friedman Xr2 (2 d.f.) = 10 (p < 0.0055), Level 4: Pages L test (L = 360, P < 
0.001). 
The time to achieve a balance is most important in relation to the 4-
year old sample, as our hypothesis (following the RR mode!), predicts 
equal times to balance all types of block. However, this age group 
showed the same progressions as the older children both in terms 0 f 
which blocks were balanced, and in the time taken to balance them. 
They were more likely to balance a block the nearer its centre of gravity 
was to the middle, and they took longer to balance a more off-centred 
block. 
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4. Discussion 
4.1 Support for Karmiloff-Smith's (1984) Model 
In terms of quantitative results the predicted support for Karmiloff-
Smith's model was not found. RR theory would predict that the 
youngest subjects would not show a 'centre preference' and would 
therefore take the same time to balance all the blocks. However, the 
same relative pattern of timings were found for all subjects: evenly-
weighted blocks were balanced more quickly than slightly-weighted 
blocks, which in turn were balanced faster than the more-weighted 
blocks. 
There was little evidence of the simple, procedural success attributed to 
children with 'phase l' representations. The youngest subjects were 
more likely to be at the intermediate performance levels 2 or 3, than at 
the entirely successful level 4. Only 20% of the 4-year olds showed the 
'level 4' balancing performance. The remaining 80% all had a problem 
with the very-weighted block. Further, the behaviour of all the 4-year-
old children indicated a preference for a centred placement of the block. 
There was no evidence of the hypothesized simple proprioceptive 
feedback procedure. 
RR theory predicts a simple division into two behavioural categories 
on the balancing task: those children who could balance all the blocks, 
and those who could balance only the evenly-weighted blocks. This ,vas 
not found. There were a large number of children at the intermediate 
stages, performance levels 2 and 3. There is no place for these children 
in Karmiloff-Smith's 1984 theory. Joiner et al (in preparation) similarly 
failed to find evidence of the distinct behavioural phases, and argue for 
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a smooth developmental progression on the balance task. Although 
their study only tests the obviously weighted blocks. The behaviours 
associated with these intermediate levels will be discussed later in the 
chapter, in relation to individual case studies. 
There was some evidence of the behaviours characterised by 
Karmiloff-Smith (1984) as indicative of 'phase 2' representations. These 
were found in the 4:11 to 5:9 age group (slightly younger than 
Karmiloff-Smith's 'phase 2' subjects who were 6-year-olds). The graph 
in figure 13 clearly shows the occurrence of 'levell' behaviour only in 
the 5-year old age group. This is consistent with Karmiloff-Smith's 
findings, that a rigidity about placement at the centre of the block leads 
to a performance decrement in older subjects - a u-shaped behaviour. 
The 5-year-olds were indeed less successful (overall) at balancing than 
the 4-year-olds. 
The 'level 1/ phase 2' rigidity was not universally found in the five-
year-old-group, and thus related to a small proportion of the total 
subjects. Karmiloff-Smith has proposed that the 'centre-theory' is a 
necessary stage in development. As this was not a longitudinal study, it 
is impossible to either confirm or deny this claim. However, the small 
proportion of subjects found to exhibit this behaviour must licence the 
hypothesis (for future studies) that 'levell' performance may be a stage 
that only some children progress through. 
Whilst replicating (between subjects) the interesting performance 
decrement which Karmiloff-Smith reported, the complete data set does 
not fit with her 1984 explanation. There is evidence of a rigidity in 
behaviour with the 'phase 2' children, but this does not appear to be 
due to a redescription of a simple phase 1 'proprioceptive feedback' 
procedure, as there is little evidence of such procedures (see Kelly's Ca~l) 
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study below). The performance of the youngest children is guided by 
more than simply proprioceptive feedback, they do have some, perhaps 
implicit, 'notion' that things balance in the middle. They all started 
with a centred placement and there was evidence of a 'pull' towards the 
centre in making adjustments: those towards the centre were often 
excessive. However, they were clearly not dominated by the 'centre 
theory' in the way that the level 1 children were. 
A further issue, which will be elaborated below is whether the 
representation underlying 'level 1/ phase 2' performance should merit 
being described as a theory. 
4.2 Re-examination of the Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder (1974) 
approach 
The RR model describes a limited range of children's behaviours on the 
block balancing task. The categorisation of children's behaviour into 4 
performance levels in the previous analysis also oversimplifies their 
performance. In particular, both approaches provide a static measure of 
performance, when there were some apparent developments within 
the session. Examination of the video recordings indicated micro-
genetic development in certain subjects during the experiment, and the 
final success or failure on the task was less revealing than the 
behaviour which accompanied it. Similarly, Karmiloff-Smith's (1984) 
description seems to oversimplify the range of performances ·which 
were originally observed. 
The earlier paper (Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder 1974) provides a 
more detailed account of the range of behaviours observed including a 
series of seven different action sequences (in contrast to the three 
described by Karmiloff-Smith 1984). Movement to a more advanced 
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action sequence was observed within sessions, and the sequences were 
presented as forming a developmental sequence. Whilst the 
observations from this study do not directly replicate the 1974 
sequences, there are many similarities. These will be referred to later in 
the chapter, as case studies are reported. Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder's 
(1974) developmental sequence is summarised in appendix 2. 
The general approach of the earlier paper also highlights useful 
issues for analysing the present observational data. The focus of the 
original paper was 
" ... not on success or failure per se but on the interplay between action 
sequences and children's 'theories-in-action', i.e. the implicit ideas or 
changing modes of representation underlying the sequences." 
Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder 1974 (p. 196) 
In particular they hypothesized that 
" ... children interpret the results of their actions on the blocks in two 
very different ways: either in terms of success or failure to balance the 
blocks which will be referred to as positive or negative action response, or 
in terms of confirmation or refutation of a theory-in action, which will be 
called positive or negative theory-response." 
Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder 1974 (p. 198, italics in original) 
This distinction between the result of a balancing action and the 
interpretation of that result seems to be a crucial one. However, the 
limitation of the interpretation of the result to two possibilities: either 
simply as goal-achievement, or as evidence for a theory seems rather 
limited and presupposes the acceptance of the notion of the 
development of a theory as central to representational change. It may 
be useful to broaden the distinction. 
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Simon (1978) in his theory of problem solving, has characterised the 
problem solving process as an interaction between the problem solver 
and the task. The knowledge state of the individual determines how 
she encodes and represents the problem, it is this representation of the 
problem which then determines her next action on the problem. The 
result of the action may again cause an updating of the knowledge state, 
and of subsequent problem representations. Simon is talking about 
progressing through the stages of a complex problem, however, the 
insight can easily be applied to the repetition of attempts with a simple 
problem. 
Rather than the simple presence or absence of a 'centre theory', 
consideration could be given to the underlying knowledge state in more 
general terms. Performance could be thought of as a cyclical sequence of 
acting, perceiving the result of the action, updating the representation, 
and acting again. The general circularity of action and representation is 
not a smooth process in the development of a concept of balancing. If a 
certain action, e.g. centre placement is repeated regardless of the failure 
of the attempt, then the representation is resistant to updating. The 
nature of this resistance requires explanation. 
The child's knowledge state will affect how the subsequent attempt 
is made. In addition the encoding of the results of an action will affect 
the child's existing knowledge state (which again, in a recursive 
fashion) then affects her subsequent actions. These interactions will be 
discussed in terms of individual performances in the various age 
groups and balancing levels. In the following section we will analyse 
case studies and look at evidence of the 'interplay' between actions, 
representations, and encoding. 
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5. Observational data 
5.1 Four-year-olds and procedural representations 
As was mentioned in section 4.1 above, there is very little evidence of 
simple proprioceptive feedback procedures in the youngest subjects. 
The 'central tendency' observed in the youngest subjects in this study 
was also reported by Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder (1974). They 
described it as an action sequence developmentally in advance of the 
initial random placement, but preceding the onset of the rigid 'central 
theory'. The 'central tendency' was due, they claimed, to a general 
interest in 'symmetry' in this age group. It is possible that the children 
tested in this study were all at this more advanced level, although they 
were the same age as those tested by Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder 
(1974). This would be consistent with the finding of 'level l' behaviour 
in 5-year-olds in this study whereas Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder 
placed it at around age 6. 
The occurrence of a 'central tendency' before phase 2 was not 
mentioned by Karmiloff-Smith in her later accounts (1984, 1986, 1993), 
although it does not necessarily refute the theory. An incidental 
'central tendency' which is implicit in young children's balancing 
behaviour, (due perhaps to a general inclination towards symmetry), is 
quite different from an explicit belief that "things balance in the 
middle", which dominates performance. As such, this different type of 
behaviour could still be compatible with phase 1 of Karmiloff-Smith's 
RR model. However, the notion of an inflexible procedure as the basis 
for the behaviour of the youngest subjects is still questionable. Two case 
studies of 4-year olds will be described in an attempt to analyse the 
knowledge state of the younger subjects. 
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5.1.1 Remee 4:3. 
The youngest subject Remee (4:3) performed at level 2 on the large and 
triangular blocks, and progressed to level 3 on the small blocks. He 
persevered, despite obvious boredom, with all the blocks until the 
experimenter terminated a trial. With the first set of blocks he showed 
a variety of behaviours, but with the later sets he rapidly got bored and 
quickly fell into a repetitive behavioural rhythm. 
He was initially given the triangular block set, starting with the 
evenly-weighted block. This he placed immediately in a balanced 
position on the bar. He was then given the slightly-weighted block 
which he first placed in a centred position on the bar. On his second 
attempt he picked up the block with two hands and put it directly in a 
balanced position. He did not make any adjustments to the position, 
but placed the block deliberately and then let go with both hands at 
once. This might have been just a fortuitous placement, but he was also 
able to place the slightly-weighted large block immediately into a 
balanced position. If he was 'intuitively' using proprioceptive 
information, it was gained whilst lifting the block, as there was no 
adjustment made when it was on the bar. 
The next block was the obviously-weighted block, which he centred 
on the bar (twice) and was amused when it fell. He then placed it off-
centre but adjusted it to a centred position. He let go, but prevented it 
falling completely, and examined the face of the block which had 
touched the bar (hereafter referred to as the 'base'). He then replaced 
the block in a centred position and let it fall. On the next couple of trials 
he again looked at the base of the block as he was placing it, as if this 
held the clue to his failure. He did shift his placements slightly off-
centre (once in the wrong direction), but never sufficiently either to 
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achieve a balance or for the block to fall towards the unweighted end. 
He later reverted to a centred position, and repeated his examination of 
the base of the block. 
The very-weighted block was initially centred on the bar and, after it 
fell, Remee examined the base of the block. At one stage he gave the 
block a slight shake as he lifted it, but did not pursue this examination, 
and subsequently placed the block off-centre in the wrong direction for a 
few attempts. On one attempt he tried pushing down both ends of the 
block - perhaps trying to stick it to the bar? His usual behaviour was to 
use two hands and make a definite placement, hold it in position and 
then let go. But with this block he also tried a one handed technique, 
just lifting the weighted end, and then letting go. He was clearly able to 
use manual pressure to exactly counteract the weight and thus hold the 
bar in a balanced position, but had not extracted the relevant 
information from the need to counteract the weight, and a fortiori the 
implication of this for the position of the block on the bar. He rotated 
the block to place a different face next to the bar, and again looked at the 
base of the block. With obvious boredom, he established a minimum 
effort rhythm of sliding the block from its fallen position, towards a 
(roughly) centred one letting it go which was followed by a 'bang' as the 
weighted end hit the table. If the block was placed off-centre it was in 
the wrong direction, influenced only by how the block had fallen and 
Remee making an insufficient movement back towards the centre. His 
interest was caught by one fall which resulted in the block standing on 
its end, but he failed to repeat this on the subsequent alert attempt and 
returned to his repetitive placement rhythm. That is, he tried but could 
not extract any meaning from observing this result. 
After this set of four blocks, the two blocks which Remee had failed 
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to balance were demonstrated, and this seemed to be both amusing and 
surprising. However, it had no effect on his subsequent performance. 
His performance with the large blocks mirrored that with the 
triangular blocks. He balanced the even and slightly-weighted blocks 
immediately and failed, after persisting, to balance the very-weighted 
and obviously-weighted blocks. His performance with the very-
weighted block involved centring the block, or placing it off-centre 
generally in the wrong direction (again through boredom, rather than 
through a positive placement decision). He once looked at the base of 
the block, but quickly fell into another unthinking behavioural rhythm, 
with little attention paid to block placement. Where blocks were 
deliberately placed they were centred, apart from one early trial where 
(for no apparent reason) it was put extremely off-centre in the wrong 
direction 
The final set was the small blocks, and Remee started with the 
obviously-weighted block. He quickly 'gave up' and settled into a 
repetitive pattern of 'put the block on, let go, clunk, clunk (as it hit the 
table, and turned over); put on let go, clunk, clunk'. His attention was 
drawn when one 'clunk' was slightly softer and, he seemed to realise 
that this difference was significant. He picked up the block more slowly 
and placed it too far towards the weighted end (he had never done this 
before) and the block fell down on the unweighted side. He then placed 
the block in balance. 
Remee had successfully executed a local solution, and balanced a 
type of block he had previously failed on. However, he had not 
extracted any general information from the experience. The following 
block was the very-weighted block which he then failed to balance, 
treating it just as he had done previously. He then balanced the even 
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block immediately. He was finally confronted with the slightly-
weighted block, which he did not balance immediately. He quickly 
established a rhythm again of placing, letting go, and the block falling. 
When a casual placement did result in a balance, it took him almost by 
. 
surpnse. He had not consciously done anything different to make it 
balance. 
Remee knew what the goal state was, because he could recognise 
success. However, he had no insight into the means to achieve that 
success. He did not seem to use proprioceptive feedback at all although 
he had the basis in his ability to counteract the weight, and therefore 
had some implicit knowledge about the balancing 'system'. Each block 
was considered in isolation, he could not verbalise anything about 
balancing. He had not done any activity specifically labelled balancing 
either at playgroup or at home. Remee seemed to think that balancing 
has something to do with the contact between the two surfaces, but he 
also had a definite tendency to balance things in the centre, although 
this was easily dropped, if some other position suggested itself. 
Remee's representation of the problem did not lend itself to 
predicting the behaviour of the block. He did not analyse the features of 
the blocks themselves, all the blocks were approached in the same way -
which involved an initial central placement. He had a general idea 
about centreing, at some level, but he did not try to judge the exact 
centre. This may have been implicit rather than explicit knowledge. 
From the RR theory perspective, Remee is an anomaly. He had not 
encountered a similar balancing task before (according to his mother 
and playgroup leader), so would have been unlikely to have progressed 
beyond a stage of 'stable success'. His behaviour was not, in any Ca~L', 
dominated by a 'centre theory'. Remee \\'as immediately successful 
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with the evenly and slightly-weighted blocks through operating \\'ith 
his 'implicit centre theory', but had reached a stage of 'stable failure' 
with the other two block types. What appeared to draw him out of his 
rhythmic repetition of failed attempts was the occurrence of something 
'surprising'. This did not always lead him to success, but it did focus his 
attention on the problem and cause him to look for an explanation. 
This observation has two implications. Firstly, it indicates that he \vas 
anticipating (in a limited, local way) the behaviour of the block 
following his actions, this is a necessary prerequisite for him to be 
'surprised. Secondly, it suggests a possible stimulus for 
Representational Redescription. The notion of surprise as a factor in 
facilitating learning has been demonstrated in the animal literature, rats 
learn mazes more quickly if surprised (Lieberman, McIntosh, and 
Thomas 1979, cited in Lieberman, Davidson, and Thomas, 1985). 
Whilst this is not directly comparable to human behaviour, it indicates 
that the focussing of attention stimulated by the experience of surprise, 
may lead to a superior encoding of the situation. The link between 
'surprise' and detailed encoding may also be evident in the 
phenomenon of 'flashbulb' memories, where a surprising event is 
stored in unusual detail. Karmiloff-Smith has a problem accounting for 
how 'stable success' stimulates representational change, and 'surprise' 
might provide a potential alternative. 
There is clear evidence of a rigidity in performance during failure. 
When Remee can no longer generate different approaches to the task he 
just adopts a repetitive behaviour. However, he has not completely 
'switched off', as is attention is drawn by any (accidentally caused) 
difference in the blocks behaviour, from the repetitive pattern. It is 
then the evaluation and encoding of this \\'hich determines whether 
any representational progress is made. Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder 
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stress the encoding of results of actions in terms of success or failure. 
The encoding could be a far more subtle and important process than 
this, for indentifying the relevant variables. 
5.1.2 FCelly4:4 
Kelly (4:4) was able to balance all the blocks and \vas, thus, at 
performance level 4. As a young success, she would seem to be a 
candidate for Karmiloff-Smith's 'phase 1 '. However, she did not 
achieve her success through executing compiled proprioceptive 
feedback procedures. Her performance was not consistent, but sho\,yed 
evidence of exploration of the task. She let the blocks fall through her 
hands, or stopped them as they were falling. These investigations led to 
the development of a slightly more effective strategy during the 
experiment. Her performance changed from fairly gross to fairly 
smooth adjustments, and she moved from a single-handed to a two-
handed technique. 
Contrary to the 'phase l' hypothesis Kelly had some level of 'centre 
theory'. She always started in the centre, but quickly changed to a 
proprioceptive method, when this approach failed. First using one 
hand only, making fairly gross tapping adjustments, and finally using 
two hands at each end of the block to make faster and smoother 
proprioceptive adjustments. However, she did not seem to analyse the 
blocks in advance of placement and treated each block in the same 'vay. 
5.1.3 Conclusion 
The task for the youngest subjects was novel; they ,\'ere not at ease ""ith 
balancing. When asked, they claimed that they had not done anything 
similar before. Their mothers and playgroup teachers agreed that this 
was the case, although 'balancing' \vould have been an implicit part of 
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many other construction activities. They were basically learning to do 
the task during the session and had to be shown a block being balanced 
to understand what was required. They then mimicked the 
demonstrated performance and success for the youngest subjects \\'as 
initially a pleasant surprise. They recognised that the goal state had 
been achieved, but seemed to have no insight into the variables 
affecting performance. They were, as Karmiloff-Smith observed, 
treating each block as an isolated problem and approaching each of 
them in the same way. Initially, failure provoked an investigation of 
the task materials, although the relevant features were not identified. 
When a repetitive failure pattern was established, a change in the 
character of that failure was noticed. This then prompted a 
reconsideration of the task and/ or behaviour, although in Remee's case 
this did not generate any insight. 
The children were actively trying to understand the task. Remee, 
looked at the base of the block for 'clues'. Kelly was feeling what was 
happening and developed a relatively smooth two handed 
proprioceptive technique during the course of the experiment. Kelly's 
awareness of the weight of the block (at one stage she asked "What's on 
[in] this block?) may have been necessary for her success, although she 
clearly had not analysed exactly how weight was implicated in the 
balancing process. 
5.2 Five-year-olds and the 'centre theory-in-action' 
The level 1 children very carefully tried to judge the exact centre, and 
therefore failed to balance all but the evenly-\\'eighted blocks. They 
were less successful than the younger children (4:3 to '+:8) with the 
unevenly-weighted blocks. They continually took the blocks off the bar 
and re-placed them at the centre. They kept trying to achieve the e'\act 
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centre, not allowing any consideration of other possible places of 
balance. Having tried centreing the block a couple of times they would 
gIve up. In line with Karmiloff-Smith, behaviours such as pressing 
down on the centre of unevenly-weighted bocks, and pronouncements 
that unevenly-weighted blocks were impossible to balance were 
observed. As Karmiloff-Smith noted, their performance is clearly 
dominated by a 'top-down' concern with centred balancing, a 'theory' as 
she terms it. 
The 5-year-old children performed less well than the 4-year olds, but 
they also persevered less. The difficulties with the blocks were not 
analysed, they were merely rejected as not possible. When asked about 
what was hard about some of them, they were inclined to answer 
simply that they're 'too heavy'. They were actively analysing features 
of the blocks, but not extracting the relevant aspects. Perhaps this could 
not be integrated with what they explicitly knew about balancing. One 
'levell' child did manage to analyse that one side was heavier than the 
other, but he didn't think there was anything he could do to counteract 
this problem. 
The main difference between levelland level 2/3 children seemed 
to be that they explicitly verbalised their belief that things balance in the 
middle, and that there had to be the 'same on both sides'. This explicit 
'theory' may have been gleaned from balance scale tasks which they had 
encountered in their school work. When asked what they knew about 
balancing they described the balance scale equipment and the items 
which they had placed in the balance scale pans, rather than any 
underlying principles. The most they could articulate about the process 
was 'it has to be the same'. 
Karmiloff-Smith does not argue that the 'theory' in phase 2 should 
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be accessible to language. Here it clearly was, and it may well have been 
influenced by the school experience. This explicit knowledge l\'aS not 
necessarily a natural progression from the earlier approach to the task, 
but explicitly taught knowledge which dominated behaviour. Its 
dominance over normal 'problem solving' behaviour may have been 
due to this direct, unintegrated, linguistic encoding. The level 1 
children did not explore the task, they knew a little, but not in a flexible 
form such that they were able to analyse the blocks along the relevant 
dimensions. 
5.2.1 Joshua (6:0) 
Joshua (6:0) began performing at level 1, but following a demonstration 
by the experimenter was able to improve his performance. He tried 
each block in the centre, in a single balancing position with no 
adjustments, and thus managed even to fail initially to balance the 
evenly-weighted block. He was encouraged to persevere and having 
balanced the evenly-weighted block he then tried some small 
adjustments around the central point with the other blocks. After 22 
brief attempts with the various blocks, the obviously-weighted block 
was demonstrated to him. The demonstration took place at the 
experimenter's end of the bar, so Joshua initially tried putting the block 
at that same end of bar, indicating that he had encoded an irrelevant 
feature of the solution. However, when this attempt failed he did then 
move the blocks further off-centre and was able to balance the 
obviously-weighted blocks and the slightly-weighted block. However, 
he refused to move off-centre far enough to balance the very-l\reighted 
block. 
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5.3 Eight-year-olds and successful performance 
Success in the older children was not a homogeneous affair. 'Vithin 
our 100%-successful (level 4), 8-year-old-group, there were qualitatively 
different performances. These are illustrated by two case studies. 
5.3.1 Stacey (7:11) 
Stacey (7:11) took a long time (3 minutes 40 seconds) to balance her first 
block which was unevenly-weighted. She was clearly dominated by the 
centre concept, only moving the block very slightly around the centre 
the point. She also tried pushing down the lighter side, an ineffective 
strategy for balancing, but which might have provided some 
information about the properties of the block. Quite unexpectedly, at 
one point, she moved the block off-centre, but failed to balance and 
returned to the centre. A short while later she repeated this move, and 
after the block was over-adjusted, so that the un-weighted side fell (a 
surprising event), she persevered with adjustments around the correct 
balancing point until she succeeded. 
After this tortuous success with the first block Stacey dropped her 
centre fixation, although not the complete centre theory. All the 
subsequent blocks were balanced in less than 18 seconds. She still placed 
all but one of the blocks initially at their centre points, but then rapidly 
moved them towards an approximate balance point. Adjustments 
towards the centre were often excessive, bringing the block back into a 
symmetrical position, but the proprioceptive information \vas given 
priority and they were moved back again. The one (obviously-
weighted) block which ,,,'as initially placed appropriately off-centre, was 
adjusted briefly back to the centre before being balanced. 
This dramatic improvement in Stacey's performance, from near 
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failure to success, does not fit in with the phase 2 to phase 3 transition 
proposed by RR theory. The 'centre theory' was modified, rather than 
replaced with a better, more inclusive theory. She had clearly not 
abandoned her concern with the centre because she over-adjusted in 
that direction rather than relying entirely on proprioceptive feedback. 
She also began placing each block in the centre, rather than analysing 
where the block should balance in advance, as Karmiloff-Smith's phase 
3 children had been able to do. 
Stacey's experience with the first very-weighted block led to a re-
formulation of her approach to the balancing task, and presumably also 
of her underlying representation. However, this was not an 
overwhelming change, but rather a partial one. She was able to use her 
new knowledge to generate a behavioural response to failure, but not as 
a way of analysing the blocks and predicting their performance in 
advance. Each block was still treated in isolation with the same centred 
approach being taken to all the blocks initially. This lack of analysis and 
prediction indicates a fragmentary knowledge of the task, this is also 
indicated by her comments which are similar to those of a phase 2 
subject. When asked why some of the blocks were more difficult than 
other she said that some were heavier. When asked what she knevv 
about balancing she referred to the equipment in the classroom and the 
fact that she had put weights in one side and stones in the other. 
Interestingly Stacey's behavioural/representational change follo\\'ed 
after a surprising result, the block being placed beyond the point 0 f 
balance such that it fell down in the other direction. This was not only , 
a different behaviour from the block, but also provided ne\\" 
information highlighting another element of the symmetry of 
balancing (that things should fall equally on both sides), \\'hich has to be 
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incorporated with the centre theory. 
5.3.2 Marina (8:1) 
Marina (8:1), another 8-year-old, level-4 subject, showed quite different 
successful behaviour from Stacey's. She was clearly analysing the blocks 
before placing them and using the information to guide her 
performance. She had a fully integrated concept of balancing. 
Marina began with a very-weighted block which she placed in the 
centre. She then picked up the block and said "I know \vhy this one is 
hard, its got a weight in one end or something." She then put the block 
on at the approximate balancing point and balanced it quickly. When 
subsequently given the slightly-weighted block with the same 
appearance she examined it and said "I thought this was the second 
one9 for a minute, but it wasn't." Having analysed the block, she then 
selected the approximate balance point and again balanced it very 
quickly. She was not confident of her ability to balance the obviously-
weighted blocks - perhaps she was not able to analyse their features as 
simply a matter of weight, however, she still managed to balance all the 
blocks in less than 25 seconds each. 
All the blocks were evaluated before they were placed on the bar, and 
put in an approximate position of balance. Minor proprioceptive 
adjustments were then made to balance the block. Marina clearly had a 
deeper understanding of balancing, and a more flexible approach to the 
task than Stacey. Stacey had changed her performance strategy, but 
perhaps not her conception of the problem. She had a strategy "'hich 
worked, but she did not know why it worked. Perhaps a stage of stable 
9 She is referring to the previous (very-weighted) experimental blo~k, which had the 
same appearance. This was the first experimental block, but for her It was second to the 
practice block. 
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performance success would be needed before she could identify and 
isolate the relevant features of her success. A re-formulation of the 
knowledge, so that like Marina, she could predict the behaviour of the 
blocks in advance. 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter has indicated that the three phases associated ,r\Tith RR 
theory oversimplify the developmental progression observed here, and 
that reported by Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder (1974). It has proved 
more fruitful to use the concerns of the earlier paper in understanding 
developmental change in this task. However, the balancing task does 
produce a rigidity associated with level 1 performance, where subjects 
are dominated by their top-down beliefs and do not exhibit either the 
active investigations or the perseverance of both older and younger 
subjects. Whether this is a necessary developmental stage, though, 
needs to be investigated through longitudinal studies. However, the 
explicit verbalisable theories about centred balancing do not accord with 
Karmiloff-Smith's idea of E-i level representation, which are not 
linguistic. The reasons for the stultifying effect of the centre theory 
seems to lie in its domination of other process, not as part of a 
representational progression. This dominance may, in fact, be a feature 
of its isolation from other knowledge. 
Siegler'S approach to balancing is not directly applicable to the result~ 
reported here. Richards and Siegler'S (1985) characterisation of 
balancing behaviour as the acquisition and refinement of a rule set, 
does not capture the exploratory nature of children's behaviour. '\ or 
does it explain the flexibility \\rhich emerges ,vith the final stage, the 
apparent integration of kno,,,rledge "'hich allo,vs an oven'ie,,' to be 
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taken of the task. This progression from success on a task, as sho"vn by 
Stacey, to the insightful success shown by Marina, illustrates clear!'\' the 
development, 'beyond success' to flexibility ,,,'hich Karmiloff-Smith (e.g. 
1992) is concerned to explain. However, this study does not find that 
the RR model provides the explanation for that phenomenon. 
There seem to be two main factors to emerge from the case studies. 
The first being the importance of prediction and analysis. Children 
were constantly predicting the outcome of their interactions ,vith the 
blocks, even in a general way. The development of the ability to 
analysed the relevant feature of the blocks, to anticipate the behaviour 
of the blocks and to plan behaviour is what differentiated behveen 
different levels of success (illustrated by the Stacey and ~Iarina case 
studies). All of our subjects seemed to anticipate what the behaviour of 
the blocks would be and thus to look-ahead to some limited extent. 
This is indicated by their being surprised when their predictions were 
not realised. However, only the oldest subjects were able to use their 
knowledge, in a flexible way, to control their behaviour in advance of 
action. Planning difficulties have already been mentioned as a potential 
explanation of problems in the dra,,,,ing task (chapter 3), and a 
consideration of the development of planning processes will folIo,,,, in 
chapters 6 and 7. 
The second related factor is the role of surprise, and of un-predicted 
outcomes in stimulating representational change. This is hypothetical, 
suggested by the observations made, but may be a useful approach to the 
issue of what motivates representational change. There is also some 
support for pursuing this idea from the animal literature, and the 
phenomenon of 'flashbulb memories'. .\s the issue of moti\'ations for 
redescription ,,-ill be shcnn1 to be problematic for RR theory (see chapter 
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5), 'surprise' as an alternative to 'stable success' merits further study. 
7. Chapter summary 
A replication of the block balancing task has not provided any support 
for the RR model. There was not evidence of a stage of initial success, 
produced by the simple proprioceptive feedback procedures described by 
Karmiloff-Smith. The rigidity associated with 'phase 2' of the model 
was observed, but the explanation of the behaviour did not accord ,vith 
the 3R's model. The rigid behaviour was also associated with a failure 
to persist on the task, and may indicate declarative knowledge held in 
isolation from other related knowledge, rather than a stage in a 
developmental progression. 
The observational data indicate a progressIon from 'success' to 
'flexible success' which illustrates the phenomenon with which 
Karmiloff-Smith, and this thesis are be concerned. Ho,,,,ever, the 
development observed in this chapter related to the ability to analyse 
the relevant features of the blocks, isolating them from the irrelevant 
features and integrating them into an overview. Knowledge 
development is clearly implicated, but it might also reflect the 
development of planning. This view is pursued in chapters 6 and 7. In 
the next chapter the RR theory is considered from a purely theoretical 
perspective. 
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Chapter 5 
A theoretical evaluation of Karmiloff-Smith's 
Representational Redescription model. 
Chapter Abstract 
Following a dearth of empirical support for Karmiloff-Smith's (e.g. 
1986) model, this chapter analyses the models from a theoretical 
perspective. The initial representational format, criticised in early 
chapters, is found to be even more problematic. It is criticised as 
inadequately specified in terms of the level of representation, and 
unworkable in terms of its proposed inaccessibility. Further problems 
are identified with the concepts of: implicitly, represented information 
within procedures; behavioural success; stability as the stimulus to 
redescription; and endogenous metaprocesses. The implications of 
removing these problematic concepts are discussed, and the basis for a 
new recursive model, to be developed in chapter 9, is proposed. 
1. Introduction 
In chapter 2 Karmiloff-Smith's representational redescription model 
was outlined and the three behavioural and four representational 
phases described. In chapter 3 the representation proposed by 
Karmiloff-Smith for 'phase l' in her model "Tas rejected, in relation to 
children's drawings. In chapter 4 it \,Tas also sho\,vn that there was no 
12.1 
evidence of a procedural representation. This is clearly just one part of 
the model and the studies do not licence the rejection of the complete 
model nor the underlying theory of representational redescription. 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) differentiates between the underlvino- theory 
"' b _ 
of Representational Redescription and possible models under that 
theory. She argues that it would be quite possible to suggest different 
models, which still related to the underlying theory. However, all of 
Karmiloff-Smith's work, to date, has concentrated on one particular 
model which is one of serial redescription. The criticisms of the model, 
to be outlined in this chapter, suggest fundamental changes to the 
theory as well as the specific model. 
Karmiloff-Smith's (1986) article provides the most detailed account 
of her model. In this chapter the complete model will be analysed in 
more detail, on a theoretical rather than empirical level. The 1986 
paper will be quoted at length to avoid the possibility of 
misrepresenting the model. The most recent account of the model 
(Karmiloff-Smith 1992) is much less detailed than the description in 
1986 paper, however, the model has not been changed in any 
fundamental way. The analysis will, thus, concentrate on the 1986 
paper. Karmiloff-Smith (e.g. 1992) has related the RR model to 
connectionist approaches, which were not mentioned in the 1986 paper, 
these specifically relate to her conception of 'behavioural success' and 
will be discussed in section 3.3. 
In the first part of this chapter the RR model will be analysed as if 
attempting to implement it as a computer program. Analysing it in this 
rigorous manner will highlight problematic issues and so aid the 
development of a ne," model. Karmiloff-Smith employs the 
computational metaphor, and argues for the benefits of a cognitivl' 
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science approach to development (Karmiloff-Smith 1992). However it 
was not her intention to provide a complete computational 
specification. It goes without saying, therefore, that the model will be 
pushed for details beyond those provided in the paper. The second part 
of this chapter discusses the implications of remedying the problems, 
and suggests the basis for a new model of representational redescription. 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) quotes Klahr's (1991) distinction between 
soft-core and hard-core modelling and happily places her work at the 
'soft-core' end. Hard-core modelling is the implementation of theories 
as computer programs, soft core modelling being simple verbal 
descriptions. There is clearly a place, as Karmiloff-Smith argues, for the 
soft core approaches. However, progress in the 'cognitive science' 
paradigm involves other researchers taking a harder core approach in 
an attempt to test and develop the underspecified theories. The aim in 
this thesis is to move in this direction. 
The examples used in Karmiloff-Smith's (1986) paper are linguistic, 
and, in fairness, these linguistic examples will be used and evaluated in 
this chapter. However, her claim is reiterated that the model is 
intended to have general application and criticisms of the model will 
include references to other domains. The example Karmiloff-Smith 
quotes in detail is the acquisition of the indefinite article in French 
which produces a u-shaped behavioural curve. French children 
initially and correctly use the word 'un' for the non-specific reference 
function, the numeral function (French uses "un" for both the "a" and 
"one" functions in English), the appellative function and so on. At a 
later stage they spontaneously produce non-standard linguistic forms to 
overtly distinguish between these functions: they still produce the 
indefinite article for the non-specific reference function (e.g. un 
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mouchoir = a handkerchief) but add a partitive when implying the 
numeral function (e.g. un de mouchoir = one (of) handkerchief). Later 
still they produce the correct surface forms, as they had done initially 
although, Karmiloff-Smith would argue, these would be generated 
from different underlying representations. 
2. Problems with Phase 1 
2.1 Introduction 
In chapter 3 the proposed representation associated with phase 1 \\'as 
addressed experimentally. Problems were highlighted with the idea 
that children's drawings are represented as compiled procedures. 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992 and personal communication) ackno\vledges the 
problem with using the term 'compiled' (see Chapter 3 and Spensley 
19911), but she does not change the requirement that I-level procedures 
should be entirely inaccessible. In this section the term compiled will be 
used, where Karmiloff-Smith has used it, but should be interpreted 
loosely to mean only 'inaccessible', in keeping with her reformulation 
(Karmiloff-Smith 1992). The problems discussed in chapter 3 about 
procedural representations will not be reiterated here. 
Karmiloff-Smith (1986) characterises 'Phase l' as the knowledge 
acquisition phase, dominated by data driven processes. The child is 
motivated by the goal of achieving 'behavioural success'. ~e\\'lv 
acquired knowledge is stored as independent procedures, and 
1 Karmiloff-Smith read and commented on a conference paper (Spensley 1991) 
containing the material from chapter 2. She also acknowle~ged the ~tudy, in h~r 1992 . 
book (although mistakenly attributing the study to 'Spencer). Karmlloff-Smlth 5 letter IS 
reproduced in appendi\. 1. 
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subsequently successful procedures are immediately compiled. The 
phase ends with 
"procedural success, i.e. when there is a match between the child's 
output and adult output and the child's output receives only positive 
feedback." 
Karmiloff-Smith 1986 (p. 105) 
The processes described as operating in phase 1 could be summarised as 
a simple flow diagram like figure 1 below. 
External OUTPUT EVALUATE 
Stimuli 
PROCEDURE J---~ PROCEDURE 
Figure 14. Flow diagram of processes operating in phase 1 
COMPILE 
PROCEDURE 
FORGET 
PROCEDURE 
External stimuli trigger the execution of a procedure. The execution is 
then evaluated in terms of success or failure at achieving the desired 
result, which may include feedback from external sources (although this 
is not essential in the model). A positive evaluation, i.e. a successful 
performance, leads to a procedure being compiled in memory. A 
negative evaluation leads to the procedure being discarded. Each ne\v 
procedure example is stored as an additional isolated procedure and 
there is no way of relating the new procedure to other similar or 
identical procedures already in memory. Behind this apparently simple 
sequence, there are a number of underlying, interacting problems with 
this conception of 'Phase 1 '. These \vill be addressed in turn in the 
following sections. 
127 
2.2. Generation of behaviour 
A basic problem is the contradiction between the accessibility of 
procedures for the generation of correct behaviour, but their opacity and 
isolation in terms of storage. This is indicated by the lack of any circular 
connection in the flow diagram from compiled procedures to output 
procedures. It is essential for the child to recognise the appropriate 
context for the execution of a procedure, but the child is then unable to 
combine the result of the execution with the generalised representation 
of context which must have triggered it in the first place. 
The fundamental requirement of the initial representational level 
in the model is that it must be capable of generating correct behaviours. 
The RR theory begins with 'behavioural success' and is only concerned 
to account for development beyond it. The first problem with the 
representation is that the correct procedures need to be called by 
something in order to be executed. In modelling cognitive processes 
this essentially means a context of use. The procedures in phase 1 of the 
model need something to enable them to recognise appropriate contexts 
in order to be successfully triggered. There need be no access to the 
contents of the procedure itself, but then the problem of access transfers 
to the contexts or conditions which trigger the opaque procedures. A 
possible example of an opaque procedure would be the author's 3-year-
old daughter who has been taught to reply ''I'm fine, thank-you" to the 
enquiry "How are you?". Her preferred response in such situations is to 
hide behind her mother's legs, so the complete verbal response has 
actually become a reflex, executed whilst she hides, rather than a 
meaningful communication for her. There may be no a\\'areness of the 
role of the response, or the meaning of the 'words, but there has to be 
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recognition of the appropriate context to trigger the execution of this 
opaque response. 
Phase 1 provides the model with a large number of independent 
compiled procedures, but it is not clear whether Karmiloff-Smith 
intended the isolated I-level procedures to relate to instances 0 r 
generalised contexts. Either level is problematic for the model, as will 
be outlined below. The question of whether this type of representation 
is a reasonable outcome of acquisition processes in general is left open at 
this stage, (this will be discussed further in section 2.6). 
The distinction between the instance and the generality is a 
fundamental problem in accounting for knowledge acquisition: the 
individual experiences isolated instances but develops general concepts. 
The difference is, for example, between using the word dog to refer to a 
specific 'token' of a dog (e.g. Fido who lives next door), or using the 
word 'dog' in a 'type' sense to refer to any instance animal in the class 
of 'dogs'. In a sentence context, this is the difference between: "I 
distrust my neighbour's dog" (specific token of the category 'dog'), and 
"I cross the road if I see a dog" (type, any member of the category 'dog'). 
In representational terms the former only requires recognition of the 
individual beast and labelling it 'dog', whilst the latter requires an 
underlying concept of 'dog'. 
2.3 Levels of procedural representation. 
If the procedures are entirely opaque, then access to the contexts will 
not only be needed for executing the procedure but \\'ill also be needed 
to distinguish the range of different procedure5 over \"hich the 
generalisation metaprocesses can later operate. 
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In the knowledge acquisition process the context could be encoded in 
terms of individual occurrences of an event, or grouped in some \\Tay 
into context 'types'. Karmiloff-Smith (at some stages) argues for no 
categorising of procedures, but it will be shown that at some level there 
m us t be a grouping process. Four possible levels of contextual 
description will be described for the procedures "utter the \t\Tord 'un''', 
two of which Karmiloff-Smith seems at different stages to be proposing. 
N one of them are satisfactory in terms of the model. 
2.3.1 The instance level representation 
The instance level of representation would reflect the encoding of a 
separate procedure for every single context of use. Thus the French 
word 'un' in the linguistic context 'un chien', would be represented by a 
separate procedure for each instance in which it had been used e.g. a 
procedure for 'un chien' in the context 'dog I saw last Tuesday in the 
park at 2.30 pm'; another procedure for the context 'dog I saw last 
Tuesday from the car at 2.45 pm'. Similarly, separate procedures would 
be represented for 'un' in the linguistic context 'un chat' and again one 
procedure for each context in which it was used e.g. 'cat I sal\, last 
Tuesday from the car at 2.46 pm'; 'cat I am looking at now' etc. There 
would, a fortiori, be no differentiation of the various functions of 'un' 
which are later distinguished. Separate procedures would relate to the 
use of use 'un' in 'un chien' to identify one specific dog of the dogs I am 
looking at now, or 'un' in 'un chat' to identify one specific cat of the cats 
I saw last Tuesday in the park 2.31 pm'. This level of representation 
would certainly generate a plethora of opaque representations, but the 
numbers would dearly be unmanageable. 
If kno\\'ledge \\Tas encoded at this level of specificity there would bl' 
no possibility of generating nel\' behaviours on the b,1..;j..; of old 
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behaviours. Every instance would be unique. :\0 identical context 
would ever be encountered again, and there could, thus, be no basis for 
old procedures being triggered in new contexts. A child '\'ith such a 
representation could not use her knowledge, and therefore could not be 
behaving successfully as required by the model. There \\'ould be no 
basis on which to generate any new utterances of 'un' or anything else 
for that matter. This kind of encoding would leave a person able to 
absorb information about their randomly generated behaviours, but 
have no basis on which to act. 
The instance level may appear to be something of a straw man, but it 
does seem to be the level advocated by Karmiloff-Smith at some stages 
in her description of the model. Following the successful evaluation of 
an instance, Karmiloff-Smith states that 
"a new representation of the phonological form and its contextual use is 
entered into memory and compiled. At phase I, such representational 
adjunctions are not evaluated with respect to the content of other entries. 
They are merely added to the plethora of existing entries, and there will 
thus exist multiple identical and/ or slightly differing entries" 
Karmiloff-Smith 1986 (p.105) 
As no reference is made to the content of existing procedures in the 
evaluation process, it would seem that context would have to be 
defined in terms of the instance level. Such representation would 
certainly qualify for the term 'plethora', and would have the 
inaccessibility her model requires. Accepting any level above the 
instance level requires that some categorisation of the procedures (in 
terms of context of application, at least) occurs prior to compilation. In 
the model Karmiloff-Smith \\'ants to reserve this type of proce~~ for 
phase 2 redescription. 
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There are other possible levels of description that could be 
applicable, and some of these are described in the next three sections. 
However, any level above the instance level necessarily involves some 
kind of grouping process. These groupings could be on the basis of 
semantic categories, or the linguistic context (function) of the \vord. 
2.3.2 Category level representation 
A first level of categorisation could be in terms of grouping procedures 
according to their semantic context. For the 'un' example, this \vould 
mean one procedure for each specific noun regardless of function. 
Therefore, in the context of chien (dog) the word 'un' will be used for 
all instances of dog. A separate procedure will produce "un" in the 
context "un chat" (a cat or one cat), for all instances of cat. This \vould 
maintain the required 'plethora' of procedures, and provide a basis for 
generating the procedure on the basis of semantic category. The other 
advantage is that the basis for generating the procedure is not the 
functional one as that should emerge later through representational 
redescription. Beyond these features, though, there does not seem to be 
much reason for the child to develop representations at this level, 
rather than at a more general level. 
2.3.3 Function level representation 
At this level of description only the function would be identified, i.e. 
there would be no distinction between semantic contexts. For 'un' 
there would be a limited number of procedures corresponding to the 
linguistic functions e.g. one procedure for 'un' in the sense of 'one' in 
English and one procedure for 'un' in the sense corresponding to 'a' in 
English. 
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In her concrete illustration of the model it seems to be the function 
level of representation that Karmiloff-Smith is referring to : 
"My argument is that during phase 1, children develop one procedure 
for the non-specific reference function which outputs the phonological 
form of the indefinite article; another, independently represented 
procedure for the numeral function which also outputs an indefinite 
article (French does not differentiate between "a" and "one" in its surface 
grammar); yet another procedure for the appellative function which 
again outputs an indefinite article. In other words, at phase 1 the child 
has stored in memory a plethora of independently represented form-
function pairs with respect to the indefinite article and its various 
functions. " 
Karmiloff-Smith 1986 (p.113) 
However, this is not consistent with her frequent use of the word 
'plethora' for phase 1 representations. There are a limited number of 
functions of a particular word. The idea that the instances are already 
categorised by function presupposes knowledge that is only, supposedly, 
implicitly represented in phase 1. The encoding processes must have 
used the functional distinction in building procedures in that format, 
even if this was not consciously processed. In phase 1 this distinction 
should not be explicitly represented, but should rather be implicit across 
a series of representations. Redescription by phase 2 metaprocesses is 
required for such distinctions to be represented and utilised by the child. 
To avoid this problem it could be that here she is referring to the 
function-category level, this 'would aHo\\' for a 'plethora I 0 f 
representations. The problem \\'ith the function-category levels is that, 
like the function level, it also presupposes the analysis of instances by 
function. 
133 
2.3.4 Function-category level representation 
A function-category level could be proposed which would take into 
account both the function of the word and the linguistic context in 
grouping utterances. Thus, there would be two separate procedures for 
using 'un', one procedure to identify an instance of dog, and another to 
identify one from a group of dogs, for example. Similarly, separate 
procedures for each function for cats and so on. 
This level seems to fulfil some of the requirements of the 
Representational Redescription model, in that it would again generate a 
'plethora' of procedures. Although, the number may still be 
unmanageably large. The functions are duplicated over a number of 
procedures, and therefore would require some rationalisation. 
Representational redescription metaprocesses could generalise over 
multiple representations for each semantic category. However, this 
level, like the category level, does seem somewhat contrived. It is hard 
to picture the acquisition processes which would lead to just so much 
categorisation, but no more. 
2.3.5 Over-general procedures 
The final level to be considered is one that does not initially seem to fit 
with what Karmiloff-Smith (1986) has described This level is the 
possession of a single, over-general procedure, which does not 
differentiate between the various functions of the word 'un'. Such a 
rule could, in theory, produce all and only correct behaviours \vithout 
representing the implicit functional groupings. 
This type of representation would not allow for the operation of the 
phase 2 metaprocesses as they are currently conceived. There would 
only be a single procedure represented, rather than multiple 
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occurrences. The RR model identifies the metaprocesses as operating 
on the procedural representations themselves. Ho\,\yever, under this 
type of representation, the functional regularities would be implicit in 
the behaviour generated by the single procedure. 
A successful 'over-general' procedure could be applied in a range of 
contexts, and the results of the execution of that procedure observed. 
The child could then extract the functional regularities implicit in her 
behaviour from the multiple occurrences. The generalisation 
metaprocesses would not then be operating on the procedural 
representation directly, but on the external behavioural output of those 
procedures. There would, however, be a plethora of 'execution 
instances' which would provide data for the metaprocesses (ho"wever, 
these instances could not be stored in an entirely unprocessed fashion, 
as mentioned earlier, due to limitations on reasonable storage capacity). 
This reformulation would requIre a significant change in the 
representational redescription model. This approach requIres a 
differentiation of the representations which generate the behaviour, 
from those which encode the results of the behaviour, and also from 
those which perceive the appropriate contexts and trigger the 
procedures. This elaboration is not unreasonable, and the three seem to 
have been conflated in the RR model. 
However, the theory of Representational Redescription emphasises 
endogenous processes operating directly by accessing the generating 
representations, and extracting the regularities in these representations. 
To accept the 'overgeneral' procedure, the regularities ,vould be implicit 
in the output, rather than the representation. 
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Instance level procedures: 
produce "un" in the context "a dog" (dog I saw last Tuesday in the park) 
produce "un" in the context "a dog" (dog I saw last Tuesday from the car) 
produce "un" in the context "a cat" (cat I saw last Tuesday from the car) 
produce "un" in the context "a cat" (cat I am looking at now) 
produce "un" in the context "one dog" (to identify specific dog of dogs I am 
looking at now) 
produce "un" in the context "one cat" (to identify specific cat of cats T sa\\' last 
Tuesday in the park) 
Category level procedures: 
produce "un" in the context "a dog", or "one dog" (for all instances of dog) 
produce "un" in the context "a cat" or "one cat" (for all instances of cat) 
Function-category level procedures: 
produce "un" in the context "a dog" (to identify an instance of dog) 
produce "un" in the context "one dog" (to identify one from group of dogs) 
produce "un" in the context "a cat" (to identify an instance of cat) 
produce "un" in the context "one cat" (to identify one from group of cats) 
Function level procedures: 
produce "un" in the context "an object" (to identify an instance) 
produce "un" in the context "one object" (to identify one from a group) 
Over-general procedures 
produce "un" before any object noun (for all functions) 
Figure 15. Examples of possible levels of procedural representation 
2.3.6 Conclusion 
The idea of a plethora of opaque procedures as the source of successful 
performance seems problematic for the model. It has been argued that 
the generation of behaviour, the recognition of contexts and the 
encoding of results should all be considered. The analysis of a new 
representational format for phase 1 should also be consistent \"ith an 
account of how such representations would be acquired. 
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2.4 Evaluation 
The second stage of the sequence of events highlighted in the flo,,' 
diagram involves the evaluation of the child's output, to determine 
whether the procedure is compiled or rejected. The success or failure of 
a child's specific utterance involves 
"a simple evaluation of match/mismatch between the present state (the 
child's output in a given context) and the goal state (the child's evolving 
representation of the adult output and of the context in which it is 
emitted). If there is a mismatch, the child receives negative feedback 
(via the internal matching process and also, at times, via social 
interaction, although correction from adults is not essential \vithin this 
model). If there is a match between present state and goal state, then a 
new representation of the phonological form and its contextual use is 
entered into memory and compiled." 
Karmiloff-Smith 1986 (p. 105) 
This does not seem to be a 'simple' evaluation process as it presupposes 
what is trying to be acquired: the child has to already have a model of 
adult behaviour in order to evaluate whether her behaviour is 'adult' 
or not. The matching procedure is also problematic as the idea of an 
'adult model' implies some general representation of appropriate 
contexts. Karmilo£f-Smith stresses that the child's procedures at this 
stage are isolated, contextually bound instances, generalities can only be 
entertained following redescription. 
2.5 Implicit information 
There is a general conceptual problem with the idea of 'implicit' 
information being present in the representations. There mu~t be some 
constraint limiting ,vhat is represented, so at some level any 'in1plicit' 
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information must have been selected as relevant to be represented 
(albeit unconsciously). This is similar to the problems outlined in 
section 2.2.1 with representing contexts at the instance level: if there is 
no restriction on what is relevant to be represented, then every single 
aspect of every single event must be represented. There will again be an 
information explosion. If there was no prior conception of \\'hat 
information would be relevant, then each instance of using the \\'ord 
'un' would include irrelevant aspects of the context. For example, it 
might include a representation of the colour of the eyes of the person to 
whom the remark was addressed. This is clearly ridiculous, but reflects 
the impossibility of representational processes being entirely data-
driven. All cognitive activities involve the interaction of top-down 
and bottom-up processes, and there is increasing interest in the 
developmental literature with the notion of 'perceptual constraints' 
operating from birth (Gelman 1990a). This will be discussed further in 
chapter 9. 
Here again, the distinction is made between what is implicit in the 
representation and what is implicit in the behaviour. It may be better to 
conceptualise implicit information as a feature of a range of behaviours 
which has not been represented, rather than as inaccessible information 
which has been encoded at some level. 
2.6 The problem of knowledge acquisition. 
The knowledge acquisition processes which precede phase 1 are 
peripheral to Karmiloff-Smith's model. However, the issue of 
acquisition needs to be considered in evaluating the plausibility of the 
representational format as the basis of phase 1 processes. Do children 
really acquire knowledge in a specific domain as a range of complete 
unanalysable procedures? Karmiloff-Smith does not align herself to 
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any particular developmental theory, but one 'which results in a 
plethora of unanalysed procedures generating behaviour must be a very 
passive process, largely data-driven process. Research in cognitive 
psychology is largely agreed on the conception of cognition as an active 
process of imposing structure on the world. There is a tendency to 
generalise, rather than to keep experiences separate and isolate. It is 
hard to see why children who may build up behaviours from their 
component parts would then render these parts inaccessible, apart from 
the automatisation which accompanies highly skilled performance. It is 
not clear that this highly skilled 'automatisation' is a precursor to 
flexibility within that particular behaviour (although it may allow other 
skills to be executed in parallel). This is not, in any case, Karmiloff-
Smith's conception of phase 1 procedures. The question of acquisition 
processes will be re-examined at the end of the chapter (section 5.3), 
where it is discussed in conjunction with the problem of defining 
'behaviour al success'. 
2.7 Conclusion - Problems with phase 1 representations 
The specification of the representation of the data is a basic requirement 
for implementing a computer program. Karmiloff-Smith is not clear 
enough on this issue, and attempting to isolate a possible level of 
description has led to contradictory requirements. The confusion at this 
level has implications for other aspects of her model, and it "'ill be 
returned to later. 
The idea of generating behaviour from a 'plethora' of 
representations goes against the general weight of knowledge In 
cognitive psychology. Humans tend automatically to generalise, to 
produce schemas and rules, and to group experiences into generalised 
. The l'dea of accumulating unanalysed instdnct'~ i~ representa hons. 
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therefore problematic. A shift of emphasis from information implicit 
in representations to information being implicit in performance may 
prove fruitful, but will also require a shift of emphasis from the purely 
endogenous processes proposed by Karmiloff-Smith. 
3. First redescription into phase 2 
There are a number of issues which are associated with the first 
redescription into phase 2 representations. They are the concept of 
purely endogenous metaprocesses, the concept of behavioural success, 
and the idea of 'stability' of a state as the stimulus to representational 
change. 
3.1 E-i level representation 
In order to continue to analyse phase 2, judgement must be suspended 
on the problems with the representation raised in section 2. Phase 2, 
like phase 1 depends on redescription of procedures in a certain format, 
so an over-simplified account will be proposed for the sake 0 f 
argument. At the end of phase I, ignoring all the issues raised in the 
previous section, the procedural representations might look something 
like figure 3 for one particular phonological form. 
(context 1, function x -> phonological output A) 
(context 2, function y -> phonological output A) 
(context 3, function x -> phonological output A 
(context 4, function x -> phonological output A) 
(context 4, function y -> phonological output A) 
(context 5 , function x-> phonological output A.) 
Figure 16. Phase 2 procedures 
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The procedures have a linguistic context and a function (or user's 
goal) which stimulate the production of a specific form and a compiled 
procedure for generating that phonological form. Whilst this looks 
plausible for the linguistic example provided by Karmiloff-Smith (1986), 
it would not be the same for the block-balancing task (described in 
chapters 4). The block balancing domain would contain entries \\'ith 
different contexts, but there would not be any differentiation of 
functions, as the goal of 'balancing' would be the same across 
procedures. Similarly, if the procedure was simply kinaesthetic in 
terms of a proprioceptive feedback loop, this would also be identical 
across different instances. 
3.2. 1- to E-i level redescription 
"Once each separate procedure for outputing the indefinite article has 
become automatised, compiled, and functions efficiently, i.e., is 
semantically and communicatively "successful" and receives only 
positive feedback, this stable internal state is recognized and the 
rewriting of I-representations into E-i form is set in motion. This is 
essential because I-representations are compiled and therefore their 
components cannot be addressed separately. The rewriting into E-i form 
makes it possible for analogies of phonological form and differences of 
function across the multiply-stored indefinite articles to be explicitly 
defined. Then the plethora of isolated form/ function pairs can be linked, 
after which one form - the indefinite article - has plurifunctionaI status." 
Karmiloff-Smith 1986 (p. 113) 
The first level of redescription translates the I-level (Implicit 
kno,,'ledge) procedures of phase 1 into E-i level (primary explicitation) 
Tl . h . d· Dll b\' the goal of 'control over internal procedures. lIS P ase IS nv~ . 
1-+1 
representations'. The E-i level procedures are more accessible, and the 
result is that the knowledge implicit at the I-level is available to 
unconscious access in phase 2. The redescription is carried out bv 
metaprocedural operators, which construct the new representations 
without destroying the phase 1 compiled procedures. 
"Constraints on the form of redescription involve a certain amount of loss 
of procedural information still retained in I-representations (e.g. 
information about the particular phonetic constraints on a particular 
form) but simultaneously a gain in accessibility of semantic/ functional 
information. " 
Karmiloff-Smith 1986 (p. 107) 
Once the E-i representations exist, another metaprocess, a scannIng 
operation creates explicit links between E-i procedures with identical 
forms with different functions and identical functions \\'ith different 
forms. 
There are some problematic concepts in phase 2, which will be 
discussed in turn. These are 'behavioural success' and the stability of 
that state, the evaluation of compiled procedures by metaprocesses and 
the definition of these metaprocesses. Karmiloff-Smith's notion that all 
these phase 2 processes are endogenous will also be discussed. 
3.3 I-level to E-i level metaprocesses 
"After procedural success at the end of phase 1 for a particular linguistic 
form, a number of meta-procedural operators are set in motion during 
phase 2 which will enable the implicitly encoded representations to 
become e\.plicitly related." 
Karmiloff-Smith 1986 (p. 107) 
1-l2 
Karmiloff-Smith is not specific about how the redescription of I-level 
into the more accessible E-i level procedures occurs. She just states that 
these unspecified metaprocesses are stimulated by consistent 
behavioural success in a particular domain and operate purely 
endogenously. However, this is not a straightforward process in 
implementational terms. The metaprocesses 'would have to be 
constantly scanning the knowledge base for domains \\'hich were ripe 
for this type of redescription (once the problem of recognising 
completed successful domains had been overcome). 
Once a domain had been identified the metaprocesses ,,,ould have 
access to a delimited range of successful, but opaque procedures. In 
order to generalise from these the first level metaprocedural operators 
must have some special access to the contents of the opaque procedures. 
How this is achieved is not specified. The resulting redescriptions are of 
a more general nature, accessible to the next level of metaprocesses, but 
the basis for the generalisations is not specified either. 
3.3 Defining 'behavioural success' 
The stimulus to the first level of redescription is 'behavioural success'. 
This concept is central to the model as Representational Redescription 
is essentially a theory of development 'beyond successful performance'. 
A Representational Redescription program ,vould thus have to have a 
clear definition of 'success' in order to redescribe procedures "'hen the 
state had been reached. Success appears, at first, to be a clear criterion 
,,,hen applied to the language domain: either the child produces the 
correct linguistic output in the correct context or she does not. 
l-B 
However, as \vas outlined in chapter 3, it is a very problematic notion in 
less clearly defined domains such as children's dravvings. 
Karmiloff-Smith attempts to define 'procedural success' thus: 
"when there is a match between the child's output and adult output and 
the child's output receives only positive feedback." 
Karmiloff-Smith 1986 (p. 105) 
However, this definition raises problems even in the language domain. 
The child will not necessarily reach both these states at the same time. 
The child may receive only positive feedback when the output is merely 
communicatively adequate, in the 'un' example, this may be before the 
child even uses determiners. Children are not continually corrected 
once they are understood. Far from it, many parents actually revel in 
their young children's linguistic idiosyncrasies! 
The issue of feedback is quite distinct from the second part of the 
definition when a match with adult output is required. For matching to 
occur, there must be a model of adult output available to provide the 
basis of the comparison. It is not clear where this model would be or 
how the matching would occur. It cannot be a purely endogenous 
process otherwise it presupposes that the child already possess the adult 
model. 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) has suggested that 'behavioural success', 
might correspond to the stabilization of the 'weights in a connectionist 
neh,yorks. A neh,york moves from continually adapting the ,,·eights on 
its connection in response to each ne,,· input, to a state ,,·here additional 
input does not change the stable neh'\'ork. This does hold some hope of 
defining 'behavioural success', but there still needs to be some 
endogenous metaprocess lvhich recognises the stability, though having 
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access to the network representation itself. In addition, it is not clear 
how a connectionist account of the initial representation, \\'ould link to 
the higher levels of redescriptions, and Karmiloff-Smith has not 
elaborated this account. This hypothesis \vill not be pursued in this 
thesis. 
3.5 Stability as the spur 
For a system to recognise that it is in a state of stable 'behavioural 
success', there are a number of criteria \\'hich must be fulfilled. The first 
is to define how many correct executions must occur before the system 
can be deemed 'successful'. This would essentially have to be an 
arbitrary limit in any implementation, as the concept is not defined 
beyond 'absence of error'. Karmiloff-Smith accepts that the concept is 
hard to define (personal communication, see appendix I), but does not 
conclude that it may not be a useful concept. The latter position will be 
argued in section 5.3. 
The idea of stable success when only consistent positive feedback is 
received requires the identification of a distinct domain to \vhich the 
state can be attributed. As there is no access to the ever increasing 
collection of procedures, there is no \\'ay to delimit such domains. The 
identification of specific domains is essential given the 'phase' nature of 
the model 2, \\Thich hypothesizes that different tasks will be ready for 
redescription at different times. Certain task domains need to be 
identifiable as ripe for redescription, \\'hen others are not. 
2 Kilrmiloff-Smith distinguishes between her model, which is a phase model, and the 
tmd itional 'stage' models e.g Piaget's. In her model children are at different levels on 
different t.1S\.-S, although the phases are passed though in the same order for each task. 
Stage models impl~' that the child is at the same level for all tasks. 
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The I-level representations are isolated compiled procedures, \\'ith 
no cross-referencing as to the contents of the procedures. 'Vith this type 
of opaque representation - which Karmiloff-Smith states can even lead 
to multiple copies of the same procedures (Karmiloff-Smith 1986, p. 105) 
- there is no apparent way of either recognising \vhether a domain is 
complete or whether success is consistent across all instances \\'ithin a 
domain. 
If task domains were identifiable in some way, it might be possible to 
specify an implementation for the ill-defined idea of stable behavioural 
success. It could be that no new procedures are added to that particular 
domain over a certain number of successful executions. Successful 
procedures could be reinforced in some way for example, moved up a 
list. However, this would still require some arbitrary 'stopping 
condition' based on time elapsed or number of executions of a 
procedure, rather than some more coherent concept of 'success'. 
Behavioural success seems to be a difficult concept in general and in 
terms of implementing a system it would not even be 'hackable' 
without some segregation or categorisation of the I-level procedures 
into domains. The recognition of this state is the stimulus for the 
operation of the metaprocesses discussed in the next section. 
3.6 Endogenous metaprocesses 
Phase 2 redescription is characterised as an endogenous process. 
Although, the possibility of external influences is ackno\vledged 
(Karmiloff-Smith 1992) the centrality of the endogenous processes is 
maintained. 
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" ... it is the endogenous processes operative at phase 2, and far less the 
influence of exogenous factors in phases 1 and 3, that are the most 
relevant to representational change. II 
Karmiloff-Smith 1986 (p.104) 
The metaprocesses which operate at this phase make explicit the 
information which was implicit across the range of compiled 
procedures. In the linguistic example this is achieved by the scanning 
metaprocess which notes the form/ function relationships. The result 
of this redescription is a new representation with procedures grouped 
according to function with explicit links. 
The problem of the initial representation and the knowledge 
explosion is relevant again here. The new E-i level representation is 
the result of the metaprocess extracting information from the plethora 
of procedures. The relevant information must, as the essential 
prerequisite, be present in the procedure. If the information explosion, 
outlined with reference to the 'instance level' of representation (section 
2.3.1), is to be avoided then the function which forms the basis for the 
grouping must have been selectively encoded from the start. So 
'function' must have been used at some level as a filter for selecting out 
of the broad experience what it was relevant to encode. Function 
cannot, then be something that emerges purely from observing 
representations, but is something that must be encoded from the start, 
albeit unconsciously. 
This problen1 of the necessity of encoding the basis for generalisation 
pO~l'~ a serious problem in the block balancing task (as described by 
Karmiloff-Smith 1984, and outlined in chapter 4). In this task the result 
of the phase 2 rede~cription is a 'theory-in-action' that blocks balance at 
their geon1etric centre~. Such a theory could never emerge through an 
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endogenous redescription of I-level procedures. If the blocks are 
initially balanced purely on the basis of proprioceptive feedback, the 
kinaesthetic procedures would not contain the information that things 
in general balance in the middle. This information is irrelevant to 
success on the task in kinaesthetic terms. The idea that things balance 
in the middle is an observation of the output of the kinaesthetic 
procedures and is not present, even implicitly, in the procedure itself. 
Thus, the development of a 'theory of balancing' could not emerge 
from purely endogenous processes operating on the kinaesthetic 
procedures proposed as generating the initial success. The redescription 
process would have to include some exogenous information, encoding 
observations of the outcomes of executing the procedures. The data for 
a 'centre theory' would be implicit in the behaviour, and dependant on 
encoding the results of the actions (however, see chapter 4 for a re-
evaluation of the block balancing task). 
The processes which create the E-i level procedures will be quite 
different from the processes which created the original I-level 
proced ures. Experience leading to initial successful performance is 
mediated through the perceptual system, and the representational 
process is based on information translated from that code. These 
metaprocesses would be creating representations from representations, 
and internal observation, which would not use the perceptual channels. 
A kind of 'internal eye'. This is quite a dramatic shift in processing, and 
it is not clear in evolutionary terms ho\\' this supercognitive 
mechanism would have evolved. It lvould be more plausible if the 
mechanisnls which lvere responsible for the initial representation could 
also create the higher level representations, and such a possibility 
should be considered before positing a supercognitive system (this 
approach is adopted in chapter 9). 
A further problem with the metaprocesses, as conceptualised in RR 
theory, is their status \\Taiting-in-the-wings' for their stability cue. 
Karmiloff-Smith has criticised Marshall and Morton (1978) for using an 
'awareness operator' in a similar fashion. However, she has just 
transfered the problem away from awareness to the metaprocesses. 
4. Second redescription to Phase 3 
The second level of redescriptive metaprocesses have the same 
problems as the first level. The same arguments against \\'holly 
endogenous metaprocesses, and stability as the spur to redescription 
apply here. 
4.1 E-i level to E-ii level metaprocesses 
"Once redescription has taken place in E-i form, those representations 
can then be scanned, and any form/ function analogies and differences 
can be explicitly defined. The scanning operation will thus be sensitive 
to identical forms paired with different functions, and to identical 
functions with different forms. A process is then initiated such that E-i 
representational links are established and defined explicitly." 
Karmiloff-Smith 1986 (p. 107-8) 
Karmiloff-Smith is not specific about how her metaprocesses operate, 
apart from the 'scanning' operator 'which detects form/ function 
generalities in E-i level procedures. However, this provides some basis 
for searching for generalities, \\Thich is entirely lacking in her 
description of the first level metaprocesses. She states that there are a 
nil mbc!' of processes, but she does not specify ho\'\' man\' or even 
suggest an order of nlagnitude. If there are so man\' additional 
metaprocesses, then their function requires explication. It is not clear 
whether the number of metaprocesses are serving different functions 
within the model, or if she just means them to scan the procedures for 
different analogies. If the latter is the case, she only needs one general 
purpose scanning metaprocess which would be easy to implement. An 
exhaustive matching process could find all the other procedures \\'hich 
contained the same particular part or parts of a procedure. This kind of 
scanning operation would identify groups of procedures, but the 
psychological validity is debatable. The process would be entirely data 
driven (though endogenous), rather than based on any top-down 
hypotheses and would certainly generate some irrelevant groupings. 
To take up an earlier example, a grouping of 'indefinite articles uttered 
by blue-eyed people' would clearly be no use at all. These irrelevant 
groupings would have to be evaluated and rejected. There is no 
evidence that this happens and in any case the processes which could 
'evaluate' the relevance of these groupings would be better suited to 
filtering out the 'encoding' of irrelevancies in the first place. A more 
constructive grouping mechanism, though, would requIre the 
metaprocesses to 'kno\,v' in advance the basis for making the 
redescriptions. This would of course, vary widely across domains. 
The scanning process highlights the problem introduced in section 
2.3 about the level at \vhich procedures are represented, and the 
problem of delimiting the domain over which scanning \vould occur. 
Karmiloff-Smith's linguistic example illustrates the existence of the 
same surface form of a determiner \\'ith different underlying functions, 
it is not obvious that this plurifunctional situation \\'ould occur for the 
majority of cognitive tasks. Ho,\'ever, this would depend on ho\\' the 
function ,\'as encoded \\'ithin the procedure. Across the range of 
balancing tasks the function ,\'ould ah\'ays be 'to balance', unless the 
f"l1ctioll~ (rather than the cOlltcrt~) were represented as 'build II house'; 
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'stack the blocks' etc. Without more detail of the representation it is 
not obvious that the scanning operation would achieve something in 
all situations. 
5. Towards a new account of Representational Redescription 
There have been a number of fundamental criticisms made of the RR 
model. These include the concept of behavioural success', 'stability' as 
the spur to redescription and the idea of entirely endogenous 
metaprocesses for redescription. The dropping of these elements if the 
RR model would have fundamental implications for the development 
of a new model. The detail of the representational format in the RR 
model (Karmiloff-Smith 1986) has been shown to be implausible (in 
this chapter) and unsupported experimentally (chapter 3) and will not 
be pursued any further. 
5.1. Redescription processes 
The emphasis on endogenous redescription processes has been 
criticised. A number of problems both in terms of ,,,hat is initially 
represented in the I-level procedures, and the operation of endogenous 
metaprocesses have been described. The example of block balancing 
particularly argues against endogenous redescription of implicit 
information. The necessary information could not be extracted, because 
it would never have been present. The block balancing case indicates 
informa tion im plici tly in the be h a v i our rather than in the 
rcprcscn ta tion \\'hich generated that behaviour. Transferring the 
emphasis from endogenous process to perceptual and en cod ing 
processes also alleviates the problem of the information explosion. If 
the emphasis on endogenous processes is dropped, then the n10del 
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would not require the initial 'plethora of procedures'; a notion \\Thich 
has been shown to be problematic. 
The RR model suggests that cognitive flexibility is the result of a 
completely new developmental mechanism which only operates after 
success. It has been argued that more parsimonious accounts should be 
rejected before additional processes are proposed. It is possible that the 
processes which created the first representations could also create 
subsequent redescriptions, this position will be elaborated in chapter 9. 
5.2. Stability as the spur to redescription 
This has been described as a vague criterion. In chapter 4, it \vas 
suggested that 'surprise' might be an alternative 'spur'. This would be 
independent of success or failure, but would be based on the prediction 
of the outcome of action. This criterion would be consistent \vith an 
interactive, rather than endogenous, redescription process. 
5.3 Behavioural success 
Karmiloff-Smith (e.g. 1992) has insightfully argued that development 
does not stop with the ability to successfully execute a task. 
Development beyond success leads to the development of the uniquely 
human flexibility to reflect on the task. Karmiloff-Smith is only 
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concerned to account for development beyond 'success', although this 
limitation has been criticised in this chapter and else\vhere (Goldin-
Meadow and Alibali, 1994). Karmiloff-Smith (1994) justifies restricting 
her account to this limited section of development maintaining that " ... 
one researcher cannot do everything" (p. 737). Ho\\'ever, her insight 
that development continues 'beyond success' and her argument that 
this is not accounted for by most developmental theories, does not 
entail differf'nt developmental mechanisms operating in these t\\'O 
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developmental periods. Treating this 'post-success' portion of 
development in isolation needs to be justified. 
The first step in justifying a separate stage in development, would be 
the identification of a clear division between pre- and post-success 
behaviours. It has been argued earlier in this thesis that 'success' as a 
single developmental point within many domains is a problematic 
concept. In the development of drawing multiple levels of success in 
depiction were described (chapter 3), and even in the apparently clear-
cut domain of block balancing 'successes' differed (chapter 4). This is 
equally true of other domains such as language where communicative 
adequacy and syntactic perfection will not necessarily coincide. 
Karmiloff-Smith (personal communication see appendix 1) has accepted 
that the concept is difficult to define, however she does not accept the 
conclusion, drawn here, that these difficulties indicate that 'success' is 
not a useful concept in a developmental model. 
RR theory specifically aims to provide a restricted account of 
development beyond 'success'. If the concept of success is dropped, the 
question of how Representational Redescription relates to the rest of 
development is highlighted. Karmiloff-Smith (e.g. 1992) has rightly 
argued that theories which stress the role of negative feedback cannot 
account for development 'beyond success'. Ho\vever, this does not 
mean that negative feedback accounts are the correct explanation of prc-
success development, which would necessitate a different post-success 
theory. More generally, Boden (1982a) has argued against the notion 
that negative feedback is important for development. If negative 
feedback is not required to enable the child to achieve successful 
performance then, it ,yill be argued, the saOle processes ,,'hich precede 
success in any domain could also take the child beyond it (see chapter 9). 
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The difficult problem of defining behavioural success' IS then not 
solved, but removed. 
6. RR as a general developmental mechanism. 
Dropping the central idea of behavioural success' from the RR model 
, 
raises the possibility that Representational Redescription could be a 
more general developmental mechanism. A new account ,,,ill be 
elaborated in chapter 8, but the implications, in general terms, of 
removing 'success' are elaborated in the next section. A more general 
RR account should encompass development from infancy to expertise. 
Neither of these extremes are discussed by Karmiloff-Smith. (This 
proposed continuum, of course, conflates learning and development, a 
position which will be justified in chapter 8). 
6.1 Recursive RR 
If the idea of 'success' as the starting point for Representational 
Redescription is eliminated, then other aspects of RR theory must be 
changed - crucially, the distinct representational formats. The limited 
iteration of 3 redescriptions requires a specific starting condition 
('success'), and ends with completely flexible, linguistically encoded 
knowledge. 
This limited passage from opacity to awareness would place an 
upper limit on knowledge development. Once 'a'w'areness' had been 
achieved, for example in the drawing domain, no further development 
is hypothesized. It does not, therefore, account for the differences in 
cognitive flexibility between expert and non-expert adults, It is hard to 
believe that the 8- or 9-year-olds who can flexibly fulfil the 'dra\\' a 
strange man task' will not develop their man-dra\\"ing representations 
any further, particularly, if they later become skilled artists. The RR 
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model also implies a lower limit on representational development. It 
could not be applied directly to development in infants and very young 
children, particularly the development of linguistic representations. 
The standard A.I. solution to this problem of limits would be to 
propose a recursive redescription process or sequence of processes. This 
removes the specific problem of defining starting conditions, although 
it creates others. A recursive process requires a more generally 
applicable redescription mechanism than the specific metaprocesses 
alluded to in the RR model. It also necessitates the dropping of the 
sequence of qualitatively different representational formats. Karmiloff-
Smith (1992, 1993) has recently prefixed her description of the three 
phases with the word 'recurrent', although this change in the model is 
not explained. It is not clear how the passage from 0 p a que 
representation to flexible representations and then back to opacity 
would be achieved in a 'recurrent' version of the model. 
A new account of representational redescription will be developed 
in chapter 9. It will eliminate the problematic concepts identified in the 
chapter and will place representational redescription in a broader 
developmental context. 
7. Summary 
" ... models do have a way of taking on an air of reality through sheer 
use and familiarity." 
Flavell 1976 (p.234) 
The RR model (e.g. Karmiloff-Smith 1986) ,,'as criticised in previous 
chapters on empirical grounds, and is criticised further in this chapter 
in terms of its internal coherence. The model has not provided the 
basis for an improved understanding of cognitive flexibility, it has been 
155 
argued that it is not consistent or plausible in a number of respects. In 
particular the concepts of initial procedural representation, endogenous 
metaprocesses, behavioural success, stability as the spur to 
development, and implicit information within representations, are 
rejected. However analysis of the model has indicated some 
modifications, the most fundamental of which, involves dropping the 
constraint of 'behavioural success'. This generates the hypothesis that 
representational redescription viewed as a recursive process could be a 
general developmental mechanism. This idea is developed in chapter 
9. 
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Chapter 6 
Planning development: a review 
Chapter Abstract 
In previous chapters the Representational Redescription approach to 
the development of cognitive flexibility has been criticised. In this 
chapter and the next, a new perspective on the development of 
flexibility, is considered: the development of planning ability. A 
number of descriptive accounts are reviewed, however no clear 
developmental sequence is proposed, or developmental mechanisms 
identified. The 'internalisation' mechanism is the only one referred to, 
and this is considered further in conjunction with Isaev's model of 
planning development, which follows in chapter 7. 
1. Introduction 
In the previous three chapters the details of Karmiloff-Smith's (1986) 
model have been analysed and various aspects challenged. This chapter 
diverges from the detailed consideration of Karmiloff-Smith's theory to 
consider an alternative perspective on the development of 'cognitive 
flexibility'. Rather than the repeated restructuring of knowledge 
representations, it might be that the development of general purpose 
processes, such as planning, might account for improvements in 
flexibility. Planning is an ability \,'hich requires 'cognitive flexibility'. 
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Whatever the domain, the relevant knowledge must be manipulated to 
form a plan, and the execution of the plan must be monitored. 
In the earlier discussions of RR theory, the development of planning 
was identified as a possible problem. In the drawing task it was 
suggested that problems in completing the 'strange man' dra'wings 
could have been caused by the failure to anticipate the interactions of 
the modification with earlier parts of the drawing. In the block 
balancing task, the two levels of successful performance ,vere 
distinguished by the ability of the subject to predict the behaviour of the 
block from an analysis of its features, and thus to plan the correct 
placement for the block. If 'cognitive flexibility' on both these tasks 
includes the ability to 'plan', then it is important to investigate whether 
it is the development of planning processes which is explanatory. 
Friedman, Scholnick, and Cocking (1987) have labelled the two basic 
approaches to the question of what it is that develops in planning, 'the 
expertise model' and 'the 'classic developmental model.' These 
positions broadly reflect the view that development in planning reflects 
an increase in domain related knowledge, and the view that it is a 
general planning ability which develops, respectively. Pea (1982) and 
Brown and De Loache (1983) claim that planning is 'metacognitive' 
skill, but as mentioned in chapter 2 there is some confusion about 
whether it is a general or a domain specific ability from this perspective. 
The 'metacognitive' approach will not be considered in this chapter. 
The development of a generally applicable, higher cognitive process, 
would provide an alternative to a representational redescription 
approach. The 'expertise model' could be compatible \\'ith 
representational redescription, and \vould provide the basis for the 
developll1ent of a ne\\" RR ll10del or theor~r. 
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In this chapter some of the psychological literature on planning \\'ill 
reviewed in an attempt to establish a developmental sequence. The 
evidence will be seen to be scant and incomplete. The most detailed 
model in the area seems to be Isaev's (1985), in the socio-cultural 
paradigm, and this will be presented in the following chapter along 
with a replication of Isaev's planning experiment. The review in this 
chapter will conclude that the development of planning and flexibility 
within planning can be explained in terms of changes in the knowledge 
and its representation, i.e. the expertise model. 
2. Definition of planning 
Definitions of planning vary from those which characterise any goal 
directed action as planning, to those who consider the conscious pre-
determination of a course of action to be definitive. Some general 
definitions are: 
" ... the predetermination of a course of action aimed at achieving some 
goal" 
Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth 1979 (p. 275) 
"Planning is a complex form of symbolic action that consists of 
consciously preconceiving a sequence of actions that will be sufficient for 
achieving a goal." 
Pea 1982 (p. 6) 
'Planning is the use of knowledge for a purpose, the construction of an 
effective way to meet some future goal." 
Scholnick and Friedman 1993 (p.145) 
Friedman, Scholnick, and Cocking (1987) argue that it i~ the element of 
'lookahead' \vhich distinguishes planning from problem solving in 
general - a concern to predict actions, rather than an emphasis on 
immediate problems (although see chapter 7 for an alternative 
comparison). The essential elements, common to all definitions of 
planning are 'lookahead', and goal-directedness. These elements are 
not sufficient for defining a flexible plan. Flexibility will require 
awareness and some ability to consider alternative plans. The highest 
levels of planning clearly require flexibility in manipulating knowledge, 
and it is the progression to these higher levels that is of interest here. 
Planning is a cognitive process which operates over representations. 
Planning cannot occur in the absence of some domain and goal. Plans 
may be stored, and old plans executed in new circumstances, but there 
must be planning processes which can co-ordinate these or develop 
novel plans. Planning is a general purpose function which operates 
differently in different domains: 
It ••• different planning contexts make different processing demands ... a 
different developmental picture can emerge depending on the task 
chosen ." different people at different ages can approach the planning 
task in different ways in different contexts. It 
Scholnick and Friedman 1993 (p.l46) 
There are many distinctions and debates within the field, and different 
theories emphasise different parts of the process (Scholnick and 
Friedman 1987). In the following sections the psychological literature 
will be reviewed to find developmental sequences, as the basis for a 
comparison between the expertise and classic developmental models. 
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3. Types of Planning 
There are two types of planning: 'anticipatory plans' and 'opportunistic 
plans' (Scholnick and Friedman 1987). Anticipatory plans relate to 
those which are formulated entirely in advance and then executed. 
This may be an idealised conception of the process lshich applies to 
well-defined or limited tasks. This type of planning is tested in 'plan 
formulation' experiments such as Klahr and Robinson's (1981) which 
will be described in section 8. Opportunistic plans are those \vhich are 
created in stages, on the hoof, during the execution of the relevant 
activity. Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth (1979) argue that this type of 
incremental planning is most representative of behaviour in 
naturalistic tasks. These approaches to planning both contain the 
necessary 'predetermination' of action, but just appear to differ in the 
scope of the 'lookahead', whether it amounts to the complete task, or 
just a part of the task. However, in both cases there must be an 
apprecia tion of progression towards a goal, and an overview of the 
complete task against which to monitor progression. 
There have been many distinctions made within the domain, and 
De Lisi has attempted to produce a complete taxonomy of plans and 
planning. This is described in the next section. 
4. A taxonomy of planning development 
De Lisi (1987) proposed a taxonomy of planning development. In this 
section the taxonomy will be critically evaluated as to \vhether it 
provides a basic descriptive account of the different stages of planning. 
De Lisi's developmental model \\Till then be related to studil'~ of 
planning by other researchers. 
161 
De Lisi (1987) has described four types of plans and planning which 
vary in terms of the relationship between the plans and their contexts, 
the differentiation of the stages of planning, and the role of symbolic 
representations in the process. De Lisi claims that the four types of 
planning form a developmental sequence, in that, as the child grows 
she will be able to engage in more advanced types of planning 
The taxonomy aims to encompass both types of plans, types of 
planning and to describe a developmental sequence. The rationale 
being that these are linked; different types of plan require different types 
of planning, and that these develop together. The result of adopting 
such an ambitious remit is a rather superficial account of representation 
and, it will be argued, a fallacious conflation of planning situations and 
the associated planning processes. The taxonomy attempts to cover 
both behaviour and the underlying representation, but these are not 
necessarily directly associated. Karmiloff-Smith (1986) has argued 
persuasively that the same superficial behaviour could be produced by 
qualitatively different underlying representations. 
4.1 Type 1 - the 'plan in action' 
De Lisi describes type 1 plans as procedural rather than declarative 
knowledge. He argues that they are executed without any level of 
awareness, or any access to the constituent stages of planning. 
"A 'type 1 plan' is defined as a sequence of overt behaviours performed 
to achieve an objective. From the subject'S perspective, the underlying 
entity that orchestrates the sequence is purely functional and operates in 
a nonconscious, automatically regulating fashion." 
De Lisi 1987 (p. 92) 
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This definition is clearly reminiscent of Karmiloff-Smith's phase 1, 
where procedures are executed without awareness or access to their 
parts. 
De Lisi subdivides 'type 1 plans' into three groups 'voluntary', 
'involuntary', and what will be called 'developed' type 1 plans. 
Involuntary type 1 plans are, prototypically, instincts. Voluntary type 1 
plans include sensorimotor means-ends behaviours (Piaget 1952 cited in 
De Lisi 1987) and practical, trial-and-error problem solving. Mid-way 
between voluntary and involuntary plans, De Lisi claims, are habits or 
skilled motor sequences, e.g. driving a car or touch-typing 'which will, in 
this thesis, be referred to as 'developed' type 1. 
It will be argued that these subdivisions do not easily share the same 
overall category. They would seem to have qualitatively different 
histories and underlying representations. Voluntary and involuntary 
type 1 plans have no acquired conceptual element, but the motor skills 
included in the 'developed' category were learned, and will have 
involved a conscious processing stage. These plans only became 
procedural and were able to be operated without awareness through 
some skill acquisition process and associated representational change. 
De Lisi himself argues that a conscious representation of these motor 
skills can be accessed if something unexpected interrupts the execution. 
In contrast, voluntary and involuntary plans never had a conscious 
representational stage and are not open to 'debugging' in the same \\'ay 
as 'developed' plans. 
For De Lisi the three categories of type 1 plan have features in 
common. The planner is aware of a goal, and \vill execute a sequence of 
behaviours to achieve that goal. She is a\\'are of success or failure at 
goal attainment, but is not a\vare of the planning process. 
"In each case the model depicts the idea of an underlying, directing 
organization of overt behaviour without having attained the status of 
conscious, deliberate representation of behaviour and its regulation." 
De Lisi 1987 (p.93) 
In the case of instinct this is because the behaviour sequences are 
hardwired, with voluntary behaviours this is because a step-by-step 
rather than an overall approach is taken, and in the 'developed' case, it 
will be argued, that this is due to some kind of representational re-
formattingl. 
According to the brief definition of planning (section 2 above) type 1 
behaviours do not constitute planning, as they do not include the 
conscious advance prediction aspect of planning which was central to 
the working definition. However, voluntary and involuntary type 1 
plans may be classed as 'pre-planning' behaviours which are clearly 
related to the activities of interest and may precede them 
developmentally. 
In terms of creating a developmental sequence we are concerned 
with voluntary type 1 behaviours, which are roughly equivalent to 
Piaget's sensorimotor schemes (Piaget 1952, cited by De Lisi 1987). 
Sensorimotor schemes are learnt, and they are acquired on the basis of 
instinctive behaviours: the innate desire to grasp things then develops 
with experience into the voluntary type 1 behaviour of reaching for an 
object. It could be argued that type 1 involuntary behaviours could be a 
developmental precursor of type 1 voluntary behaviours. But, the 
'developed' type 1 grouping is quite distinct, these plans must have 
1 The term 'representational redescription' is not being used here, ,)<; in this l'\.ample the 
representation is becoming less accessible, whereas for Karmiloff-Smith Representational 
Redescription is ,1lways ,1 process of increasing explicitation. HO\\l'\er, the new model to 
be presented in chapter 9 will allow for both developmental sequences. 
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evolved from higher level plans. This means that the behaviours do 
not belong in the same category as pre-planning behaviours. For the 
emerging developmental sequence being presented in this chapter 
'developed' plans will not be included within the type 1 categorisation. 
Type 1 will be defined as De Lisi's voluntary type 1 behaviours and 
distinguished from instinctive behaviours \vhen discussing 
development. 
4.2 Type 2 - the 'plan of action' 
De Lisi's type 2 plans differ from type 1 plans in that the behavioural 
sequence, in addition to the goal, is anticipated before the course of 
action is triggered. This, he argues, requires the presence of a 
representational component which is lacking in type 1 plans. Type 2 
plans are directed towards immediate contextual problems rather than 
distant or hypothetical goals. 
Although the plan and the goal are distinct, type 2 planners are 
limited by the lack of an overview. They do not have a distinct phase of 
'recognition of the need to plan', and they are unable to monitor their 
performance. Any monitoring that does occur is carried out by a more 
capable other. 
The examples De Lisi (1987) gives of type 2 planning are a novice 
playing chess, adult direction of a child's problem solving, and skill 
acquisition. Thus, De Lisi includes both novice planners, i.e. children, 
and experienced planners operating in novel domains in the type 2 
category. If the same developmental progression is proposed, this is a 
wide ranging claim. It implies that the process of 'planning' depends 
on the development of domain knowledge, rather than the 
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development of a unitary planning ability which can then be applied to 
all domains. However, this distinction is not discussed by De Lisi. 
De Lisi includes in his type 2 category instances where the subject 
creates the plan and those where the plan is communicated to the 
subject by a more capable other. That is, both cases where the 
representational component is 'in the subject's head' and those \Nhere it 
is 'in the head of someone else'. These seem to be quite distinct types of 
planning. Wertsch (1985) and Vygotsky (1962) amongst others would 
argue that these two types of planning form a developmental sequence. 
Vygotsky suggests that higher cognitive processes, such as planning, are 
first experienced inter-psychologically and are later internalised to 
control the subject's own performance. In the developmental context 
De Lisi seems to be proposing this thesis of 'other-regulation' and 
internalisation (see chapter 2 and 7). However, it is not clear whether 
this is also the progression hypothesized for adult novices. 
4.3 Type 3 - the 'plan as a strategic representation' 
Type 3 plans are fully fledged plans. They use a representation of 
possible future courses of action, and the plans can be made in advance 
of the context of application. Each of the stages of planning are present 
and separate, the phases being plan recognition, plan formulation, and 
plan execution. 
"Plan as a strategic representation. A deliberate, strategic representation 
of anticipated future states of the environment and behaviour sequences 
designed to deal with them. Subject is aware of each phase of planning, 
and represents relationships among formulations, executions, and goals." 
De Lisi 1987 (p. 91) 
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This fully rounded planning process seems to be a significant advance 
on the type of supported planning proposed by type 2 planning. There 
is no account of the developmental progression from type 2 into type 3 
planning, beyond the mention of 'internalisation'. A more detailed 
developmental sequence, in this tradition, is that of Isaev (1985) which 
will be considered in chapter 7. 
4.4 Type 4 plans 
De Lisi defines type 4 as the type of plan which is developed for a 
distant, contingent, or hypothetical goal. It is a high level of planning, 
where the creation of a plan is the goal of the activity. An example of 
such a plan would be the organisation of social services in the event of a 
nuclear war. The recognition of the need for such plans is central to the 
activity, in the clear knowledge that the event planned for may never 
happen. 
De Lisi's type 4 plans will not be described further as they are only 
differentiated from type 3 plans by the nature of the goal. In terms of a 
developmental sequence the processes will be the same. Type 4 plans 
are generated to achieve a hypothetical goal, but if that goal becomes a 
reality subjects execute the plan in the same manner as a type 3 plan. In 
terms of the cognitive processes involved type 4 is not a qualitatively 
different form of planning from type 3. In both cases the planner is 
aware of, and in control of, all the component processes. 
4.5 De Lisi's developmental progressions 
De Lisi has identified four types of planning, of \vhich the first three are 
of interest to us. He claims they form a developmental progression, but 
does not specify any mechanisms for the development of one t~lH.> of 
plan. He briefly ackno\dedges the Yygotskian internalisation approach, 
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but it is not clear whether this is also proposed for development in 
adults. The range of tasks which are grouped under each type do not fit 
easily together, particularly in type 1 which includes both the most basic 
instinctive plans, and the advanced automatised plans associated with 
skilled performance. This conflation is due to attempts to account for 
development and to categorize all types of planning within the one 
taxonomy. As a result no mention is made of where 'developed' type 1 
fits into a developmental sequence. 
Another issue with De Lisi's account is that it is not clear if he 
believes that children acquire more advanced plans for more advanced 
tasks, or whether they learn to apply more sophisticated planning 
techniques to the same tasks. All his examples in each category are of 
quite different types of planning. 
De Lisi claims that his taxonomy reflects developments in terms of 
four functions: (i) a shift from 'functional' to 'representational' 
planning; (ii) the distancing of planning from the context of execution; 
(iii) the elaboration of the representational component; (iv) the 
increasing differentiation of the phases of planning. These are 
interesting concepts, which we describe further below, but they do not 
seem to relate directly to the four categories of plan in his taxonomy. 
4.5.1 Functional-representational shift 
The ontogenetically earliest plans are purely functional. There is no 
representational component, they are just a behavioural sequence 
generated to achieve a goal. Later in development a representational 
component allows the behavioural sequence to be rehearsed in 
advancp, and facilitates the consideration of alternative behaviour 
sequences. The representational component then decrea~es in 
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importance with the development of skilled behaviour: overlearned 
plans are executed without any reference to the representational 
component being required. Although, if the plan execution is disrupted 
in some way, the representational component can be accessed. 
It could be argued that all activity must be generated by a 
representation at some level. The movement which is characterised as 
'functional to representational' might relate to the development of 
flexibility in a given domain. This shift could be compatible with the 
representational redescription model, locating the change in the 
representational format. 
4.5.2 Relationship of plan to context 
Linked to the functional-representational shift is the relationship of 
plans to their context. Early plans are directly linked to their context of 
occurrence, both the instigation and the execution of the plan are 
dependent on the relevant stimuli being present. Later plans can be 
formulated in advance of events and to fulfil hypothetical goals. De Lisi 
hypothesizes that the separation of plans from contexts occurs on a 
continuum, but again he does not suggest any mechanisms for the 
developmental shift. Donaldson (1992) argues that development in 
general, involves a distancing of thought from context, and this 
progression may not be specific to planning. 
4.5.3 Representational component 
The ability to separate plans from their context is dependent on the 
development of a representational component, and the related 
developments of logical structure, mental anticipation, knowledge base 
and memory. De Lisi quotes Piaget and Inhelder (1958), and Spitz et al 
(1982) as having demonstrated that a more elaborate representation 
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facilitates plan formulation. However, he does not elaborate on the 
possible mechanisms for the development of the representational 
component, although he seems to be advocating a 'classic 
developmental', rather than an 'expertise' view here .. 
4.5.4 Differentiation of planning phases 
De Lisi identifies three components of planning which he claims are 
fused in early plans: plan recognition, plan formulation and plan 
execution. Increasingly these components become temporally and 
functionally differentiated. At first they are merged in an 
undifferentiated plan, then the plan formulation phase is separated-
from the execution of the plan. The last phase to develop is the 
recognition of the need to plan. 
4.6 Conclusion 
The different developmental progressions advocated by De Lisi, 
although interesting in themselves, do not map easily onto his four 
planning phases. Contradictions emerge, rather than a unified model 
of planning development. The differentiation of the planning phases is 
the main component of De Lisi's shift from type 2 to type 3 planning, 
which De Lisi explains in terms of the internalisation of adult 
distinctions (following Vygotsky 1962). In contrast the 'function to 
representational shift' seems to describe an entirely different 
developmental sequence, which describes the progression associated 
\\'ith skilled performance that results in the 'developed type l' plans. 
De Lisi does not suggest any mechanisms for the development of the 
representation component, although if he is relating it to skill 
acquisition it must include domain knowledge. He does not explicitly 
Inention \\Thether the development of a representational component 
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occurs on tasks where previously a functional approach had been taken, 
or whether the representational component accompanies totally new 
planning situations. 
De Lisi's taxonomy attempts to provide an account of both 
ontogenetic development of planning, and that associated with skill 
acquisition in adults. It aims to categorise types of plans in conjunction 
with types of planning. This is an laudable aim, but no underlying 
mechanisms are proposed to unify the approach. The result is a rather 
fragmentary account, containing wide variety of examples which does 
not provide the clear developmental sequence. A clear developmental 
sequence would provide the basis for evaluating any proposed 
developmental mechanism whether 'classic developmental' or 
'expertise' based. 
5. Development of planning in naturalistic search tasks 
The transition between type 1 and type 2 planning, on De Lisi's account 
would relate to the emergence of planning. Wellman and his 
colleagues have looked at young children's behaviour in an attempt to 
discover the origins of planning abilities. They have used various 
search tasks and have distinguished between planful and non-planful 
solutions (Wellman and Somerville 1982; Wellman, Somerville, 
Revelle, Haake, and Sophian 1984; Wellman, Fabricius and Sophian 
1985). Physically searching for missing objects was thought to be a 
naturalistic task which would be understood by even the very young. 
\Vellman and colleagues have argued that there is a gradual 
progression from non-planful to planful approaches to the task. 
\Vellman et al (1984) carried out two search tasks \\'hich indicated 
that young children were able to understand the requirements of the 
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task, and to search systematically in supportive conditions. In their first 
task 21/2- to 5-year-old children were required to exhaustively search 8 
dustbins in 6 conditions (3 x 2 design). The dustbins were arranged in 
one of three patterns: a semi-circle, a circle, or a random pattern, and 
each pattern was presented in two lid conditions, either the lids of the 
dustbins closed automatically after having been searched or they stayed 
open. It was hypothesized that the arrangements of the bins would 
affect the ease with which children could keep track of their search. The 
semi-circular arrangement was thought to be the most supportive as it 
provided an implicit order of search, and both a stopping and a starting 
position; the circular arrangement suggested an order of search, but 
without defined stopping and starting positions; the random 
arrangement provided none of these supports. The 'lids-open' trials 
were hypothesized to be more supportive than the 'lids-closed' trials as 
they provided an external memory for which locations had been 
searched. 
In terms of the exhaustiveness of their search the youngest age 
group (21/2- to 3-year-olds) were able to perform as well as the older 
children in the most supportive conditions. In every 'lids-open' trial 
they searched all the locations exhaustively. However they were more 
redundant in their searches than older children in both the 'lids-open' 
and 'lids-closed' conditions. All age groups showed less redundancy 
when the lids remained open than when they closed automatically. All 
the children who searched systematically adopted an approximately 
circular strategy for all arrangements. As a result, the circular 
arrangement \\'as found to be more systematically searched than the 
senli-circle, '\Thich ,vas in turn better searched than the random 
arrangement. In the 'lids-closed' conditions, the sy s tema tic 
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arrangement of locations facilitated the youngest children in searching 
exhaustively, but did not help to avoid redundancy. 
The oldest children studied on this task (41/2- to 5-year-olds) H'ere 
capable of searching exhaustively and non-redundantly in all 
conditions. The efficiency of the search of younger children depended 
on the availability of external supports and improved gradually with 
age. Improved performance in the most supportive conditions 
indicates that even the youngest children understood the requirement 
of executing an exhaustive, non-redundant search, but without the 
external support they were unable to perform it. Wellman et al (1984) 
do not suggest any explanation for the differences in performance, but it 
is possible that the explanation may be related to cognitive capacity 
limitations. The results indicate that the deficit was not a lack of 
knowledge about the task, but difficulties in terms of execution. The 
younger children were unable to keep track of their progress. 
In their second task Wellman et al (1984) focussed on an Issue 
arising from the child's ability to adopt a systematic search strategy: the 
goal of minimising distance travelled. They tested 3 to 5-year-old 
children on a search task which required them to find five Easter eggs 
which they had seen being hidden at different locations in the 
playground of their pre-school. The locations fell (loosely) into two 
irregular clusters on either side of the playground. The 'clustering' of 
the locations ,vas not obvious to us from the diagram they provide 
(Wellman et al 1984, p. 476). The distance between the left-most egg in 
the right hand cluster and the right-most egg in the left hand cluster i~ 
about the same as the distance between the two eggs in the left-hand 
cluster. It is certainly not clear that children H'ould perceive these 
locations as 'clustered'. The locations could be divided into those to the 
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left and those to the right of the child's starting position, but this 
analysis would only have relevance to a child 'who considered all the 
locations before moving, i.e. a planner. The goal of minimising 
distances in the task was argued by Wellman et al (1984) to be valid as 
the distances between locations were large enough to be salient to even 
the youngest children tested. Although it is arguable how much of a 
sanction running around a familiar playground would prove to be for 
young children, as this is a normal recreational activity for them. In 
fact, they found that the total distances travelled by each age group did 
not differ from chance, showing that either the children did not aim to 
minimise distance travelled, or else they did not achieve it. 
Notwithstanding the criticisms of the study, all the children were 
found to traverse the playground (move between 'clusters') less than 
would be expected by chance. This could be because children planned to 
minimise distance travelled, but Wellman et al (1984) argue that this 
result could also be achieved by a 'sighting' approach, where children 
went from the nearest/ most salient location to the next. In both cases, 
the cluster first examined would be more likely to be examined 
exhaustively before the playground was traversed to search the other 
'cluster'. Wellman et al (1984) argue that the production of a sequence 
of actions which achieves a goal is not adequate evidence to conclude 
that a child has engaged in planning. The behaviour could be achieved 
by the preconception of a series of moves, or by a 'step-by-step' approach 
choosing each move only after the execution of the previous one based 
on considerations of immediate perceptual saliency. 
In later experiments Wellman, Fabricius and Sophian (1 q~5) 
described the behavioural evidence for different approaches based on 
the planning and sighting approaches by children. They distinguish 
174 
between two alternative 'sighting' strategies which are used by non-
planning pre-school children: line of vision and proximity. These 
strategies involve searching the location in direct line of vision and the 
nearest location respectively. In each of these strategies only one move 
is considered at a time, in a 'step-by-step' approach. Older children 
consider all the locations and plan to use the shortest possible route 
regardless of these other influences. 
Wellman et al (1985) used another search task to distinguish 
between planning and sighting behaviours. The task involved 
collecting three Easter eggs from three clearly visible \\'hite buckets and 
depositing them in a target red bucket. The locations of the \vhite and 
red buckets were varied in order to isolate the factors which affected 
their search strategies. The children were asked to go 'the quick \vay', 
and again it was argued that the distances involved were large enough 
to be salient to pre-school children (around 28 feet between locations). 
The children tested were aged 3- to 5-years old. Wellman et al (1985) 
predicted that children who were able to plan a route would minimise 
the distance travelled. Those influenced by line of vision would first 
take the location straight ahead, and those influenced by proximity 
would take the nearest first. Wellman et al also considered the possible 
attractive or aversive affect of the target red bucket, but found that this 
was not a factor. It was then possible to predict the first moves by 
subjects using each approach on each of the the arrays illustrated in 
figure 17). The predictions are shown in table 4. 
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XA C XA 
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Array 3 B 
t 
s 
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-J 
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Figure 17. Five 3-location search arrays used by Wellman et al (1985). S indicates 
subjects location, arrows indicate subjects line of vision. X indicates end point. 
Approach Search Array 
1 2 3 4 5 
Planning C C B/C B/C C 
Sigh ting by line of vision B B B B B 
Sighting by proximity - B - A C 
Table 4. Predicted first moves on Wellman et aI's (1985) search task. 
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Wellman et al (1985) found that the first move by all their subjects ,,'as 
based on sighting, with line of vision predominating: 661 ( of subjects 
moved to location B. Having moved to location B, subjects found 
themselves faced with a 2 move search problem in \\'hich neither 
location was straight-ahead and neither location \\'as nearer than the 
other (see figure 17). However, a move to location C ,,'ould avoid 
considerable backtracking. At this point the behaviour of the different 
age groups diverged: three-year-old children operated at chance level 
(51 % choosing C), but both 4 and 5-year olds planned to avoid 
backtracks: 4-year olds 69% and 5-year olds 77j:(i of the time. 
In a follow-up study Wellman et al (1985) carried out a two location 
version of the task to investigate at what age planning dominates 
behaviour and replaces sighting. The two location arrays (illustrated in 
figure 18) eliminated the possible influence of line of vision sighting, 
and manipulated the influences of proximity-sighting and planning. 
The results, in terms of the first location searched by subjects in each age 
group are shown in table 5. 
In array 1 the only possible influence on choice of location is 
planning. Children who are able to plan should choose location B. 3-
year olds were found to behave randomly in this condition, but some 
3 1 /2-year-olds showed evidence of planning, and the proportion 0 f 
planners can be seen to increase with age. By looking across the rows of 
the table, the effects of planning and sighting, separately and in 
combination, can be evaluated. For the 41/ 2-year-olds, it can be seen that 
the influences of both proximity and planning have an equal effect 
(guiding 73:;;1 of location choices) "'hen the:' are the sole potential factor. 
\ "hen they reinforce one another (array 3) this percentage increasl's to 
HY'I'. Ho\vever, planning does not donlinate sighting at this age, and 
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Array 1 Planning Array 2 Proximity 
XA B A 
B 
~ + S 
S X 
Array 3 
Planning & Proximity 
A rray 4 
PJanni ng vs. Proximi ty 
XA A 
B BX 
+ 
S + S 
4.1...--_________ --.l 
Figure 18. Four 2- location sea rch arrays used by WeHma n e t al (1985). S indi cates 
s ubjects location, arrows indicate subjects line of vis ion. X indica tes end point. 
Arrays 
Age 1 2 3 4 
A . B. A. B. A B B 
3.0 .50 .50 .42 .58 .47 .53 .47 .53 
3.6 .42 .58 .42 .58 .30 .70 .52 .48 
4.6 .27 .73 .27 .73 .17 .83 .47 .5 3 
5.G . 08 .92 . .62 .38 .08 .92 .88 .1 2 
Ta ble 5. First locations searched by age-g ro up for the arra ho\ n in figure 1 
(ad a pted from We llmclll e t a l 19 5) 
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when the influences conflict, as in array 4, performance decreases "'ith 
only half the children (47%) taking a planning approach. In contrast, 
the 51/ 2-year-olds maintained a strong planning effect in array 4. 
The previous paragraph reports the aspects of the results that 
Wellman et al (1985) choose to discuss, but there are other factors "'hich 
they do not mention. Their summary supports their conclusion that 
planning takes over gradually from sighting, but from this study there 
is no evidence that proximity is ever actually as strong an influence on 
behaviour as planning. In array 2 proximity is the only pos~ible 
influence and those using that strategy should show a marked 
preference for location B. In fact, only the 41/ 2-year-olds show a strong 
effect and, as argued above, they also show evidence of planning. 31/2-
year-olds show a slight preference for the proximate location, but like 
the 41/ 2-year olds, this effect is not as strong as the cOll1bined effects of 
planning and sighting in array 3. The 3-year olds show no influence of 
planning in array 1, but produced the same result as 31/2-year-olds on 
array 2, indicating an effect of proximity. However, if the 3-year olds are 
oblivious to planning, they should also show the effects of proximity on 
arrays 3 and 4, but instead they behaved at chance level. This casts 
doubt on the significance of the 42% /58% results2 for 3- and ]1/ 2-year-
olds on array 2, who may, in fact, have been behaving randolnly. An 
unmentioned quirk in the results is that 5-year-olds actually seem to 
reject the proximate location in array 2, but 'Vellman et al (1985) do not 
comment on this result. There does not seem to be any support in these 
results for the idea that there is a stage "'here proximity-sighting 
dOll1inates behaviour. It could then be argued that planning and 
2 Wellman et a) (1985) do not give details of the number of subjects tested in each age 
group and, ,1S such, \\l' cannot t'v,1Iuate at \\hich point the ~1rOp?rti~~s reportl>d differ. 
significl1nth from challce. J'heir conclusion is that A2/.58 IS a slgmficant re .... ult, but .t ..... 
sighting develop together, and only later is sighting dropped in favour 
of a planning approach. Wellman et al (1985) might not have chosen 
the best task to support their conclusion, since in their previous study 
they found line-of-vision-sighting to be the most dominant influence, 
but, they chose to concentrate on the less influential proximity-sighting 
in this task. 
5.1 Discussion 
Wellman et al (1985) conclude a discussion of their studies by reiterating 
the conclusion from their 1984 paper, 
" ... young children's search processes represent a mixture of sighting and 
planning, with planning growing in dominance over the preschool 
years." 
Wellman, Fabricius and Sophian 1985 (p. 132) 
Their later experiments provided some additional quantitative results, 
but do not enable them to go beyond a purely descriptive account. 
There is no evidence that planning develops from sighting, only that 
sighting provides a transitory influence on search behaviour (possibly 
unrelated to planning), which at a certain age overlaps with the 
developing ability to plan. 
All the children tested were successful on the tasks, \\Thich indicates 
that they understood and remembered the goal, although they either 
did not understand, or did not remember the means of achieving the 
goal. The studies carried out by 'Vellman et al (\Yellman and 
Somerville 1982; 'Vellman, Somerville, Revelle, Haake, and Sophian 
1984; \Vellman, Fabricius and Sophian 1985) do not advance our 
questioned on the grounds th.lt the numbers of children tested in their pre\'ious "tudil'" 
were not lilrge. 
understanding of how these approaches develop, how they are related 
to each other, or how they are represented cognitively. 'Vellman et al 
1985 promise to elaborate on the two behaviours: 
" In our current work (Fabricius, Wellman, and Sophian, in preparation), 
we have distinguished between planning and sighting more directly 
and definitively, by using search tasks especially constructed to contrast 
planned paths with those possible by sighting alone." 
Wellman, Fabricius and Sophian 1985, (p. 128) 
Sadly, the article that finally appeared (Fabricius 1988) did not have 
anything more to say on the topic, but provided instead m 0 r e 
quantitative (but still descriptive) data. 
Wellman et al (1985) justify the use of search problems as they are 
naturalistic. They argue that for young children planning may only 
appear in context, as a part of a specific task. They contrast their 
approach to that of Klahr and Robinson (1981, see section 7) which 
requires children to produce a plan in isolation from any activity. 
There is certainly a case for naturalistic studies, but at the current level 
of knowledge of planning development, the problems of isolating 
planning processes from other processes are immense. In relation to 
the underlying cognitive processes and representations, the naturalistic 
approach has not provided much information. In the section 7 the 
alternative "pure planning" approach of Klahr and Robinson (1981) will 
be described. 
Wellman et al (1985) have outlined a possible developmental 
progression in terms of the goals and constraints \\'hich children's 
planning is able to address 
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"A possible developmental progression is from sensitivity to the need for 
and ability at formulating plans (a) designed to ensure success, to (b) 
those designed to ensure efficiency - in terms of the general constraints of 
effort - to (c) those designed to minimize cognitive costs, such as 
boredom. Such a progression, if verified, would help explain quite a 
few developmental differences in problem solving" 
Wellman, Fabricius, and Sophian 1985 (p. 144) 
However, using search tasks to identify planning development may be 
problematic in just these terms. Search tasks can benefit from planning, 
but they do not require planning to be successfully solved. Particularly 
with the low level of the tasks used in these studies the need to plan 
may not be obvious. Children may know that the task of collecting 
objects is achieved by picking them up one at a time, and not go further 
than that. Such a procedure will lead to success. What they may not 
appreciate is the need to plan, \i\Thich is an arbitrary part of the request, 
or the fact that there are alternative paths possible. Children may have 
the capability to plan in a task that requires planning for success, but in 
these simple search tasks (as in many real life situations) a simpler step 
by step (or trial and error) strategy will work. Planning in these task 
depends on the the children relating their behaviour to considerations 
of efficiency, such as minimising distance travelled. Efficiency in such 
abstract tasks is basically a convention which has to be learned. These 
concerns are not central to young children, and running around a 
playground 'would not be considered a great sanction inducing them to 
plan ahead. This type of task does not tap the earliest planning 
situations, on \Yellman et aI's (1985) own account, those that require 
planning for success "Till emerge first. Thus,' Yellman et aI's studies 
may underestimate the age at 'which children are able to plan. 
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These studies provide some interesting descriptive data, but they do 
not provide clear data for either the classic developmental, expertise or 
metacognitive models of planning development. A possible 
interpretation of their results is that planning appears relatively late in 
search tasks, as the tasks can be successfully performed without 
planning. The application of a planning approach is dependent on the 
appreciation of arbitrary conventions on the method of being successful. 
Whilst this is very general knowledge, it might be the acquisition of this 
knowledge rather than the development of a general planning ability 
which accounts for the change from sighting to planning. 
6. Development of planning in relation to general event knowledge 
This section describes a further naturalistic task, tapping the emergence 
of early planning, in a shopping task. Hudson and FivuslJ (1991) stress 
the role of general event knowledge and external environmental 
support in the development of planning. They argue that planning 
develops first in relation to familiar events, the representation of these 
events being organised as a generalised event representation (GER). 
GER's are script-like organisations containing the action sequences, 
temporally and spatially specified which constitute an event. However, 
GER's differ from scripts (Shank and Abelson 1977) in that the former 
provide the basis for planning whereas the latter are conceived as the 
result of recurring plans. 
Hudson and Fivush propose 5 levels of planning in relation to 
GER's. At level 0, the plan is the GER. The child carries out the action 
sequence as specified in the GER, and therefore does not need to plan. 
Levell, requires the child to fill slots in the GER. For example, the 
getting dressed GER \\'ill contain different items depending on the 
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activity planned, e.g. for a school day or for a party. Level 2 planning 
involves multiple goals. For example a 'going shopping' event, \\Till 
draw on other GER's e.g. breakfast, lunch and house cleaning, to fill the 
'select items' slots in the shopping script. These three levels of 
planning are suggested to characterise planning in pre-school children. 
The two higher levels of planning are level 3, co-ordinated event 
planning, where a set of independent events (e.g. shopping, laundry, fix 
the sink, make dinner) are co-ordinated into a sensible sequence. At the 
highest level, level 4, the action sequences are disembedded from 
specific GER's and the elements are reassembled to generate novel 
plans. 
Hudson and Fivush (1991) used a shopping task to investigate 
children's progression between planning levels. They claim that this 
would more accurately reflect children's planning abilities than 
previous route planning (Gauvain, 1989, Gauvain and Rogoff, 1989) and 
maze planning tasks (Gardner and Rogoff, 1990). These shopping tasks, 
they claim, only require level 1 or level 2 planning whilst the novel 
maze and route planning tasks require novel plans to be generated, 
which means level 4 planning. 
In the shopping task children had to select items for either a birthday 
party or for breakfast, or for both from a 'supermarket' of twenty items 
displayed on two bookcases. There were five items appropriate to each 
specific event, and ten distractors. After familiarisation with the 
'supermarket', the children were asked to generate a shopping list (a 
plan) and then to execute the plan by collecting items in a shopping 
trolley. 
There were t\VO 'planning' conditions. Children were either asked 
to produce a (verbal) list of the items appropriate for one of the t\\·u 
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events, in which case they were subsequently asked to plan for the other 
event (successive condition) or they were asked to list the items for both 
the party and breakfast together (simultaneous condition). In all the 
conditions, after producing their list, the children were then asked to 
shop for the items. There were also two shopping conditions: either the 
relevant items were grouped onto the same shelf (clustered), or they 
were interleaved with the distractors. The former was a more 
supportive environment. 
All the children were better able to plan for one event at a time, than 
for two events simultaneously on the basis of the number of items 
generated for each event. Four- and 5-year-old children generated more 
relevant items in the plan construction phase than the 3-year olds. In 
the shopping phase, 3-year olds tended to select everything, and were 
unable to use their plan except in the most supportive condition (the 
successive event condition with clustered displays). The 4-year-olds 
performed randomly on the least supportive condition (simultaneous 
with interleaved display), but were able to benefit from both the simpler 
task and the environmental support so that when both were present 
their performance equalled that of the 5-year-olds. The 5-year-olds 
shopped significantly better than either the 3- or 4- year olds and did not 
appear to be affected by either task or environment variables in their 
shopping performance. 
The shopping performance was a measure of both advance planning 
and opportunistic planning, as children were able to select appropriate 
items which had not been explicitly planned for. A truer indication of 
advance planning ability was provided by the interaction of the 
planning and performance components, a measure of h()\\' \\'ell the 
individual carried out her plan, regardless of the merit of that plan. 
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The children were generally good at executing their plans, although 
performances improved with age and were again better in the 
successive than in the simultaneous condition. 
In a subsequent experiment, Hudson and Fivush (1991) provided 3-
and 4-year olds with support for their plan creation. The experimenter 
provided feedback on the appropriateness of an item suggested by the 
child, either in terms of event-consistency or the item's presence in the 
supermarket. The child was then reminded twice during the shopping 
phase, what the goal was. This kind of support was dearly helpful to 
the 4-year-olds who now performed at the level of the 5-year-olds in the 
previous experiment. The performance of the 3-year-olds improved 
and they showed evidence of following a plan, but they were affected by 
the cognitive loads imposed by the varying conditions. Thus, the 
memory load of the simultaneous condition, and the lack of support 
from the interleaved displays both decreased their 'shopping scores'. 
6.1 Discussion 
The shopping task is a naturalistic one, recognisable and played as a 
game by many children. However, the game may be more common, 
and more elaborated, in five-year-olds than in 3-year-olds. The 
constraints of the task, to select only the items specified in a plan would 
not be a part of the normal shopping game, and these would require a 
novel perspective on their shopping and event knowledge. The 
breakfast and party events will have been experienced from a 
participant's point of view rather than from a shopper's perspective. 
Planning the shopping for these events involves adopting an adult 
goal. It is arguable ,vhether they were really testing planning at levels 1 
and 2, as they claimed. The task seems to require the generation of a 
novel (for the subject) plan, co-ordinating their shopping GER \\'i th 
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their breakfast or party GER, novel plans only being a feature on 
Hudson & Fivush's sequence of levels 4. 
Hudson and Fivush (1991) seem to have three separate progressions 
involved in their single sequence, one in terms of the subjects' ability to 
engage in plans progressing up the GER knowledge hierarchy (level 0 to 
1 to 3), and one in terms of increased plan flexibility, and the ability to 
co-ordinate multiple GER's at anyone level (level 1 to level 2). The 
separate level 4, allowing for 'creativity' could apply to any level of the 
knowledge hierarchy. These distinctions will be clarified in the model 
to be developed in chapter 9. 
Hudson and Fivush (1991) do not propose any mechanisms for the 
transition between levels of planning, which might have highlighted 
the problems with their transition sequence. However, they argue that 
the development of both event knowledge, and plan-monitoring skills 
might be implicated. They conclude that: 
" ... with increasing age and event experience, children become 
increasingly able to flexibly coordinate event knowledge in the service 
of planning ... [and] become less dependent on external supports to assist 
then in plan construction and execution. II 
Hudson and Fivush 1991 (p.414) 
This conclusion, whilst convincingly supported by their results, does 
not help differentiate between different developmental mechanisms. 
Either an expertise view or a classic developmental vie,v could be 
consistent with that result. The effect of environmental support ,vas 
also found by Wellman et al (1984) in his bin searching task. Ho\-vever, 
it is not clear how children are benefiting, in cognitive terms, from the 
support, or if it is causally implicated in development. A potential 
explanation could be offered that it is processing capacity \\'hich 
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develops. In these situations it could be simply memory which is being 
supported rather than the planning process itself which is being 
'scaffolded'. 
7. Development of planning on a formal task: the Towers of Hanoi 
A 'plan formulation' approach to planning development ,\'as adopted 
by Klahr and Robinson (1981), who asked children to produce a verbal 
plan without actually executing it. The advantage of the approach is 
that there is no question of whether or not planning has taken place, as 
the product of the task is a pure plan. Klahr and Robinson (1981) tested 
subjects with a towers of Hanoi isomorph, and required them to 
generate a verbal move sequence. They were given no feedback on 
their performance which allowed Klahr and Robinson (1981) to capture 
a static picture of the planning level of each subject. Subjects were 
presented with tasks of increasing difficulty which, with feedback, might 
have lead to subjects improving their performance on the later tasks. 
The task used (an isomorph of the 'tower of Hanoi') is less 
'ecologically valid' than those described in the previous section and it 
has has been criticised on this basis (Wellman, Fabricius and Sophian 
1985). However, the constraints of the task allowed a formalisation of 
the cognitive processes involved in the plan construction stage of the 
planning process. This kind of analysis has been lacking in the 
literature reviewed so far. 
Klahr and Robinson (1981) quote Piaget (1976) as arguIng that 
children of 5 and 6 years old cannot perform the 3 move to, n:'r of Hanoi 
problem3 and can only succeed on the two disk problem by trial and 
J The basic tower of Hanoi task involves a tower of three rings, small, medium, and 
large, which have to be transferred from one of three posts to another. The restriction 
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error. Klahr and Robinson (1981) found this surprising as the two ring 
tower of Hanoi is a trivial problem merely involving the movement of 
the two rings to the goal peg in the correct order. This is equivalent to 
the type of two move problem solving performed successfully by infants 
(Gratch 1975, quoted in Klahr and Robinson 1981), and therefore well 
below the capabilities of five-year-old children on everyday tasks. 
As the abstract nature of the original tower of Hanoi problem might 
have been a barrier to children's problem solving Klahr and Robinson 
(1981) used an isomorphic task with a plausible cover story. They also 
used materials which supported the child's observance of the rules and 
their memory for the goal state. Klahr and Robinson's isomorph 
involved moving three different-sized cans between the three posts. 
The ordering constraint of the original tower of Hanoi was built in to 
the problem as a smaller can could not be placed on top of a larger can as 
it would fall off. It was thus impossible to execute an illegal move. 
However, it was possible to generate an illegal move sequence, as the 
child was only describing a move sequence which was not executed. 
The three posts and cans were positioned opposite an identical set of 
cans which represented the goal state of the problem. The cover story 
involved a family of copy-cat monkeys (the large can was the father, 
medium was the mother, and small was the baby) who lived in three 
trees. These monkeys lived on the experimenter's side of a river. On 
the child's side were another family of monkeys who indicated the 
required goal state. The child's task was to instruct the experimenter in 
on the movement of the rings are that only one ring at a time may be moved, and a 
smaller ring must not be placed on top of a larger ring. The minimum move sequence 
for a three ring tower is seven moves. Problems \\'ith increasing numbers of ring are 
solved according to the same algorithm although the number of moves increases with a 
fou r move problem requiring 15 moves etc. 
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how to move her copy-cat monkeys so that they could be like the child's 
monkeys. 
Klahr and Robinson (1981) presented the problem with a variety of 
initial and goal states, unlike the standard tower of Hanoi problem. 
This meant that optimal solutions varied from one move up to the 
seven move optimum of the traditional three-ring tower of Hanoi 
problem. There were two main variations in goal states in that some 
problems ended with the cans in the traditional tower formation 
(tower-ending) and some problems with the cans distributed one to a 
peg (flat-ending). 
The problems were presented to 4- to 6-year old children in order of 
increasing difficulty starting with the one move problems. The child 
then progressed up to their own limit. After an initial familiarisation 
the subjects were not encouraged to handle the cans and instead were 
asked to direct the experimenter as to how she should move her cans. 
The experimenter did not actually move any of the cans or give the 
child any other feedback on her performance. The child was, thus, 
operating in a 'pure planning' mode and was not improving her 
performance during the course of the experiment. 
Klahr and Robinson used Siegler's 'rule-assessment' methodology 
to develop profiles of potential strategies used by children. The profiles 
assumed three general principles for operating on the environment 
which, they argued, could be assumed to be possessed by all the children 
studied: 
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PI: If you want object X to be in location B, and it is currently in 
location A, then try to move it from A to B. 
P2: If you want to move object X from A to B, and object Y is in the 
way, then remove object Y. 
P3: If the thing you are doing is too hard, then do some part of it 
that IS eaSIer. 
Klahr and Robinson 1981 (p. 132) 
The first two of these principles would normally develop during 
infancy, but the assumption of the third seems more problematic. 
Children may well operate on the principle 'If the thing you are doing is 
too hard, then get someone to do it for you or do something else'. The 
level of analysis required to distinguish a part of the problem which is 
easier may well be a later development. It also depends on the problem 
type as sub-goals are not always easy to distinguish. Children may well 
do something far more ad hoc before they are able to isolate a subgoal. 
Klahr and Robinson created nine models of performance which 
have been specified in a MacLisp program. The nine models differed on 
three functions, (i) subgoal selection, (ii) obstructor detection and 
removal, and (iii) search depth, which were problem-specific versions 
of the general principles outlined above. Subgoal selection refers to the 
choice of the next can which needs to be moved to the goal peg. 
Obstructor detection and removal involves the identification of 
obstacles (which may be blocking either the 'from' or the 'to' peg) and 
the decision as to where to move the obstructor to. Search depth refers 
to the number of moves \\Thich can be planned ahead. An additional 
factor is the use of a simple means-ends analysis, evaluating \vhether a 
move has a 'positive goal gradient', i.e. if it results in more cans on the 
target peg. The lllodeis ,,'ere created a priori and then related to the 
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performance of the subjects. They were used to analyse the behaviour 
of the six-year-old group and a subset of six of the models vvere found to 
closely mirror the performance of individuals across the problem set. 
The weakest subjects operated with models 1 and 2, the best subjects 
with model 9, and the mid-range with models 4, 6, and 8. It is this 
subset of the models that we will consider as a possible developmental 
sequence. 
The models applied to performance across all the problems although 
they found differences in performance based on the goal state of the 
problem: 'tower-ending' problems were easier than 'flat-ending' 
problems. This was due to the clear sub-goal structure in tower-ending 
problems which was absent in flat ending problems. 
Klahr and Robinson's models were compared with their subject's 
first move on each problem. They argued that because they provided 
subjects with a range of initial and goal states, the first move of any 
particular problem was the x-I move on another problem. This 
approach was necessary because of their 'pure planning' task, without 
the child seeing their moves executed. Many problems occurred in the 
later moves due to memory problems, mis-remembering the current 
state, for example, which could not be disentangled from their planning 
performance 
7.1 Weakest subjects 
The weakest subjects' behaviour could be modelled by two different 
models. Both these models move the smallest can \vhich is not on its 
goal peg first. This means attempting to solve the n10st constrained 
problem first. This may reflect the fact that the smallest can is visibly 
the first problen1 to solve as it ends up underneath the others. 
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Model 1 reflects subjects' inability to operate within the rules. Thev 
have identified the goal, but attempt to move the cans directly to the 
goal peg regardless of any obstructions. This model is reminiscent of De 
Lisi's type 1 planners who are dominated by the goal of the problem and 
unaware of the processes involved in achieving it. 
Model 2 works within the rules, but has no look-ahead and is 
dominated by physical salience. An obstructing can on the "from" peg 
is moved to free up the target can, with no consideration as to where 
the obstructor is put. The subjects do not anticipate obstructions on the 
'to' peg, as they are focussed on the 'from' peg i.e. the first part of the 
move. This is similar to the 'step-by-step' sighting strategies described 
by Wellman et al (1985) in their search task. 
7.2 Intermediate subjects 
Behaviour of intermediate subjects was consistent with models 4, 6, and 
8. Model 4 showed the use of some means ends analysis, but they are 
limited to the extent that they can deal with the problems they detect. 
Subjects using this model have sufficient lookahead to move an 
obstructing can to the 'other' peg i.e. neither the "from" nor "to" pegs. 
However, they will not do this if this is an illegal move. Model 4 
concentrates on the 'from' peg and will attempt to clear an obstruction 
here before it clears the 'to' peg if they are both obstructed. For example, 
on the problem (initial state 3/21/- to goal state 321/-/_)4 a model 4 
subject sees can 2 as the obstructor in this problem and chooses 2BC. On 
4 The three sections separated by '/' refer to the three pegs. These are referred to as 
(\,8 and C, lettered from left to right. The cans are represented by numbers ::; being the 
largest and 1 being the smallest. The leftmost can is at the t~~ o~ any par~icular pe? A 
move e.g. '3CA' refers to a numbered can, its starting <lnd fImshIng locatIon. In thIS 
case, the largest can is moved from peg C to peg .\. 
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the problem (initial state 2/1/3 to goal state 321/ -/ - ) the model 4 subject 
would initially choose 2AC, but as it is illegal would produce 2AB. 
In this model, as in models 1 and 2, the smallest can is attended to 
first. The subject is able to detect obstructors on both the "from" and 
"to" pegs. However, the subject gives priority to the "from" peg. The 
look-ahead amounts to only one level, enough to check the legality of 
an obstructor removal step. 
Model 6 involves a limited depth first search of up to two moves. 
Using the subgoal ordering 1,2,3, the model 6 subject looks first for a 
single legal move that will get a can onto the goal peg. If there is no 
single move solution the subject will looks for a two move sequence 
that will achieve the same result. On the problem (initial state 1/ - /32 to 
goal state 1/2/3) cans 1 and 3 are on the correct pegs, and can 2 cannot 
legally be moved directly to its goal peg (2CB), so the obstructor 3 is 
moved (3CA) to the 'other' peg of the can 2 subgoal. 
Model 8 is similar to model 6 but with greater search depth. It does a 
3 level depth first search with the same sub-goal ordering. On the 
problem (initial state - /321/ - to goal state - / -/ 321 ), the priority subgoal 
is 1BC, however, there is not a 3 move solution. The subject then looks 
for a three move solution for can 2 and moves 3BA and then 2BC. 
7.3 Advanced subjects 
The most advanced subjects recursively attend to the mInImum 
obstructor, by moving it to the "other" peg of the immediatel\' 
preceding subgoal. 
In the problem (initial state 2/1/3 to goal state 1/2/3 ), the subgoal 
1 BA is blocked by can 2. It is not possible to move can 2 to "other" peg 
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of the IBA subgoal i.e. make the move 2AC, as C is blocked by can 3 .. 
The next move considered is to move can 3, to "other" of the 2AC 
subgoal, i.e. to move 3CB. This is a legal move and so is the 0 n e 
executed. This model produces the minimum path solutions on all but 
2 problems where one extra move is generated. 
7.4 Discussion 
The Klahr and Robinson approach provides an interesting analysis of 
some components of plan formulation, but the validity of the models 
may be open to question. There are only a small selection of legal 
moves from any particular problem state, and on the straightforward 
problems the intermediate and advanced models produce the same 
predictions. It is therefore only a small subset of the problems which 
become diagnostic. In any case, the fit with the models is only 70% at 
best, even when the comparison has been limited to the data from the 
first moves, of only the 6-year-old subjects. 
The attribution of complete strategies is a little thinly supported by 
evidence from single move data. It may be that approaches to the 
problem are not so clear-cut, and would have an opportunistic element 
on later moves or that strategies would be changed if, for exam pIe, 
'looping' behaviours were recognised. 
The cover story of the problem was a vast improvement on the 
traditional abstract version. However, it was not a 'naturalistic' task for 
young children. The idea that the lack of feedback would provide a 
'snapshot' of children's performance, assumes that children do not 
spontaneously progress without feedback. The children \\·ould be 
evaluating their own perceived performance, and might change their 
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approach even without external feedback. Karmiloff-Smith 'would 
certainly argue for such a developmental possibility. 
Klahr and Robinson have implied a developmental progression 
between the different models, but there are no hypotheses about 
possible mechanisms for moving from one model to another. The 
main progression between models, though, seems to be in extent of 
lookahead, although there is also a development in strategies and 
analysis. They conclude 
"Y oung children appear to have rudimentary forms of many of the 
problem-solving processes previously identified in adults, but they may 
differ in encoding and representational processes." 
Klahr and Robinson 1981 (p. 113) 
This study provides a useful perspective on planning development, and 
raises some issues which will be pursued in chapter 7. However, here 
again there is no mention of developmental mechanisms. 
8. Conclusion 
Planning development is not well understood, this is amply illustrated 
by De Lisi's (1987) taxonomy which did not bring much clarity. This 
chapter has failed to produce a detailed developmental sequence, on a 
single task let alone a suggested developmental mechanism. All of the 
planning studies reviewed treat planning in isolation and none of them 
have been linked to a general theory of cognitive development. 
Klahr and Robinson, have produced a developmental sequence \\'ith 
different levels of planning on the same task, \\'hich must be the 
fundamental basis for developing a mechanism. Othen\'ise, there have 
been no clear description of qualitatively different processes operating at 
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different age levels. This is confounded by a tendency to describe 
different types of planning with different levels of ability. 
Hudson and Fivush (1991) had an interesting basis, with GER's, '\Thich 
could be developed, if the various factors within their hypothesized 
levels were considered separately. They were approaching planning 
development from the knowledge representation perspective, '\Thich, it 
will be argued, may actually be more informative than trying to isolate 
the process. 
Planning development will be pursued in the next chapter, where a 
replication of Isaev's (1985) train shunting experiment will be reported. 
In this chapter, whenever a developmental mechanisms has been 
mentioned, it is 'internalisation', so it is appropriate to consider a 
model is in the socio-cultural tradition. This broader theoretical context 
recommends the work, and in addition Isaev provides a four stage 
developmental sequence for consideration. 
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Chapter 7 
Planning development: the Isaev-Magkaev model 
Chapter Abstract 
The development of planning was proposed as an alternative account 
to representational redescription, to account for children's behaviour 
on the drawing and block balancing tasks. In this chapter, one detailed 
developmental sequence proposed by Isaev (1985) is evaluated. A 
partial replication of his train task, with better controls is reported. The 
results, presented as case studies, produced evidence of the levels of 
planning proposed by Isaev. However, the subjects level of planning 
was shown to be related to domain knowledge, and problem 
representation, rather than to age. Case studies of adult subjects indicate 
that performance decrements with increasing cognitive load. It is 
argued that rather than the development of planning, the development 
of domain knowledge explains performance. Isaev's stages could be re-
characterised as the interaction of problem representation and a limited 
capaci ty processor. 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter various descriptions of planning behaviours 
were described. These were presented as isolated pieces of research 
rather than as part of a broader developmental theory, or a complete 
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view of cOgnitive processes. They were also predominantly descriptive: 
a fuller account of the development of planning would include an 
account of the representations and the developmental mechanisms. 
The current chapter will focus on one particular approach (a composite 
of Isaev and Magkaev's models) to the development of planning \vhich 
was developed in the socio-cultural tradition. From this perspective the 
developmental mechanism involved is internalisation. Planning as a 
higher cognitive process will have developed from the internalisation 
of social planning processes, which were originally used by others to 
guide the child's behaviour. 
In this chapter the work of two Russianl psychologists, Magkaev 
(1977) and Isaev (1985), will be described, and a partial replication 
experiment reported. They view planning as an essential part of 
thinking in general: 
" ... the essence of human thought is the active transformation of nature 
in accordance with man's ability to foresee the results of his future 
actions." 
Magkaev 1977, (p. 606) 
Magkaev's (1977) and Isaev's (1985) articles appeared in the journal 
'Soviet Psychology', and form isolated islands of translated research 
from a different tradition. The material specifically referenced in their 
discussions is not available in translation, so the full meaning of the 
terminology used cannot be appreciated. Any discussion of their work 
must necessarily be an interpretation. An attempt has been made to 
relate their work to other papers in the Soviet socio-cultural tradition 
(as translated by Wertsch), but the following description may be 
1 Soviet citizens at the time of their studies, now Russians. 
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criticised for reflecting too strongly the author's western perspective. 
Many of the criticisms made in this chapter may relate to the different 
concerns and reporting formats of the Soviet tradition rather than to 
any inadequacies in the work itself. Nevertheless, the comparisons are 
worthwhile and informative. 
The work of Isaev and Magkaev will be related to that discussed in 
the previous chapter. There are certain observations which link closely 
to points made by other researchers. Of particular interest here is the 
hypothesis of four developmental levels in planning, culminating in 
flexible performance. These levels provide an interesting basis for a 
comparison with Karmiloff-Smith's model as three of the levels relate 
to different behaviours in children who are successful on the task. As 
such the sequence of planning development could be related directly to 
her three representational phases. 
2. Magkaev 
Magkaev defines planning as the ability to consider alternative courses 
of action, which is more advanced than merely being able to produce a 
sequence of actions which will reach the goal. He identifies three major 
aspects of planning acts: 
1. Planning acts constitute a mental search for as yet unknown but 
possible systems of operation (not the recall and mental reproduction of 
operations already acquired). 
2. The search for these systems of operations is deljberate and 
intentional (in tent or~; their logical structure and the actual 
construction of that structure are the particular focus of the activity of the 
individual. 
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3. These systems are constructed on the basis of the individual's forecast 
of the results of future acts up to a specific point or "depth". 
Magkaev 1977 (p.608-9) 
This characterisation indicates a flexible planning process where the 
subject is able to consciously consider a variety of novel ways to achieve 
a goal. In a socio-cultural developmental context, it can be assumed that 
the planning processes have been extracted and internalised from 
previous experiences of the plans of others (e.g. Wertsch 1985). The 
limitation on the depth of plan generation mirrors one of Klahr and 
Robinson's (1981) considerations, and is an acknowledgement of the 
limited capacity of central processing. 
Magkaev's experimental task involved presenting subjects with an 
array of 3 or 4 numbers as in the left hand side of figure 19 below and a 
target arrangement as on the right hand side of figure 19. The objective 
was to transform the initial array into the target array in the minimum 
number of moves. The numbers could be moved to an adjacent empty 
square, or could leap over one other number into the empty square. 
Numbers were not allowed to leap over two or three numbers, and only 
one number at a time could be moved, i.e. two numbers were not 
allowed to simultaneously swop places 
1 
• fL....---..I1_1---'1_2---J.--3--.J 
Figure 19. Magkaev's number sequencing task. 
Subjects were given the problems in written form with a column of 
empty boxes corresponding to the minimum move sequence. Each 
movement of a number to the empty square was recorded by filling in 
the resulting number sequence in one of the empty boxes. 
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From children's performance on this task Magkaev identified four 
developmental levels of planning behaviour: (i) manipulative; (ii) step-
by-step; (iii) short-range planning; (iv) choice of effective alternative. 
These are described in the following sections. 
2.1 Manipulative 
In order to solve the problems the subject had to have learnt the rules 
for moving numbers. Manipulative level children had learnt the rules, 
but in a formal way. They moved according to the rules, but each move 
was treated independently. There was no goal in terms of the final 
organisation, instead the intention was to demonstrate mastery of the 
rules. There was a fortiori no understanding of the requirement to 
complete the problem in the minimum number of moves. These 
manipulative level children operated within the relevant restrictions, 
but they were unable to solve the problem. 
2.2 Step-by-step 
Step-by-step-Ievel children used the rules as a means to achieve the goal 
but without any internal or external testing of moves. There was little 
evidence of lookahead. Errors in terms of minimum move sequence 
were not corrected or even noticed. The subjects succeeded in achieving 
the goal, but ignored the minimum move requirement. 
2.3 Short-range 
Short-range planners were able to use a lookahead of three or four 
moves. They were able to correct legal, but non-optimal moves on the 
basis of the minimum-move requirement. However, they did not 
always seek out the most efficient solutions as a short-range plan, once 
formulated dominated their performance. At this level, external tests 
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of possible solutions were made In the form of pencil and paper 
sketches. 
2.4 Effective 
Effective planners made more external tests and sometimes made only 
mental tests. They considered more alternatives than short range 
planners and achieved perfect performance. These children did not 
show any evidence of looking ahead more than four moves. 
Magkaev illustrated each level with an account of one individual 
child's performance on one problem. A different example problem was 
used in each case, which also restricts comparison of performances 
between levels. The descriptions referred to both the move sequence 
generated and to the children's comments. However, it is not clear 
which pieces of evidence were used to categorise the children. Ninety 
primary school children were tested individually, but the majority, 400 
subjects, were tested in groups. Protocols could only have been taken 
from the individual subjects, and no account of how these were 
recorded or analysed was given. Thus, it is not clear how the subjects 
were assigned to one of the four categories from the purely written 
records which will have formed the major portion of the data. 
Hypothetically, the written evidence could allow the following 
(rather basic) analysis to be made, in order to distinguish behYeen 
behaviour types: 
Manipulative - legal move sequence without success 
Step-by-step - legal, but not optimal, move sequence to goal state 
Short-range - legal, but not optimal, move sequence to goal state, 
with some evidence of 'working out' plans. 
Effective - legal and optimal move sequence to goal state 
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Magkaev's claim that these four types of planning form a 
developmental sequence is based on the percentage of children at 
different ages operating at the different levels. The percentage of 
children showing more sophisticated behaviours increasing with age. 
Transition between the stages was not discussed. 
Magkaev characterised the development of planning as involving six 
functions. These functions being associated with plan generation, 
rather than the execution of a plan. 
1. Connections were established among the elements of the situation, 
enabling the subjects to use the rules as practical devices for achieving 
the goal. 
2. The subjects regarded changes in the situation and their effects as 
special, internal tools for achieving the goal. 
3. The subjects envisioned the results of future actions, up to a certain 
point, before actually carrying out the operations. 
4. Possible operations were distinguished and dealt with as relatively 
independent entities. 
S. Operations were grouped together, and the subject operated with 
their overall result by abbreviated tests and envisioning the results of 
future actions. 
6. The most efficient solution to the problem was sought and chosen 
(Le., the instruction to find such a solution guided the subject's 
approach). 
Magkaev 1977, (p.618) 
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There are two points which can be made here. The first point indicates 
a role for knowledge elaboration. This knowledge development issue 
will be discussed further in chapter 8, Chi and Ceci (1987) arguing that 
knowledge elaboration is central to development. The most interesting 
for our developing argument is point 5, that the lookahead is facilitated 
by the grouping of operations. This could be interpreted as chunking, a 
point which will be elaborated in the discussion section and in chapter 
9. 
3. Isaev 
Isaev, who was a student of Magkaev's2 developed Magkaev's sequence, 
emphasising the role of problem analysis in the development of 
planning (Isaev, 1985). He used a less constrained task and identified 
three basic approaches in the behaviour of 60 primary school children. 
These were (i) manipulative; (ii) empirical; and (iii) theoretical. Isaev's 
(1985) work appears to be a development of Magkaev's levels of 
planning and, as such, we have assumed that his three categories are 
also proposed as a developmental sequence. This is an assumption as 
Isaev does not explicitly make this claim in his paper and he does not 
provide any information about the distribution by age of his subjects 
into the three planning categories. 
Isaev's planning task involved the movement of railway carriages 
in sidings, the objective being to rearrange the carriages into a target 
sequence in the minimum number of moves. The task is described in 
more detail in section 3.1 below. The problem required the subjects to 
2 Rubtsov, personal communication. 
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restrict their consideration to the relevant tracks only i.e. to analyse the 
problem space. 
3.1 Isaev's task 
a) Initial order of cars 
A B 
c 
b} target order 
A B 
D 
Figure 20. Experimental manoeuvering task, from Isaev 1985. 
Isaev's task involved physically manoeuvering railway carriages in a 
siding using a model railway. The task was to rearrange the carriages 
into correct numerical order in the minimum number of moves. The 
carriages could be coupled and decoupled from each other at will, but 
they needed to be attached to the engine to move between sidings. The 
optimal solution to the example in figure 20 would be: 
(1) Split the train between carriages 4 and 3 
(2) Move the engine with carriages 2 and 4 attached to track B, 
detach carriage 4 
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(3) Move the engine with carriage 2 attached back to track E, attach 
carriage 3, leaving carriage 1. 
(4) Move the engine with carriages 2 and 3 attached to track B, 
attach to 4 and detach the engine from all the carriages. 
(5) Move the engine back to track E, pick up carriage l. 
(6) Move the engine and carriage 1 to track B, attach to carriages 2,3 
and 4. 
(7) Move the whole train to track E. 
Isaev's children were given three 'series' of tasks, although he does not 
state how many trials constitute a 'series'. The first series involved 
working with the toy train on problems involving three carriages; the 
second series involved four carriages with the task being presented as a 
'drawing'; the third series involved five carriages with the task 
presented as a 'diagram'. In the latter two series the subjects were 
allowed to use the toy train if they desired (although it is not clear 
whether the train was set up for them in the relevant problem 
configuration). The essential differences between the 'drawing' and the 
'diagram' condition was not made explicit, and it was not clear from the 
paper whether there was any hypothesized, or observed effect on the 
children's behaviour. Isaev states that the object of the first series was 
"to determine how, specifically, the subject established the spatial-
functional relations among the elements of the problem" 
Isaev 1985 (p. -l1) 
and the object of the third series was to study 
" ... how the subjects constructed possible systems of rearrangements (i.e. 
the nature of constructing a plan of action)." 
Isaev 1985 (p. -l1) 
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No specific objective was stated for the second series. It seems that 
presentation type was confounded with problem difficulty in that the 
more complex problems were presented in a more abstracted format. 
These variables need to be controlled before any useful conclusions can 
be drawn. 
Isaev based his analysis on data from sixty children "from the 
primary grades". The ages of the children were not provided and no 
information was given on the distribution of the sixty children over the 
primary age range. Isaev does not mention age in the context of his 
analysis of performance patterns, although the more advanced 
performances are attributed to 'third grade' children so it appears likely 
that the results form a developmental sequence. An analysis of strategy 
by age group would clarify this point. In common with Magkaev, no 
specific account of the transition between stages was proposed, although 
the internalisation process (Vygotsky 1978) is assumed. 
The three basic approaches Isaev found were (i) manipulative; (ii) 
empirical; and (iii) theoretical. 
3.2 Manipulative 
The manipulative category seems to be the same as the manipulative 
approach proposed by Magkaev. Children with a manipulative 
approach (10% of the children tested) were able to use the rules to move 
the carriages around, but did not seem to have a strategy. Their moves 
were unrelated to previous and subsequent moves, and they did not get 
the child nearer to the goal. Indeed, the child \\Tould forget the goal 
while manipulating the carriages. Support from the experimenter, in 
the form of a continuous dialogue, \vas required for the child to achieve 
the goal. 
208 
... the absence of single-mindedness in actions, which is the basis for 
establishing functional -spatial relations among the objects of which a 
task is made up results in manipulative solutions to maneuvering tasks. 
Isaev 1985 (p. 47) 
3.3 Empirical 
The majority of subjects (83% of the children tested) used an empirical 
method. Subjects in this group were able to achieve the required result 
but did not do so in the optimal way. There were two subsets of the 
empirical method. The first subset labelled "planning thought in 
action"3 contained subjects who planned only one step ahead. They 
would evaluate the situation after every move, alternating planning 
actions with external actions, but they were also dominated in their 
choice of moves by the obvious possibilities of the current situation. 
For example, if two carriages were on the same line they would 
immediately be joined up. Subjects in this group used all the tracks, 
having failed to identify that only a subset - those opposite the direction 
of movement of the train - were of use. This group is similar to the 
'step-by-step' category of Magkaev. 
The second empirical subset, similar to Magkaev's short-range planners 
did identify the relevant lines for using in the task and executed the 
plan in their heads, before moving the objects, but their routes were 
non-optimal. Like the previous method they \vere clearly oriented 
towards getting a result, but did not fulfil the requirement of using an 
optimal strategy to achieve it. 
3 After Rubinstein (1946), a Russian language reference. The connotations of the term 
have, therefore, not been appreciated by the monoglot author. 
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The two empirical approaches seem to form distinct developmental 
stages. Isaev has reason to link them in that both approaches 'were 
result-oriented, rather than being concerned with the method by \\'hich 
the result was achieved, but there are also clear reasons for 
distinguishing them. The first subset seem to be dominated by the 
immediate context, while the latter were able to use a significant 
amount of lookahead. This may be an important transition in the 
development of planning reflecting a change in the representation of 
the problem. The two distinct categories suggested by Magkaev, ~tep-by­
step planners and short-range planners will be maintained to describe 
the two empirical subsets. 
3.4 Theoretical 
Subjects who took a theoretical approach to the task 
It ... viewed the situation as a holistic system of elements from the very 
outset." 
Isaev 1985 (p.48) 
They were able to take account of all the requirements of the task. The 
difference in approach between theoretical and short-range planners 
was evident in the four car task. (The three car task has only two or 
three possible solutions and so could not reliably differentiate the short-
range and theoretical types). Short-range subjects stopped after they had 
achieved a result, theoretically-oriented subjects spontaneously 
continued trying three or four different routes until they found the 
optimal one. 
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3.5 The relationship of the Isaev-Magkaev model to Western 
theories. 
The manipulative category in the composite Isaev-Magkaev model has 
a similarity with Klahr's model 1. Both found that 'pre-planning' 
subjects were not able to represent the entire problem. Isaev and 
Magkaev found that subjects forgot the goal of the problem, and in 
contrast Klahr found subjects were able to remember the goal, but not 
the rules. The difference in what was forgotten, reflects differences in 
the tasks. Klahr's goal was maintained for the subjects in terms of a 
visual model, they only needed to remember that this was the goal, not 
the contents of the goal. This visual presentation of the goal may have 
prioritised the goal over the rules, particularly because the moves were 
not actually executed. Isaev's 3-carriage task, in contrast in vol ved 
physically manipulating the carriages, so the movement rules were 
paramount. The comparison of the two accounts leads to an overall 
impression of manipulative performance as reflecting capacity 
limitations In general, rather than a particular problem with 
maintaining the goal of the activity. 
The Isaev's step-by-step approach is is similar to the sighting 
strategies described by Wellman Fabricius and Sophian (1985) in their 
search task, which also proceed 'step-by-step'. As in the step-by-step 
category, children exhibiting sighting behaviour do not lose sight of 
their goal, although they do not look ahead more than one step at a 
time. Klahr and Robinson (1981) also describe a similar strategy which 
they call limited means-ends analysis. Their model 2 has some of the 
same characteristics as 'step-by-step' planning in that children plan only 
one move ahead and are dominated by the immediate possibilities of 
the situation. 
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Isaev's account differs from Magkaev's in that he sees planning as a 
derivative act of analysis and reflection, rather than a component of 
thought on an equal level with them. He also stresses the importance 
of the analysis of the task. This seems to be similar to Simon's (1978, 
Simon and Hayes 1976) concern with problem representation. This 
issue will be pursued in the discussion section. 
4. A partial replication of Isaev's train task 
4.1 Introduction 
The composite Isaev-Magkaev account (hereafter referred to as 
Isaev's model), seems to offer a developmental sequence compatible 
with elements of the accounts presented in Chapter 6. The context of a 
socio-cultural approach also suggests (in very general terms) a 
developmental Inechanism, i.e. internalisation. However, it seemed 
necessary to replicate the results due to the methodological problems 
with the original study. Isaev (1985) and Magkaev's (1977) descriptions 
of the behavioural levels are supported only with partial individual 
examples rather than with any overall statistical analysis. Additionally, 
there was no detailed account of how clear-cut the categories were, or of 
any problems allocating subjects to groupings. As a result, there is no 
basis for evaluating their validity or accuracy as developmental models. 
Their conclusions could not be accepted without serious reservations. It 
was therefore important to attempt a replication of the Isaev study, in 
order to evaluate the model. 
Isaev's model assumes the development of a generally applicable 
planning ability. If this were demonstrated, it ,vould cast doubt on the 
validity of any representational redescription (kno,vledge development) 
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approach to the development of cognitive flexibility. It is possible that 
the developments observed in chapters 3 and 4, in drawing and block 
balancing, could be explained by a planning development rather than by 
representational redescription. Isaev's three behavioural levels 'beyond 
success' cannot, from their account, be directly mapped onto Kanniloff-
Smith's Representational Redescription model, although, the highest 
theoretical subjects are clearly able to adopt a more flexible approach to 
the task than those at the developmentally earlier stages. The train task 
will be a novel one to subjects, and Karmiloff-Smith does not deal with 
the issue of how children approach novel problems. A replication of 
the Isaev's stages should, however, provide a useful perspective on RR 
theory. 
A partial replication of Isaev's train task will be presented in an 
attempt to illuminate Isaev's model. Isaev's task is more recent and his 
task is more naturalistic than Magkaev's, using a real train rather than 
an abstract manipulation of numbers. It should therefore be more 
appropriate for primary school children, who have limited experience 
with abstract problem solving. It also requires children to analyse the 
problem situation, and to limit their attention to the relevant tracks. 
However, both tasks include in the goal statement the requirement of 
completion within the minimum number of moves. This type of task 
has been criticised by Wellman et al 1985 who argue that it is not a 
familiar constraint for children (Anglo-American children, at least) and 
does not provide a good test of planning ability. An attempt was made 
to elaborate the minimum move requirement 'with a cover story, 
making it more readily understandable to young children. However, it 
remains an arbitrary constraint. 
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As mentioned in section 3.1, Isaev presented the more complex 4 
and 5 carriage tasks in the form of a drawing and a diagram. This 
confounds the comparison process. In this replication, all the tasks will 
be given in the practical form as this was the most naturalistic format, 
faCilitating the youngest subjects. From this approach it would be 
possible to compare performances between tasks of increasing difficulty, 
to distinguish the interaction between planning level (if this is a static 
processing feature) and task complexity. 
Isaev's theoretical planning style describes a quite advanced, level of 
planning. In their studies, external memory was available to support 
this approach to the more complex problems. In this study, in order to 
compare performances between tasks of different complexity, the 
physical manipulation format is used throughout. It may not be 
possible for children to operate at the theoretical level on the more 
complex tasks. The problem spaces for the tasks increase by orders of 
magnitude in the numbers of possible problem states, and it may not be 
possible for children to adopt a theoretical approach to the harder 
problems. It seemed advantageous to have a 'top line' comparison to 
evaluate the solutions of the most advanced children against. In 
addition to testing primary school children, a small group of highly 
educated adults were also tested. These adults could be expected to 
produce optimal planning performances on the tasks. 
4.2 Interventions 
Much of Isaev's account is based on the comments made by the children 
as they solved the problem and on the role of the experimenter in the 
process. Isaev provided verbal support if required during the 
interaction and also asked questions. The conditions for intervention, 
and the types of assistance given "vere not described, and may not have 
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been very systematically analysed. The general conclusions, for 
example, that manipulative children could not succeed \\'ithout 
assistance were supported only by a single example protocol. 
In order to define Isaev's planning levels more completely, and to 
look at the transition between stages, a replication will be reported in 
this chapter. A more systematic approach to 'scaffolding' the activity 
could provide additional useful information on the child's 
performance capabilities, particularly the nature of the "zone of 
proximal development" i.e. the level of the child's activity with the aid 
of an adult, and perhaps illuminate the internalisation process. 
A systematic approach to interventions has been used by Wood, 
Wood, and Middleton (1977) and by McNamee (1987). Wood, Wood 
and Middleton (1978) identified five levels of intervention 
spontaneously used by mothers in assisting their children with a 
complex construction task. The levels are: 
(1) General verbal encouragement - e.g. "Good, now do something 
I " e se . 
(2) Specific verbal encouragement - telling the child what to look 
for or how to proceed. 
(3) Selection - physical intervention to indicate the appropriate 
puzzle pieces. 
(4) Prepared material - orientation of pieces so that the child has 
minimal input to achieve success. 
(5) Demonstration. 
Most mothers used a variety of levels at different stages in the task, but 
Wood et al found that the optimal approach to facilitate learning was to 
use all five levels contingently, following the rule 
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"If the child succeeds, when next intervening offer less help. If the child 
fails, when next intervening take over more control" 
Wood, Wood, and Middleton 1977 (p. 133) 
Similarly, McNamee (1987) used four types of intervention 
systematically in 'scaffolding' young children's recall of narratives. 
These interventions were, by the nature of the task, all verbal. They 
were: 
(1) Repeating the child's last utterance. 
(2) Asking general questions such as "what happened next?". 
(3) Asking specific wh- questions e.g. "What did the king do when 
the girl said 'No'?". 
(4) Providing the next piece of information by asking tag questions, 
e.g. "He went to see the girl's father didn't he?". 
These studies indicate that it is possible to be systematic in 
interventions, and such systematicity could be employed in this 
experiment. In both these studies the experimenter intervened only 
when the child was stuck and could not proceed or if the child became 
distracted from the task. The types of intervention in both cases are 
determined by the structure of the task. Although both Wood et al 
(1977) and McNamee (1987) based their interventions on data collected 
from adult-child interactions, following from their findings it is 
possible to determine the levels of intervention solely on an analysis of 
the task. The experimenter in an experimental situation cannot interact 
naturally with the children, In the way a parent might in a play 
situation. The formalisation of interventions is imperative for any 
objective analysis of children's individual level of planning, or zone of 
proximal development. 
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From these studies we can abstract certain levels of assistance: in 
both Wood et al and McNamee's studies the level of least assistance 
consisted of general encouragement to proceed with the task, and the 
level of most assistance involved carrying out the next step for the 
child. The intermediate steps involved drawing the child's attention to 
various aspects of the task with increasing specificity, decreasing the 
amount of input that the child had to make to successfully complete the 
step. In the planning task these would involve narrowing the goal 
down to the specific next step. The proposed intervention sequence is as 
follows: 
(1) General verbal encouragement - e.g. "Good, now what are you 
going to do next?" 
(2) Recap on the goal - What are we trying to achieve? 
(3) Provide the goal. 
(4) Prompt for sub-goal - Which carriage do we want to move first? 
(5) Provide sub-goal. 
(6) Prompt for obstruction to sub-goal (if any) "What is stopping us 
from doing X?" 
(7) Identify obstruction to sub-goal (if any) 
(8) Prompt for next step - "What do we have to do to achieve X?" 
(9) Provide next step. 
4.3 Experimental procedure 
Isaev's experimental procedure is described thus, 
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"Before the experiment was begun the basic features of the maneuvers 
were described in general outline .... The experimenter demonstrated 
that each specific assignment could be accomplished by different 
routings. Attention was focused on the main requirement of the task, 
namely, to find the shortest routing." 
lsaev 1985 (p. 41) 
From this description it is not clear what was demonstrated to the 
subjects, nor exactly what was said. It is not clear whether an actual 
target task was shown, or if it was possible that the subjects' behaviour 
could have been influenced by the alternatives shown. It is also not 
mentioned whether the goal of achieving the optimal solution 
included the target number of moves which appears to be the case in 
Magkaev's experiment, which might have made the 'optimising' 
solution more tangible for younger subjects. 
4.4 Method 
4.4.1 Subjects 
Twenty primary school children from Harrold pnmary school, 
Bedfordshire were tested. Their ages ranged from 5:2 to 9:2, with equal 
numbers of boys and girls4. Four adult researchers (2 male and 2 
female) from the Institute of Educational Technology at the Open 
University were also tested. 
4.4.2 Apparatus 
A children's train set manufactured by 'Tomy' was useds. The carriages 
and the engine joined together with magnets, and were easy to join and 
4 Sex was considered to be a problem in this e\.periment, because the use of a train 
would traditionally favours boys. . . 
5 The train set was selected because it was sUitable for chlldre~ of 3 years and .upw~rds, 
and therefore relatively eas~' to locate in the tracks. The couplIngs are magnetIc which 
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detach. The tracks were laid out in the arrangement illustrated in figure 
20, each labelled section of track being long enough to accommodate 
the engine and five carriages. The top of each carriage was covered with 
a piece of paper (firmly attached) which bore a large numeral to identify 
it. 
4.4.3 Task Problems 
The problems were presented in order of increasing difficulty, i.e. 3-
carriage, 4-carriage, and 5-carriage problems. Three problems at each 
level were presented to each subject, in a randomised order. The initial 
arrangements of the carriages in the 3-carriage group were 1-3-2; 3-2-1; 
and 2-1-3. The initial arrangements of the carriages in the 4-carriage 
group were a random selection from 2-1-4-3; 4-2-1-3; and 3-1-4-2. The 
initial arrangements in the 5-carriage problems were a random selection 
from 3-1-5-2-4, 4-2-5-1-3; 5-3-1-4-2; and 3-1-2-5-4. The target in each 
condition was to arrange the carriages in numerical sequence with 
carriage 1 next to the engine. 
4.4.4 Experimental Instructions 
The detailed task instructions and cover story used for this experiment 
are included in appendix 3. In summary, subjects were asked to re-order 
the carriages in the minimum number of moves. Alternative 
solutions, one long and one short were demonstrated. The justification 
for the minimum move request was that the carriages were full of eggs, 
which would break if they were moved too much. All subjects were 
asked to provide a verbal protocols whilst solving the problem. 
II f r relatively easy joining and separating of carriages. The train set also had the a ows 0 Th .. h' b 
relevant track junctions, which were ope~ated by t,oints. e en.gme In t IS set m,l\ e 
battery operated, but batteries were not htted durmg thiS expenment. 
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4.5 Results and Discussion 
There were substantial problems getting the kind of interaction \\'hich 
was envisaged in the introduction. It was not possible to systematically 
prompt subjects because it was not easy to identify the point at which 
they were getting stuck. With hindsight, the reason is clear. Unlike the 
tasks used by Wood et al (1977) and McNamee (1987), Isaev's task did 
not cause subjects to stop when they did not know how to progress. 
Subjects meandered around the tracks and did not give any clues as to 
the exact point at which they should be interrupted. Problems with 
manipulating the carriages and changing the points led children to 
move round in circles. This behaviour was initially indistinguishable 
from the behaviour of children who moved round in circles because 
they had no plan and were awaiting inspiration. The proposed 
interaction with the subjects was not easy to achieve and was not 
systematically implemented. The attempt to implement this aspect of 
the experimental design was abandoned after a few subjects. However, 
it leaves open the question of understandings the nature of Isaev's 
interventions. 
A number of behaviours, for example paUSIng, redundant moves 
etc. were analysed from the video-tapes, but there seemed to be little 
clustering of them in terms of the four planning levels, and there \,vas 
considerable variation within individuals between tasks. The analysis 
of behaviours at the level of broad descriptions and clustering of 
behaviours seemed to obscure rather than illuminate the processes 
involved, particularly, as the performances changed over the course of 
the experiment. The unanticipated microgenetic development is 
confounded \·vith increasing problem difficulty. Consequently, 
220 
quantitative analyses were abandoned and here, as In the block 
balancing experiment, a case study approach was adopted. 
5. Case Studies 
It was not possible to categorise the children's behaviours neatly into 
the four categories, and it became more informative to look in detail at 
case studies. One general factor which seemed to influence the relative 
success of subjects was their prior experience with train sets. Children 
were asked whether they owned a train set, and those \vith considerable 
experience performed better at a younger age. However, this experience 
is difficult to quantify: there is a large difference between the simplest 
child's train without even a track, and a complex electric train layout. 
Also, brothers and grandparents were reported as owning train sets and 
it was difficult to assess how much access the subject had to it. As a 
result, no quantitative support for this 'hunch' is offered. Nonetheless, 
those who were less experienced with trains or who reported simpler 
train sets (e.g. Duplo) did not have a conception of how the points 
worked, and were unable to predict the way that the train would be 
facing after a manoeuvre. They tended to repeat manoeuvres hoping 
that the train would not subsequently be facing the same direction, for 
example. This was consistent with Isaev's idea of analysis as the basis 
for successful planning, but it implicates the lack of background 
knowledge rather than a lack of analytical processes. 
Children who had difficulties physically manipulating the train did 
less well on the planning task. This suggests that there was some 
interference, in terms of capacity limitations on dealing \vith these 1\,vo 
problems at the same time. For these children there was a motor 
221 
problem, a conceptual problem with the interface, and a planning 
problem. 
Predictably, none of the children managed to provide a complete 
protocol. However, a number of comments made by the mo t verbal 
young subjects are revealing. The majority of children were ilent 
whilst they attempted to execute the task. The case studies to b 
reported were selected because they describe the most communicative 
children's behaviour, and as a result it was easier to analyse "vhat the) 
were doing. Three case studies across the age range are reported. 
The adults studied did provide good protocols. Their performances 
provided a revealing level of comparison because they did not adopt a 
theoretical approach. A case study of the most successful of the adult 
subjects is also reported. 
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Figure 21. Track labels for the Isaev train task 
A summary of the track diagram containing the reference letters i 
provided in figure 21, for reference 'Nhilst reading the follo\ ing ca e 
s tudies. 
5.1 Manipulative 
5.2 Ben (5:2) 
The youngest child tested "vas Ben, he has a 'Duplo' train set at home, 
\\'hich has a simple circular track. He might be considered to sho\,' a 
manipulative approach. Ben could not achieve the solution \\Tithout 
considerable support from the experimenter, \\Tho had to prompt each 
step of the solution. He seemed to characterise the task as one of 
splitting up the carriages and then re-assembling them, in sequence. 
Initially, at least, he seemed to remember the goal, but he \\'as unable to 
keep track of the apparently arbitrary movement constraints of the task. 
His initial approach was to pick up the carriages and re-arrange them 
into the required sequence. Ben "ranted to turn the engine round 
corners, he \",anted to pick up the engine and/ or the carriages, and he 
wanted to move the carriages \vithout the engine attached. He didn't 
know how to operate the points, and preferred to just force the train 
over the points in the direction he wanted it to go in, regardless. This 
method of over-riding the physical set up, then, did not restrict him 
from turning the train round the corners etc. eliminating the task 
constraint of backing the train onto certain tracks. The experiment \vas 
abandoned after the third three-carriage problem, during \vhich he 
began setting his o\,\'n agenda. He had latched on to perhaps the most 
subjectively meaningful aspect of the experimental instructions (that 
the carriages \",ere loaded \vith eggs), and began loading his O\\T\ 
imaginary items (cheese and burgers) into the train. 
Ben had multiple problems "pith performing the requested task. lIe 
interpreted the train as d toy, ,,·hich he just \\'anted to play "pith. In his 
first school year, this is perhaps not surprising. He could see ho,,' to 
solve the problem that "'as set, by' picking up the carriages and re-
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arrangIng them, and he didn't see the point of pursuing another 
(arbitrary) way of doing it. He had problems in physically manipulating 
the train, but the restrictions on the physical movement of the train 
(points and junctions) were ignored rather than understood and used to 
constrain the search for a problem solution. The restrictions on 
moving the train with the engine, and not picking up the carriages were 
just meaningless to him. 
Ben's performance highlights how much there is to know in this 
task. The fundamental problem was with the social game of 'doing 
things an arbitrary way because you have been asked to do it that way', 
which is part of the school experience, but would still be novel for Ben. 
At Ben's age the conception of a train is a toy for putting people and 
goods in, and moving around. The idea that the engine provides the 
power, and as such is necessary to move the train did not seem to be 
central to Ben's conception. If this is so, rules which are transparent to 
older children and adults (e.g. you can't move the carriages on their 
own) are entirely arbitrary to a child like Ben. Ben's inability to succeed 
on various aspects of the task, indicates just how much knowledge is 
presupposed by it. He could have rearranged the carriages in his own 
way, but was not interested in playing the experimenter's game. It 
could not be concluded that Ben could not plan, but only that he would 
not accept the experimenter's conditions for planning. 
5.3 Martin (6:6) 
Martin had an electric train set at home and was clearly quite at ease 
with manipulating the train: the train remained on the track, and he 
had no problems with the points, usually changing them in advance of 
movement over a junction rather than in response to a problem. Thus, 
the problem for ;\Iartin was one of planning. 'Vith the simple three 
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carriage problems, Martin did not use track E, the starting track as a 
location for leaving carriages. Thus, he is initially representing the 
problem as one which involves only tracks Band C as locations. On 
these problems he never even considered tracks A and D as locations. 
On one of the four carriage problems he did express a fleeting desire to 
leave a carriage on track A, but realised this involved turning the train 
around which was not possible. He seemed to have a complete 
understanding of all the relationships between the physical components 
of the task, he was able to perceive this directly without having to 
physically establish the constraint. 
In response to the experimenter's request, Martin accompanied his 
performance is by an almost continuous description of his actions, e.g "I 
move this one up here, and then I move this one back here ... ". He 
moved fairly slowly, but deliberately. He did not give any insight into 
his planning, except when he encountered problems. However, he 
clearly was predicting the outcome of his actions, as he was surprised by 
unexpected outcomes. 
In the following discussion of Martin's performance (and for the 
other case studies), the carriages will be referred to by their numerals 
and the tracks by the letters given in figure 21. Tracks A and Dare 
irrelevant, and track F and G are for transit only. Where a sequence of 
numerals appear, this relate to a group of carriages and their ordering 
on the tracks. The track arrangement only allo\vs the train sequence to 
be backed onto a track, therefore a split in a sequence 'will allow the 
right-most portion to be left on a track. References to the engine \\'ill be 
kept to a minimum. All moves must be made \vith the engine 
attached, and the engine only attaches at the left end of a sequence. 
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With his first problem order: 1-3-2, the initial move "vas of the 
whole train from track E to track C. This is actually redundant given 
the problem statement, but not so if track E is not considered as a 
suitable location (This initial redundant step was also produced by some 
of the adults tested). Carriage 2 is then left on track C, the engine with 1-
3 attached moves to track B where carriage 3 is then deposited. With 
carriage 1 still attached to the engine Martin collects carriage 2 from 
track C, then collects carriage 3 from track B. No plan was articulated in 
advance, and there was no apparent delay before he started moving the 
train. However, the task performance was fluid and apparently pre-
planned, with a running commentary describing the moves made. The 
solution seemed to have been transparent for him. 
Martin's second problem order was 3-2-1. Again his initial move 
was of the complete train to track C where, carriages 2-1 were left. The 
engine and carriage 3 were moved to track B where 3 was left. Martin 
then picked up both 2 and 1, whilst saying "then I pick up number 2" 
and moves them slowly towards track B. This may indicate that picking 
up both carriages was a slip of action (Reason 1979) rather than his 
intention. He hesitates as he move toward track B (where 3 has been 
left) and there is a break in his running commentary, indicating that 
something unexpected has happened. He then pauses to re-plan given 
the current situation. He then leaves only carriage 1 with 3 (1-3), on 
track B, and moves carriage 2 back to track C. This was obviously not 
the optimal move sequence, but each step was goal directed. 
Martin prefaces his attempt at the third 3 carriage problem (order, 2-
1-3), with the emphatically delivered comment "That is easy", and 
indeed he performed well on the task. In this case he seems to be 
building up from 3. These changes of strategy may indicate than he 
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does not in fact have an overall strategy, but is working from each 
situation as it emerges. There is no evidence of a theoretical approach, 
in that he does not consider alternative solutions once one has been 
perceived. 
With the four carnage problems, some added difficulties emerge. 
There is evidence that he is 'thinking-in-action' in that he divides, then 
reconsiders, and joins carriages up again. 
With problem 4-2-1-3 he moves all the carriages to track C, then 
leaves 1-3 (saying I leave 2 and 3, the experimenter then corrects him to 
1 and 3). He then moves 4-2 back on to track B. He initially splits off the 
2, but then reconsiders and leaves off the 4 as well. This may be 
evidence of conflicting subgoals. It will become apparent that he 
intended to join 1 and 2, and so perhaps he is also trying to get 1 next to 
the engine. He cannot achieve both these moves in one step. He 
returns to track C and collects carriage I, having detached it and moved 
it slightly forwards he exclaims 
Martin: "Ah! Now that's a bit of a hard bit!" (pointing at the carriages 
4-2 on track B, then continues moving the train). 
Expt: Now that's a hard bit is it? Why is it hard? 
Martin: ' cause its behind there (pointing at carriages 4-2 on track B) 
Expt. ' cause its the wrong way round? 
Martin: behind there, Yeah! 
He realises this problem, but hardly pauses because of it. He moves on 
to track B, picks up both carriages 4 and 2 and moves them back to track 
C, forming the sequence 1-4-2-3. He doesn't seem to have anticipated 
the construction of the 2-3 subunit, as his intonation reflects surprise 
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and delight when he notices it. He then leaves the 2-3 component on 
track C, deposits carriage 4 on track B, collects 2-3 and then 4, solving the 
problem directly and smoothly. 
With problem 3-1-4-2, Martin initially moves all the carnages to 
track C and leaves 1-4-2. He moves carriage 3 to track B and then 
returns to track C. He collects carriage 1, splitting it off from 4-2, and 
then pauses, at this point, he seems to remember or create the goal of 
getting the 2-3 subunit which was the stepping stone to success in the 
previous problem. He then reconnects 1 with 4-2 and moves all the 
carriages to B. The order is now 1-4-2-3 which is the same as the 
antepenultimate state of the previous problem, and he proceeds to 
solve the problem in the same way. 
Martin's performance on the other problems is similar. The extra 
carriages do not pose much of a problem. His general approach seems 
to be to divide up the train, not necessarily in the most efficient way, 
and to re-arrange them until subcomponents appear, and the solution 
becomes obvious. He does not undo moves he has previously made, 
and he does not produce many redundant moves. He seems to set as 
sub-goals, the positively evaluated states from previous problems (as in 
problem 3-1-4-2 above). In all the 5- carriage problems, for example, he 
creates the state 5-2 or 5-3 on track B, at the beginning of the problem, 
although this is not actually a particularly helpful state it seems to have 
been a subgoal. However, all the solutions emerge initially through 
step-by-step planning, looking for the opportunities which the current 
state affords, and later on with a short-range plan towards the solution. 
These plans being typically 5 moves long, equivalent to a complete 
solution to a three carriage problem. 
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5.4 Adam (9:2) 
Adam (9:2) does not have a train set, although he reported that his 
brother does. He thus has some exposure to and familiarity with trains, 
although how much and with which type of train is not clear. 
Adam made a shaky start, but seemed to be clarifying the relevant 
issues, and analysing the problem. He progressed from apparently 
having problems with the three carriage problems, to succeeding easily 
on the four and five carriage problems. The improvement was quite 
dramatic. 
The constraints of the problem were not transparent for Adam, in 
the way that they were for Martin. They had to be discovered, and this 
was what he was doing in the early tasks. Adam asks appropriate 
questions, and is ultimately able to encode the answers in a useful way 
(e.g. that he can't turn the carriages round), so that he does not 
continually repeat the same errors in later tasks. At the end of the 
'learning period' Adam can focus on the relevant issues, and thus 
concentrate on planning effectively. There is a dramatic improvement, 
when he is presented with the 4th task. He does not ask any more 
clarifying questions, and does not 'look back' in terms of performance, 
despite the increased problem difficulty. Adam's planning is at its best 
on the more complex problems. It is short-range at its best, and so is 
similar to Martin's performance on the more complex problems 
5.4.1 Problem 1-3-2 
For the problem 1-3-2 Adam's first move is to split the carnages 
between carriages 1 and 3, leaving 3-2 on track E, and moving 1 to track 
B (via F). He deposits carriage 1 and move the engine down track G to 
the E / G / C junction 
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Adam: "Damn, 1 can't turn it round here, can l?" 
Expt.: "No, the engine's facing the wrong way isn't it." 
He then moves the engine back onto track A (via G), pauses, taking his 
hand off the engine, then moves it back to the E / G / C junction, 
Adam: "Still is facing the wrong way" 
He then repeats his move back to track A and pauses again with his 
hand off the engine. He then moves back to track E to join the engine 
up with carriage 3 and 2. He pauses slightly, with his hand hovering 
above the carriages as if considering splitting carriage 3 and 2. 
Adam: "Can you have it one, two, three ?"[indicating the carriage in 
the reverse of the target order 1 
Expt.: " No, the one needs to be next to the engine" 
He splits off carriage 3 and takes it to track A (after some fiddling around 
trying to get the points right). He then pauses, taking his hand off the 
train, then goes to separate the engine from carriage 3: 
Adam: "Gh, no" 
He seems to realise that this would block in carriage 3, and he instead 
moves it to track G. Here he splits off carriage 3 and attempts to leave 
it. 
Expt.: "1' m sorry 1 forgot to tell you, you can't leave the train on the 
curved bit of the track." 
Adam: "Can'tl?" 
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E t "N" xp .: o. 
Adam: "Oh, right." 
Expt.: "You can leave it on any of the straight bits, but not on the 
curves. " 
Rejoins carriage 3 to the engine and moves it to track C 
Ada m: "Can I leave it there?" 
Expt.: " Yes, that would be fine." 
Adam splits off carriage 3 leaving it on C. He then quickly moves the 
engine back round to track E (via G and F) and joins up with carriage 2. 
Carriage 2 is then moved back to the junction of ElF ID where he 
pauses. It is then moved with apparent forethought to track A, as some 
fiddling with the points was required to achieve that goal. He splits off 
2 from the engine then utters. 
Adam: "Oh no" 
Immediately realising he has made the same mistake again: the engine 
is blocked in by the carriage. He then backs the train off track A and 
incidentally onto track B. While he is concerned with the position of 
the front of the engine, carriage 2 accidentally joins up with 1. Having 
solved the front end problem, his hands automatically move to rectify 
this unintentional coupling, but after pausing he decides against 
splitting them up. Presumably he recognises the '1-2' sequence, but 
does not realise that it is not useful because it is reversed. He moves the 
engine, with carriage 2 and 1 to track D (via F). 
Adam: "This is irnpossiblef" 
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He backs onto track E, pauses, moves 2-1 back to C and joins it up to 3, 
without any conviction. Not with any particular plan, but because his 
(step-by-step) manoeuvering now suggests this option. Having done 
this he considers his possibilities, and splits the train up, leaving 
carriage 2 with the engine and leaving carriages 1 and 3 attached 
together. 
Adam: "Get off! Can I split them two up." [indicating 1-3] 
E t fly h" xp .: ea . 
He then splits up carriages 1 and 3 and leaves them both on track C. He 
then moves carriage 2 up to the F/GI AlB junction where he has 
problems with the points. There are two sets of points here, and he is 
manipulating the wrong set. The experimenter and Adam then have a 
conversation, during which she explains how they operate. During this 
conversation he seems to change his mind about where he was going 
with carriage 2, from track A to track F. It is impossible to tell whether 
he thought better of the proposed move, remembering that it led 
nowhere or whether his behaviour was influenced by the points 
incidentally ending up in the correct configuration for moving round 
the curve. The latter is hypothesized, but in either case, by the time he 
had reached the F I DIE junction he had slowed right down and was 
considering the options. He slowly backed onto track E, then split off 
carriage 2. From here he could see that he could then pick up carriage 1 
and bring it back to link up to carriage 2. This sequence: pick up carriage 
1 from track C (via F and G); move carriage 1 back to track E (via G and 
F) to link up with carriage 2) was performed quickly and smoothly. 
Adan1 then splits off the carriages 1-2 from the engine. 
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Adam: "Well, that wasn't exactly the quickest way!" 
This comment seems to imply that at this point he had a complete 
solution plan in mind. In fact, the carriages are aligned in sequence 
along the bottom tracks with carriage 3 on track C and carriages 1-2 on 
track E. All that is required is for him to reverse back to track C. 
However, he seems to misconceive it as a problem of needing the 
engine to move carriage 3. He had already split the engine off from 
carriages 1-2, before he made his last statement, indicating that the 
simple reversing movement was not being considered. He seems to be 
conceiving of the engine simply as a tool for moving carriages rather 
than also as part of the problem. When his consideration is turned to 
carriage 3 he feels he needs to use the engine to pick it up. In any case, 
he leaves 1-2 on track E and moves the engine quickly to track C (riding 
roughshod over a problem with the points), he pauses on track C and 
does not immediately join the engine to carriage 3. 
Adam: "I've got a problem now!" 
He moves carriage 3 slowly onto track E 
Adam: "1 can't get around there. [track EJ I think I'll go up here. [G]" 
This comment refers to the idea of reversing the engine and carriage 3 
onto track E, thus leaving carriage 3 behind the 2. The structure of the 
problem means that the engine can only go forward onto E from track 
C, with the engine between the 2 and the 3. He quickly realises this and 
takes the only alternative move onto track G. He pauses at the end of 
track G, to consider his options. He then seems to see the \y hole 
solution and moves quickly to leave carriage 3 on track B, and to collect 
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carriages 1-2. He pauses briefly to double check after he has collected 1-2, 
but the performance is otherwise a continuous movement. 
5.4.2 Problem 2-1-3 
The second problem for Adam was 2-1-3. He begins by making the 
redundant move to B, and then stops, and stands back from the train. 
A dam: "Can I drop all of them off?" 
E t "Y" xp .: es. 
He then immediately, decisively, and with a flourishing hand 
movement splits the train leaving carriages 1-3 on B and moves 2 back 
to track E This manoeuvre was executed quickly indicating that his 
question actually related to whether the engine could move on its own, 
rather than the apparent question of leaving all the carriages in a single 
block. This indicates he was anticipating two moves ahead. However, 
he pauses on track E, if he had more of the plan in advance, then he is 
double checking it. He then splits the engine from 2 and quickly moves 
back to collect carriage 1 from the 1-3 grouping on track B. 
(Interestingly, he had not split up the 1-3 in advance as he had done on 
the previous task - but could consider them separately whilst joined 
together). He then moves fluently back to track E to join the 1 with the 
2, and then immediately splits the engine off from the 1-2. He then 
pauses. It is possible that his immediate response is to collect the 3, 
according to his perception that to move things you need the engine. 
This approach had led him astray in the previous task. He rejoins the 
engine with 1-2, makes a small movement of the train on track E and 
pauses again. He then moves 1-2 round to track B, slowly at first then 
accelerating (perhaps when the orientation of the trains was clearer, and 
the end state anticipated) to link up 'with carriage 3 and immediately 
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removes his hands from the train indicating that he has completed the 
task. He had completed this trial efficiently in the minimum number 
of moves. Although the pattern and length of the pauses clearly 
indicates that he had not anticipated the complete move sequence in 
advance. 
5.4.3 Problem: 3-2-1 
Adam again begins by making a redundant move of the complete train 
to track B. He seems to begin by moving, and reflecting as he does so. 
As he reaches track B he pauses briefly 
Adam: "Not so easy!" 
He tries to move forward onto A, but the points are in the wrong 
position. 
Adam: "I've got to change these little thingies." 
He then changes the points at F I A and moves the train forwards onto 
track A changes the points at CIB and moves back along track G to track 
C. Both points changes are made with ease and the movement of train 
and points is smooth and co-ordinated in marked contrast to his 
previous attempts. 
He separates 3-2-1 between carriages 2 and 1, but they immediately 
accidentally rejoin themselves (the couplings are magnetic). He 
perhaps wanted to leave carriages 1 and 2 as separate items on the track. 
However, when they rejoined he just continued executing his plan and 
moved on to split the train between carriages 3 and 2. The separation of 
1 and 2 "vas obviously not crucial, as he does not rectify the physical 
reJoInIng. Perhaps the act of splitting them initially was sufficient to 
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represent them as separate. Or perhaps he was just exploring the 
problem at this stage, rather than following a plan. 
Adam: "Stay there!" 
Adam moves 3 to junction F I GI AlB and pauses, then moves forward 
onto the redundant track A, and goes to separate the carriage from the 
engine by placing his hands on it, but then does not do so. He realises 
(at an earlier stage than in the first problem, that this is a bad move). He 
then moves the train round to track D (via F), again negotiating the 
point changes efficiently. He then separates the engine and 3 on D, he 
realises that this also is a bad move and rejoins them. He moves 
hesitatingly onto G, back to track E and almost back to C. He seems to be 
looking for somewhere to leave 3. He then moves carriage 3 forward 
nearer to the centre of track E and splits it off. He then reverses round 
to track C and picks up both carriages 2 and 1. He doesn't see that he 
could build up from 3 if he just took carriage 2. Perhaps this is because 
the reversed sequencing of carriages 1 and 2 is not appreciated, the 
visual ordering across the bottom section of the track would have been 
3 engine 2 1 (i.e. the goal ordering but in reversed sequence). 
Adam brings 2-1 back round to track D, and pauses taking his hands off 
the train. The ordering is perhaps not what he had anticipated and 
hoped for. He then backs onto track E pauses for a long time, moves 
forward onto D again, puts his hands on the carriages as if to split off 
carriage 1, but then doesn't (presumably recognising that this ''''ill not 
achieve anything before the move is completed). He then moves back 
onto track E and pauses. He puts his hands on the train as if to split off 
carriage 1 alone, but both carriages 2 and 1 are detached. He does not 
move to rectify this. He seems to be more concerned with a goal of 
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getting carriage 3 from the other side. He moves the engme quickly 
round (via F and G) to track C where he pauses, and moves slowly onto 
track E, as if to confirm that the engine is facing the wrong way round. 
He mutters 
Adam 'Bah!" 
Adam reverses back round to the C / G junction end of track E pausing 
briefly on track C and again on track F. He then returns to the D / F 
junction end of track E and connects 2-1 up with carriage 3 and takes the 
whole train (2-1-3) to track B. He pauses, and then splits off carriage 3. 
He then moves 2-1 swiftly to track E. He then places his hands on the 
engine and 1, and the train splits between the engine and carriages 2-1 
(perhaps not what he intended). He moves the engine forward slightly 
as if considering this possibility (he had previously 'gone with flow') for 
previous chance splits. Here, he has a definite idea and pursues his 
goal. He rejoins the engine to carriages 2-1 and splits off the 1 alone. 
He moves carriage 2 round to track C (via F and G). He may have been 
trying to reverse the sequence of 1 and 2, by depositing carriage 2 behind 
carriage 1 on track E. Once again he finds that this is not possible 
because the engine is in between them. On this occasion he does not 
need to complete the move onto track E to recognise the error. He 
retraces his steps, moving slowly back up track G, pausing halfway and 
looking at the other carriages, then quickly moving to the F / G junction 
Adam: "Can I leave one there?" [indicates junction FIG}. 
Expt.: "No. On one of the tracks." 
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This choice of location may have been influenced by the fact that it 
would have left the 2 on the direct path between 1 and 3, and thus in 
order. However, this being disallowed, he then moves forward on to 
track A, and pauses considering splitting off carriage 2. Then, \vithout 
taking his hands from the carriage and the engine he reverses quickly 
onto B (riding roughshod over the points), joins carriage 2 up with 
carriage 3 (2-3). He splits off the engine and moves it round to track E 
and picks up carriage 1. As he is moving the engine and carriage 1 (via 
F) to track B he says: 
Adam: I've got it now! 
Adam then moves carriage 1 to track B to join up with carriages 2 and 
3. 
On this problem he seems to have identified the possibility of building 
up the solution from the end of the sequence, i.e. carriage 3. From this 
point onwards he uses this strategy to successfully solve all the further 
problems. As a result he solves them without producing redundant 
moves (apart from the initial move of the complete train). During 
these three solution attempts he has clarified the problem space. He has 
had to overcome the conceptual problem of operations of the points. 
He has had to identify which of the tracks it is possible to leave the 
carriages on, and to limit consideration to these. He has had to 
appreciate the orientation of the train following his moves. Adam has 
a problem with the left-to-right restrictions on the ordering of the 
carriages. It is only possible to reverse onto the tracks, so it is not 
possible to add carriages to the end of a constructed sequence, unless 
that sequence was attached to the engine. Coupled to this \\'as the 
inclusion of the engine as part of the problem, not just as a tool to move 
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the carriages with. The engine itself could form an obstruction. The 
engine also had to be considered in the sequence, there was a difference 
between the 1-2-3 and reversed 3-2-1 orderings. This constraint had to 
be understood in relation to the sub-components as well. Before these 
points were established, Adam seemed to be unable to plan effectively 
as he could not predict the outcome of his moves, he anticipated 
wrongly. 
Adam's initial problems are the process by which he establishes the 
problem space. These things were just automatic for Martin, part of his 
understanding of train sets. Adam, in contrast, had to discover them 
and even to repeat misconceptions, before he achieved Martin's level of 
planning performance. Adam comes to understand the problem - to 
represent the important constraints in concise ways, so that his other 
knowledge (from number sequencing, for example) can be applied. He 
is not acquiring task specific strategies, he is encoding the problem. 
5.5 Adults 
None of the children appeared to consider alternative plans, so there 
was no evidence of Isaev's theoretical level. Although this may be a 
feature of the problem format (i.e. manual rather than written). If any 
of the subjects were to exhibit planning at a theoretical level it would be 
the adults. The adults tested were either academic staff or doctoral 
students all with considerable mathematical or programming 
experience. It could be assumed, therefore, that they were all competent 
planners, experienced in manipulating abstract problems. On Isaev's 
account, such subjects could be expected to operate at the theoretical 
level: producing optimal solutions and where possible exhibiting the 
complete pre-planning of entire solutions, comparing options before 
choosing and executing the optimal solution. 
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The three carnage problems were trivial to the adult subjects. 
Indeed they worried that they were missing some trick. The limited 
number of carriages allowed subjects to consider alternative options. 
The optimal move sequences were between three and five moves. 
However, once they had envisaged a non-redundant move sequence, 
there seemed to be no point in considering other possibilities. They did 
not feel it necessary to compare alternatives to evaluate their proposed 
solution. It seems unlikely that these subjects could not perform at this 
level, certainly given the problem as a paper and pencil task. However, 
it is interesting to discuss their behaviour given that they did not 
spontaneously do this. On the 3-carriage tasks, it was possible to 
generate the complete solution in advance, and to keep it in memory. 
This provided an overview of the problem, and this understanding of 
the inter-relationships meant that they generated optimal solutions and 
did not need to compare them with any other solutions. One subject, 
M.R. suggested that his performance would benefit from using a pencil 
and paper, but, these having been supplied, he did not use them. There 
is quite an amount of effort involved in generating all the alternative 
move sequences, and there was no strong motivation for the subjects to 
do this. 
There are certain problems which emerged from the children's 
behaviour that are unproblematic for the adults. The constraints of the 
task are unremarkable for them, and the interface is (relatively) 
transparent. For example, the adults could see which tracks were 
possible locations, knew how to work the points, realised that carriages 
could only be left if the engine could back onto the tracks. These 
elements do not even get raised in the protocols - they are not 
consciously perceived as part of the problem. They are merely 
background knowledge. 
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The adult subjects were all satisfied with a non-redundant 
performance, and believed that they had succeeded (clearly having little 
insight in to the problem space). They did not consider more than one 
alternative to any problem, and for the 4- and 5-carriage problems, they 
certainly did not work the plan out in enough detail to compare 
solution lengths. It would be impossible to mentally consider all the 
possible solutions with the four and five carriage task, as the problem 
spaces reach unmanageable proportions. 
Instead, over the course of the trials, the adults seemed to create, a 
strategy (and a representation of the problem) which allowed them to 
consistently produce a non-redundant (but not always optimal) solution 
strategy. In their performance on the five carriage problems (which all 
had an optimal solution of 7 moves) there was clear evidence of 
improvement, and the honing of strategies. Subject PC, progressed 
from 10, to 9 to 8 moves; Subject MK progressed from 11, to 8 to 7 
moves, Subject MR, progressed from 8 to 7. Subject AD produced 
optimal solutions to all of the 5-carriage problems, (apart from a 
redundant first move, in all cases, moving the complete train to track C, 
due to her not categorising track E as a possible location) 
All the subjects produced their last solution by relying on a type of 
means ends analysis, which worked well because there were no hidden 
complexities in the task. This strategy led to the adults, invariably, 
producing a non-redundant move sequence, but not necessarily 
producing the shortest move sequence. The complete problem spaces 
for the five carriage problems, with the engine, 5-carriages and 3 
locations is large (8,640 states), and there are a large number of non-
redundant, reasonable move sequences. Even the much simpler 3 
carriage, 3 location task has 432 states. However, the extra carriages 
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increase the state space significantly, the fourth carriage multiplies the 
state space by 4 (to 1,728 states) the 4th and 5th carriages by 20 (to 8640 
states). 
There was some kind of progression in adult performance. In the 
three carriage task, they could anticipate the full progress of the task, 
and compare options without losing the overview. As the number of 
carriages increased they became unable to do this. They then adopted a 
strategy, for splitting the task into subgoals, and monitored this for 
redundancy, but they did not produce the optimal solutions, due to 
capacity limitations. They honed their task specific strategies over the 
course of the experiment and improved their performance. 
5.6 Subject AD 
The case of AD will be taken in detail as she provided the best 
performance of all the adult subjects. Like the other adult subjects her 
performance does not reflect a theoretical approach even to the three 
carriage problems. However, AD was the only adult 'r\Tho produced 
optimal move sequences for all the 5-carriage problems The train 
seemed largely irrelevant to AD who treated the problem as a problem 
of dealing with an abstract number sequence. 
5.6.1 Three carriage problems 
Problem 1-3-2 
This problem seems trivial for AD, and at various points she is looking 
for the trick! She immediately analyses the problem as one of 
remOVIng the 3 from between the 1 and 2 which are alreadv In 
sequence. There are only two legitimate ways to achieve the sub-goal 
'dump 3', and they only differ by which track is used as the dumping 
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ground. AD chooses track C because the final manoeuvre then just 
involves (elegantly) backing them all together. 
AD does not consider any alternatives because, having defined the 
problem as 'remove 3' the solution is obvious. She generates the entire 
sequence in advance, and there is no redundancy, so it is just executed. 
There are slight problems with the magnets attaching the carriages, but 
these are easily rectified. She can see, without overt analysis, which 
tracks are potential dumping grounds without ever having to consider 
that issue. 
Problem 3-2-1 
On this problem AD generates a non-redundant move sequence, 
however it was not the shortest possible sequence. One step would 
have been saved by using a 'build up from 3 strategy'. 
For this problem she begins by transferring a sub-goal from the 
previous example, indicating that she perceives that the tasks have an 
underlying similarity which might be useful. However, she does not 
prioritise this sub-goal. As she follows up her first, 'split and 
reconstruct' approach, it occurs to her that the obvious solution is to 
simply reverse the complete sequence, by placing the engine at the other 
end. She double checks that there is no way she is allowed to do this 
with the set up provided. 
She then returns to her previous plan. She produces the 'towers of 
Hanoi' analogy which is actually misleading in this context, as the same 
restrictions do not apply. This may, however, explain her prioritising 
moving 1 (the smallest ring?) before moving 3 (the largest ring). 
At one point she has a significant interruption to the execution of 
her plan, when she derails the train. At this point, her attention is 
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switched to the problem of physically locating the train, and she loses 
track of her goal. She then has to re-consider the state of the problem 
and reconstruct the sub-goal before she can continue. 
Problem 2-1-3 
AD initially represents this problem as one of swopping 1 and 2 around, 
having left the 3 somewhere. She does consider an alternative first 
move, but she quickly rejects it. It is not clear on what basis this move 
is rejected, as both of these first moves could lead to optimal move 
sequence. It seems that it is just not consistent with the initial 
characterisation of the problem. Having fixed on the first move, the 
sequence is again generated in advance, no problems are encountered so 
it is then executed. It was, in this case, an optimal move sequence 
5.6.2 Four carriage problems 
Performance of each of the four carriage problems was similar, a single 
example is provided to avoid repetition. 
Problem 2-1-4-3 
On this problem AD does not generate the complete sequence in 
advance, let alone compare alternative sequences. Again she is using a 
global analysis of the problem to generate a single move sequence 
which is then evaluated. In this case the initial set up is analysed in 
terms of the two groupings of 2-1 and 4-3. Initially, AD wants to split 
the train into these two halves and to deal with them separately. 
However, she quickly rejects that first step, presumably because she 
realises that keeping the pairings together would not be an efficient first 
move. Instead she recharacterises the problem as one of breaking 
everything up. She still considers the two swops as separate problems, 
and pursues the 4-3 swop first. Having visualised these on separate 
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tracks she realises that if she can then split the 2-1 pairing in such a way 
that the 2 is left with the 3, that this would minimise the moves. This 
is left as a general sub-goal, without an actual plan to achieve it being 
generated in advance. She then starts to execute the initial stages of the 
plan. Having split off the 3 and moving towards leaving the 4, she 
generates the actual move which will allow her to link up 2 and 3. This 
involves leaving 1 and 4 rather than just leaving 4 on its own. From 
this point the rest of the solution is obvious. 
5.6.3. Five carriage problems 
From her protocol it can be seen that subject AD started with a tentative 
strategy of ensuring that the number 5 carriage was at the back of a track, 
to avoid smaller numbers getting trapped behind it. (Isaev identifies 
this movement of the final carriage to the back of a track as the first step 
to producing the optimal solution path). This strategy is then adopted 
this as a firm first step in solving problems. She considered alternative 
first moves for the first of the three problems, and began on a step by 
step basis. The latter plan only considered a single option, and the plan 
was worked out in full before execution. However, alternative plans 
were not considered. 
Problem 2-5-4-1-3 
Subject AD initially characterises the problem as one of getting 4 and 5 
at the ends of each track. However, by mentally executing the first two 
steps she realises that this is not possible (on the two tracks which she 
restricts herself to). She therefore drops consideration of getting 4 at the 
back of a track and executes the move to get 5 at the back of the track. At 
this point, she sees that she can then place 4 next to 5 in a 
straightforward fashion. Having executed this, she then re-evaluates 
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the remaining problem. She is left with a 3 carriage problem 'which is 
trivial for her. 
It can be seen that AD considers alternative first moves, but having 
decided on the first move she then plans in a step-by-step fashion. 
When she has executed the first step, she can then see what the second 
step should be. Having executed that she is left with a much smaller 
problem. At no point does she seem to consider alternative move 
sequences. 
Problem 5-3-1-4-2 
For this problem AD begins with the comment "This time it seems 
slightly clearer that what I need to do is deposit the 5 somewhere, 
because its at totally the wrong end". She looks three moves ahead, to 
building up the sub-component '4-5' on track B. She starts to execute 
this move sequence, but as she goes to pick up carriage 4 she realises 
(looking a further two moves ahead) that this will mean that carriage 2 
will end up behind carriage 3. She considers, but decides to press on. As 
she leaves carriage 4, she can then see that the perceived problem is not 
crucial. Carriage 3 can remain attached to the engine, enabling 1 to be 
left with 2, and 3 to be left with the 4-5 sequence. The rest of the 
solution is then obvious. 
Problem 3-1-5-2-4 
In this problem, subject AD tests out her strategy of build up 4-5, and 
then solve the 1-2-3 problem, and seems to create a complete, non-
redundant solution in advance. She hesitates at the end, apparently 
because she has generated the complete sequence, but is not holding the 
complete solution in her head. She has used her strategy to mentally 
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execute a series of steps which she believes form a non-redundant path 
to the solution. No alternatives are considered. 
When it comes to executing the solution, her performance differs 
slightly from the plan. It does not generate any extra steps but the 
presence of the 1-2 sub-component, seems to prioritise creating the 1-2-3 
subcomponent, over the 4-5 sUbcomponent in the mental plan. This 
influence of 'visual saliency' is a characteristic of step-by-step planning, 
although in this case it is not leading the planner astray in any way. 
In the course of the trials AD seems to be evaluating and finally 
fixing on strategies for the problem. The strategies she selects initially 
are good ones, and, as they are evaluated positively, no other ones are 
considered (e.g. build up from 1). AD generates optimal solutions to the 
5-carriage problems, but she does not do this by adopting a theoretical 
standpoint. She begins with a step-by-step approach and, when the 
problem is reduced to a manageable size, she uses a short range 
planning approach. As she becomes surer of her two strategies (split 
into sub-problems and build-up from the end), she becomes able to 
generate the sequence of moves in advance, but was not able to hold 
onto and execute the sequence from memory. She had to re-generate 
them using the same strategies whilst executing the task. 
6. Conclusion 
There was evidence of the manipulative, step-by-step, and short-range 
approaches described by Isaev (1985) and 11agkaev (1977), although these 
did not characterise the behaviour of individual children. Their 
occurrence was dependent on the interaction between the child and the 
particular task or stage of the task. The theoretical style \\'as not 
observed, the Dlain reason being that in this experiment the more 
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complex tasks which could stimulate theoretical behaviour were 
presented as practical exercises rather than as pencil and paper tasks 
(which was the case in Isaev's task). 
It seems highly unlikely that the adults tested in this study could not 
have adopted a theoretical approach. The adults would almost certainly 
have been able to systematically generate the entire problem space if an 
external memory (pen and paper) and enough time was provided 
(along with sufficient inducements to pursue the problem to these 
lengths). It is interesting that the subjects did not feel the need to do 
this to succeed on the problem. One subject M.R. suggested using a pen 
and paper, but when one was provided, he did not use them. 
It was difficult to categorise the behaviour of the majority of child 
subjects who did not provide any protocol data. This aspect would have 
to be overcome in some way in a future experiment (see chapter 10). 
However, the short-range and step-by-step planning behaviours which 
were observed were not directly age-related in this sample, as the 
comparison between Martin (6:6) and Adam (9:2) indicates. 
The most insight has been gained from the behaviour of the adults, 
who were able to provide protocols. Their behaviour indicates that as 
the task demands increase, performance decreases in terms of Isaev's 
developmental levels. This is important in any account which argues 
that cognitive development is knowledge development (see chapter 8). 
Performance must decrement in a similar fashion (although at different 
points). If the higher cognitive processes involved in planning do not 
develop, then performance on a planning task should break do\vn in 
the same way regardless of age, although the breakdown will occur at 
different points, for adults and children of different ages. \Velsh (1991) 
in her study of a problem solving task (the towers of Hanoi), noted, 
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with surprise, that this was indeed the case with her subjects. Older 
children made the same errors as younger children when faced with 
more complex problems, which exceeded their processing capacity. 
7. Planning and problem solving 
Planning and problem solving could be considered to be the ends of a 
continuum, with Isaev's levels of planning lying between them. 
Wheatley (1984) has defined problem solving as "what you do when 
you don't know what to do." Planning could be taken to describe what 
you do once you do know what to do. Although, between these 
extremes there are various levels of 'knowing what to do'. 
With very complex problems people may not know where to begin. 
However, this is rarely the case as there are many general problem 
solving heuristics available. In clearly defined domains (such as the 
train task) a lack of understanding of how to achieve the goal will not 
preclude moving appropriately, without necessarily moving 
strategically towards the goal. Manipulating the problem may be a way 
of generating new states from which the solution may become apparent, 
or the constraints of the problem become clearer. Isaev's manipulative 
approach does not really constitute planning, but may rather reflect the 
most general of problem solving heuristics applied to an ill-understood 
problem. Isaev's train task permits planning, once the various domain 
restrictions have been understood. But, for the youngest children (e.g. 
Ben 5:2), it is a problem solving task comparable to the Chinese Ring 
task (Kotovsky and Simon 1990) where even the definition of what 
constitutes a move is not clear. 
A short-range plan requires a definite goal (although this may be a 
sub-goal of the complete problem). A sequence of steps are then 
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explicitly generated to achieve this goal. It requires an ability to 
recognise 'solvable' states, or promising subcomponents in relation to 
the goal, i.e. perceiving patterns to motivate the plan. The step by step 
approach is intermediate between these two approaches. A general 
strategy (e.g. build up from 5) may guide an initial step, but no definite 
path towards the goal or sub-goal is being followed. Small steps are 
taken, until the pattern of the problem becomes clearer, and a path to 
the goal, or an obvious constituent (sub-goal) becomes apparent. At this 
point a short-range plan can be generated to achieve the goal. The 
theoretical approach requires an overview of the complete solution 
which would allow for the comparison and evaluation of possible 
solutions. On the train task, it seems that the memory load was such 
that a theoretical approach required an external memory (perhaps 
because on top of generating a solution sequence the number of moves 
also had to be counted. These activities could not be carried 0 u t 
simultaneously. 
The continuum between planning and problem solving is 
illustrated by Bodner and McMillen's (1986) distinction between 
problems and exercises in relation to answering chemistry problems. 
According to this definition, if you know what to do when you read a 
question, it's an exercise, not a problem. The status of a given question 
as a problem is not an intrinsic attribute of the question itself. The 
problem is in the eye of the beholder. It is a feature of the individual's 
interpretation of the question, i.e. of their encoding and representation. 
The line between problems and exercises in any domain will be defined 
by the individual's level of expertise. 
Students can learn a set of algorithms for solving chemistry (or any 
other problems), but these are of no use unless the student is able to 
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identify the relevant question. Chi, Glaser and Rees (1982) have 
demonstrated in the physics domain that experts and novices categorise 
mechanics problems in different ways. Novices concentrate on the 
surface features, e.g. problems which involve an inclined plane, 
whereas experts analyse them directly in terms of their solutions e.g. 
those solvable with Newton's laws. Experts' additional knowledge has 
led to a new way of perceiving physics problems. This encoding step is 
crucial to problem representation. In the same way that novice 
physicists were misled by the surface features of the problems, so Ben's 
(5:2) understanding of the train task caused him to represent the 
problem in terms of what he did understand, i.e. in terms of a 'play 
schema'. 
Larkin, McDermott, Simon and Simon (1980) have looked in detail 
at the problem solving processes of novices and experts. They argued 
that novices used means-ends analysis in an erratic way. They seem to 
have been using a general problem solving strategy, rather than a 
specific one, and using a step-by-step approach. In contrast, experts 
perceived the solution directly and only applied the appropriate 
equations. They are encoding the problem in such a way that the 
solution is obvious. With sufficient domain knowledge, the solution 
becomes perceptual. In the train task, this immediate perception of the 
solution to 3-carriage problems obviated the need to consider 
alternative move sequences by competent subjects. 
The importance of encoding and representation is evident in the 
lack of transfer of solution algorithms (Bodner and McMillen 1986) or 
problem solutions (Gick and Holyoak 1980; 1983) between situations. 
Providing isolated strategies does not help subjects to recognise 
appropriate situations for applying the algorithms. The basis for 
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transfer is understanding, which depends on having an elaborated 
knowledge base, and being able to take an overview (this \vill be 
developed in chapter 9). 
Problem representations allows for different level of planning. 
Ben's representation of the problem allowed him to achieve a direct 
solution to the problem (picking the carriages up), but did not allow 
him to succeed on the task as defined by the experiment. Adam's initial 
inaccurate representation allowed him to manipulate the train, 
however, with increased understanding of the constraints he was able 
to re-represent the problem in a solvable way. 
7.1 Interacting knowledge 
There were various types of knowledge necessary to perform the train 
task successfully, and which would lead to different representations of 
the problem. Ben (5:2) brought the most basic of these into focus, he 
neither understood the problem nor the social situation. At a higher 
level, Adam (9:2) had problems with the 'interface', the physical train 
set. There were motor problems with the points, and with the magnetic 
couplings re-attaching. When attention had to be concentrated at these 
lower levels of the task, higher levels plans are forgotten. Both Adam 
and AD lost track of their 'plan' when the 'interface' got in the way: for 
example AD had to re-create a goal after a de-railing problem. The train 
task requires to subject to limit their attention to the tracks which are 
relevant to the task. A lack of appreciation of the relationship between 
the track sections and the orientation of the train, caused problems for 
Adam, but not for the younger Martin. Experience of trains meant that 
this aspect of the task was entirely transparent for Nfartin (and the 
adults). These constraints were literally unremarkable for them. In 
contrast, Adam had considerable problems: he is initially unable to 
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understand the relationship, which meant that anticipated moves 'were 
mis-predicted. However, he quickly assimilated these constraints, and 
was then, able to focus on the underlying problem and improve his 
performance. In contrast, Martin (6:6), was able to move the train 
smoothly and did not experience any interruptions due to the interface, 
he was directly engaging the problem6 . A succession of such interface 
problems would inevitably lead to a step-by-step performance, because 
any short-range plans would be prematurely lost. 
The adults found the interface transparent, but perhaps more than 
this, they classed it as largely irrelevant. They focussed on dealing with 
the abstract number sequences, and generated higher 1 eve 1 
characterisations of the problem In terms of crossed sequences and 
interleaved numbers, for example. Chi and Ceci (1987) have argued that 
it cannot be assumed that children's knowledge of number is the same 
as adults', even in relation to basic number sequences. In terms of the 
initial representation of the problem, this kind of knowledge 
differential seems to be implicated in this experiment. This will, in 
turn affect the strategies adopted, and the salience of sub-components. 
When the problem space is understood, the 3-carriage problems are 
almost perceptual, they are not really a problem because the solutions 
are obvious from understanding the problem. The four and five 
carriage problems become more complex, and there is change of 
approach. The strategy is then such that the problem is reduced to one 
where the solution becomes, again, obvious. 
6 This is similar to the concern for 'direct manipulation' interfaces in the human 
computer interaction literature (Hutchins, Hollan, & Norman 1986). 
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7.2 Strategy creation 
The behaviour of subjects indicated that they were developing specific 
strategies as they interacted with the task. As subject AD progressed on 
the task, she adopted certain heuristics more firmly. Along with other 
subjects she remembered significant states from previous problems, and 
began using these states as subgoals. As these subgoals became firmer, 
less effort was required to analyse the problem, and the further the 
subject could lookahead. Experience allowed exploration of the 
problem space, and the identification of strategic subgoals. This drive to 
understand the problem continued despite success, to ultimately 
achieve the smoothest possible performance with the minimum of 
monitoring. This is comparable to Agre and Shrager's (1990) study of 
photocopying which indicated that the 'practice' effect is not mere 
'speeding up', but the refinement of strategies. 
7.3 Problem representation 
Isaev's concern with 'analysis' has been interpreted as 'problem 
representation'. In the problem solving literature there is evidence of 
the importance of encoding. Success in planning and problem-solving 
tasks crucially depends on how the child or adult represents the 
problem to themselves. Amarel (1966 cited in Simon 1981) states that 
problem solving is just a matter of finding a representation in which 
the solution is obvious, i.e. it is the representation which turns a 
problem into an exercise. It has been established that the content of 
cover stories make a great difference to the process of problem 
representation. Those that are consistent with general knowledge are 
easier for subjects than those that do not fit. Wason and Johnson-Laird 
(1977) have shown this \vith the card-turning reasoning task, and 
Kotovsky, Hayes and Simon 1985 \vith various isomorphs of the to\\'er 
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of Hanoi. If less capacity is used on holding the problem statement in 
working memory, then more capacity is available for solving it. The 
logical limit may occur in children (and adults on some problems) 
where all the capacity is required for the former, and therefore no 
solution is possible (or manipulative behaviour results). This indicates 
that whilst there must be absolute capacity limitations, there are also 
contingent capacity limitations based on the interaction of the problem 
representation with the absolute capacity limitations. 
8. Chapter summary 
A partial replication of Isaev's planning task was presented, to test the 
hypothesis that planning development involved the creation of new 
planning processes. This was proposed as an alternative to a 
representational redescription approach of knowledge development. 
Isaev's planning stages were demonstrated: however, rather than 
indicating an absolute level for an individual, it was argued that it 
reflected the individuals knowledge level interacting with problem 
complexity. In adults, the planning mode decreased from short-range to 
step-by-step as the state space of the problem increased. Planning never 
occurred at the theoretical level on this task. 
Children need to clarify the problem space and to understand the 
constraints of the task, before they could plan. This supports Isaev's 
emphasis on the development of problem analysis, although the 
explanation presented here is one of the development of problem 
representation interacting with capacity limitations, i.e. it is a 
knowledge development rather than a process development account. 
The development of encoding and problem representation is dependent 
on domain specific background knowledge. 
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At this stage we have rejected Karmiloff-Smith's specific RR model, 
but have not rejected the underlying principle of representational 
redescription. In this chapter and the last, only one complete account of 
planning development was found , and it has been argued that the 
apparent process development can be explained in terms of knowledge 
development. In chapter 8, the knowledge development position will 
be supported further. In chapter 9, a new account of representational 
redescription will be proposed. The empirical evidence from this 
chapter illustrated the need to consider the issues of problem 
representation, and capacity limitations in developing that model. 
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Chapter 8 
Cognitive Development as Knowledge Development 
Chapter Abstract 
The empirical work presented in chapter 7 indicates that the 
development of planning ability reflects the development of knowledge 
rather than the development of any cognitive processes. This chapter 
presents further supporting evidence for the 'knowledge development' 
view. It is argued that apparent developmental differences in processes 
can be explained by differences in knowledge. The apparent 
development of higher cognitive processes, is a feature of the 
interaction between the processes and the child's knowledge base (e.g. 
Chi and Ceci 1987). The correlative evidence of 'early competence' 
indicates that children do possess higher cognitive processes at an early 
age, but their performance is limited by their understanding of the 
relevant knowledge content. The justification of the knowledge 
development position provides the basis for the re-formulation of 
representational redescription which is presented in chapter 9. 
1. Introduction 
Karmiloff-Smith's Representational Redescription (RR) model 
(Karmiloff-Smith 1986) \\'as analysed in chapter 5, and some 
modifications suggested. One of the fundamental changes proposed 
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was to drop the problematic concept of 'behavioural success'. 
Karmiloff-Smith limits her explanation of behaviour to development 
beyond 'behavioural success' and does not relate her model to general 
theories of cognitive development. In chapter 5 it was argued that 
whilst it was an important insight that development does not end with 
successful performance, there needed to be some justification for 
proposing a different developmental mechanism for the 'post-success' 
period. No justification has (to date) been found. 'Success' has also 
been shown to be hard to define in many domains (see chapters 3 and 
5). Consequently, it was suggested, in chapter 5, that the concept be 
dropped. The full implications for the RR model will be elaborated in 
Chapter 9. In this chapter, the main consequence of the dropped 
constraint will be pursued: the broadening of the applicability of 
representational redescription to development in general. 
As a general developmental model representational redescription 
becomes a 'knowledge development' theory, involving changes in the 
structure of knowledge. No additional developmental of cognitive 
processes are suggested1. The qualitatively different knowledge levels 
in the RR model (Karmiloff-Smith 1986, 1992) might be taken to imply 
structural changes, but these will be dropped from the reformulated 
recursive account to be presented in chapter 9. Before presenting the 
reformulated model of representational redescription, this chapter will 
argue in general terms that knowledge development is central to 
cognitive development, along with the correlative argument that 
cognitive processes do not develop, qualitatively. The latter position is 
supported by the empirical work on planning presented in chapter 7. 
1 It is not suggested that Karmiloff-Smith would subscribe to this view of 
representational redescription, if she were to broaden her conception to form a general 
developmental mechanism. 
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This chapter begins with Carey's (1985) question "Are children 
fundamentally different thinkers and learners than adults?" It will be 
argued that children are not fundamentally different - the apparent 
differences are attributable to knowledge development - although 
various suggestions for fundamental differences are considered. In the 
previous chapters it was argued that knowledge development rather 
than the development of planning processes was responsible for 
performance improvements. The corollary of the knowledge 
development view, is the 'early competence' approach to cognitive 
processes, which is then presented. Processes reserved (in structural 
theories) for adults are demonstrated as being available to young 
children, given the relevant domain knowledge. Knowledge 
development is obviously not a mere accumulation of knowledge, it 
involves restructuring. Accounts of the development of the structure 
of knowledge, with increased quantity are then considered. 
2. Developmental differences 
A knowledge development account must hold that children do not 
think in fundamentally different ways than adults. Carey (1985) has 
concluded that the most important differences between adults and 
children relate to the accumulation of knowledge. 
Carey (1985) identifies five ways in which children could be said to 
fundamentally differ from adults, these are: 
(1) domain specific knowledge. 
(2) tools of wide application 
(3) metaconceptual knowledge; 
(4) representational format; 
(5) foundational concepts; 
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These will be considered in the following sections, with the additional 
category of the development of processing capacity. Carey argues that 
differences exist in the first three categories, this thesis will argue only 
for difference in the first two categories. 
2.1 Quantity of knowledge 
It is undisputed that, ceteris paribus, younger children know less than 
older children. They clearly differ in 'domain specific knowledge'. This 
lack of knowledge has serious ramifications for children's performance 
in ways that may appear, on first examination, to be unrelated to 
knowledge. 
If 'tools of wide application' are defined as strategies, heuristics and 
skills, then again children and adults will clearly differ. Language 
might be considered to be the most general of the tools, the 
development of language abilities will clearly impinge upon a large 
number of tasks. However, the differences are not a feature of age per se, 
nor of cognitive structure, they are a difference of knowledge. They do 
not, therefore, constitute fundamental differences. 
An increase in general knowledge has a number of implications: 
children are universal novices, and this will limit the analogies which 
can be made across domains. Keil (1991) argues that this will give rise to 
differences in learning in childhood which mean that this will not be 
comparable to learning in expertise. However, this does not constitute a 
fundamental difference in learning processes nor in organisational 
structure. Children who are experts in a domain \vill acquire 
knowledge, and organise it in the same way as adult experts. They \vill 
be able to draw analogies from other knowledge domains, although, 
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there will clearly be less of these domains available to children than to 
adults. If the knowledge-related differences were to be factored out, the 
underlying learning or developmental mechanisms should be the 
same. The comparison of expert adults and children in terms of their 
creative processes will prove useful in developing the Recursive Re-
Representation (3R's) model in chapter 9. 
Differences in quantity of knowledge will also result in 
(quantitatively) different structures of that knowledge. Carey (1985) 
argues that children and adults may have different theories as a result. 
Changes in the organisation of knowledge will be discussed further in 
section 5, and in chapter 9. 
2.2 Metaconceptual knowledge 
Carey (1985) accepts that there are differences between adults and 
children in 'metaconceptual knowledge', she argues that children may 
lack 'metaconceptual knowledge': 
"Unlike adults, children cannot think about their mental representations 
and inferential processes" 
Carey 1985 (p. 106, emphasis in original). 
This is exactly the kind of development that Karmiloff-Smith (e.g. 1992) 
wanted to explain with her RR model and which, it will be argued, can 
be explained by the 'Recursive Re-Representation' model to be 
presented in chapter 9. Both of these representational redescription 
accounts explain the development of this kind of conceptual overvievv 
purely in terms of knowledge development, although acquiring 
knowledge in the domains of 'mind' and 'thought' \\'ill obviously be 
fundamental to many other domains. 
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Carey (1985) describes an example of metalinguistic change 'which, 
she argues, involves only the acquisition of knowledge (however, she 
does not feel able to conclude that this explains all metaconceptual 
change). She cites Piaget's (1929) example of asking preschool children 
whether the word 'needle' is sharp. The children answer that it is 
sharp, because they do not focus on the 'word' but only on the referent. 
Similarly, young children will claim that the ,,,,ord snake is longer that 
the word caterpillar. However, Carey (1985) does not feel able to 
conclude that children and adults do not differ 'metaconceptually'. 
This kind of concession to 'metacognition' is also found in Goswami's 
(1991) knowledge development approach to analogical reasoning, but, it 
will be argued below, the concession is unnecessary . 
Clearly children lack metaconceptual knowledge, relative to adults, 
just as they lack 'domain specific knowledge', and 'tools of wide 
application'. However, Carey does not distinguish metaconceptual 
knowledge from metaconceptual abilities. In fact, she seems to use the 
term metaconceptual development to refer to both. As was argued in 
chapter 2, following Flavell (1979): (meta)cognitive knowledge does not 
differ from knowledge in any other domain, and is acquired in exactly 
the same way. The chronological progression from domain knowledge 
to (meta)conceptual knowledge is unarguable. The ability to reflect on 
language must be preceded by the ability to use that language. On this 
interpretation, adults will obviously have more metaconceptual 
knowledge than children simply because they have more knowledge 
than children. However, unless Carey suggests (with Piaget) that the 
development of a general 'reflective capacity' is responsible, then the 
differences may be explained by increased domain knowledge. 
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The preschool child who fails to answer the question about 'words' 
probably does not have the concept of a 'word' to use in making this 
judgement. Even if they did have some referent for the word 'word' it 
would clearly not be the adult version. Young children are adept at 
making the best sense out of incomplete (to them) communications and 
their interpretations do make the request sensible. Perhaps they just 
ignore the word 'word' when it does not find a coherent referent. In 
the "Is the word needle sharp?" example, the 'correct' interpretation of 
the sentence is quite complex. Answering 'no' to the question would 
imply that the word needle is 'not sharp', i.e. it is 'blunt'. A further 
level of conceptual analysis needs to be involved to answer the question 
correctly. A linguist might answer that 'sharpness' cannot be attributed 
to a 'word', and the utterance is thus infelicitous, rather than true or 
false. Alternatively, a poet might take a metaphorical approach to the 
word and conclude that the 'ee' in 'needle' did make the word sound 
quite 'sharp'. These 'meta-meta' conceptual interpretations perhaps 
more obviously implicate knowledge development, than the first level 
of metalinguistic knowledge which would be acquired early on in a 
literate culture. 
The implications of acquiring (meta)conceptual knowledge, in any 
domain will have widespread implications. This is clearly the case in 
the 'theory of mind' (see chapter 2). However, this does not amount to 
a fundamental difference in cognitive processes. To pre-empt the 
Recursive Re-Representation account (chapter 9), knowing about words, 
rather than just using them will involve a Re-Representation of the 
knowledge implicit in using words. It forms a new conceptual space, 
which in structural terms requires the creation of a higher level in the 
knowledge hierarchy. However, this would not be qualitatively 
different from earlier or later Re-Representations involved in learning 
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the meanings of the words, or learning about poetic uses of language. 
All of these Re-Representations will change how the world is perceived, 
but they will be a fundamentally a function of increased knowledge, 
rather than of the development of a 'reflective capacity'. 
2.3 Foundational concepts 
Carey (1985) cites Piaget's (1929) argument that children differ in the 
content of foundational concepts, such as 'causation'. However, Carey 
argues that this proposition reflections an association of the underlying 
reasoning with the content which is reasoned about. The content of 
children's theories will change, and this will affect the conclusions 
drawn. This is a feature of knowledge acquisition and restructuring, 
and will be discussed further in section 5. Carey cites Bullock, Gelman 
and Baillargeon's (1982), review which indicates that the same 
principles of causal explanation are adopted by 3 year olds up to adults, 
but there are marked differences in the ability to reflect and thus 
articulate the concept of causation. It is implicit in their reasoning, but 
has not been explicitly represented. 
2.4 Representational format 
In the category of 'representational format' Carey (1985) places the stage 
theories of Piaget, Vygotsky, and Bruner. These theories argue for 
qualitative changes in domain-general cognitive processes or in 
representational format during development. This class of structural 
changes would include Vygotsky's complex to concept shift, and Piaget's 
development of operational thinking, 
This type of global explanation provides a blanket explanation of the 
differences between adults and children in term of a structural deficit. 
This, of course is the most fundamental difference possible, entailing 
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that children could not, in principle, represent or reason in the same 
ways as adults. Smith, Sera, and Gattuso (1988) have argued that the 
problem with both Piaget and Vygotsky was the notion of intemalising 
logic: the internalising processes are logical themselves, as they must 
separate the valid from the invalid. 
Mandler (1988) characterises Piaget's account of the development of 
a symbolic capacity as a long drawn stage of the transformation of 
sensorimotor information. She dismisses Piaget's idea that concepts 
can develop out of sensorimotor representations, because the 
mechanisms of transfer from one system to the other (and particular 
the intermediate transition states) have not been explained. She argues 
that the child's accessible knowledge system, with a symbolic 
representational code, must be present from birth and develop 
alongside the sensorimotor representational system. Mandler's (1988, 
1992) account of conceptual development, is discussed further in 
chapter 9. 
2.5 Processing capacity 
A sixth potential difference between adults and children which is 
not on Carey's (1985) list, is the development of capacity, and/ or 
processing speed. These were perhaps excluded because they are not 
fundamental, qualitative differences. However, such explanations have 
been suggested (e.g. Case, Kurland & Goldberg 1982; Kail 1986). 
However, it is possible that capacity does not develop, but just appears 
to develop on the basis of elaborated knowledge. Chi (1976) has shown 
that the oft-quoted difference in memory span between adults and 
children is reduced to insignificance when items are equated for 
familiarity between the age-groups. In this thesis, it is possible to 
remain agnostic on the issue of capacity changes, the account does not 
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stand or fall on the basis of whether memory capacity or processing 
speed increase with maturation or not (although see Chi and Ceci 1987, 
for arguments against) . 
3. Early competence 
The initial moves away from structural views were characterised by 
experiments which showed 'early competence' (e.g. Donaldson 1978). 
These experiments took tasks which had been taken to indicate 
children's inability to sort out a logical problem and showed them to be 
artefacts of the knowledge required of the task 
3.1 Transitive inferences 
One of the logical abilities that Piaget argued was lacking In young 
children was the ability to make transitive inferences. He argued that 
young children could not infer 'Sam is taller than Fred' from the 
premises "Sam is taller than Henry" and "Henry is taller than Fred". 
However, Bryant and Trabasso (1971) argued that this was an effect of 
incorrect encoding of the concept 'tall', Children did not lack the ability 
to make the appropriate comparison and deduce the conclusion. Tall is 
not encoded as a comparative attribute, but as a category, thus 'Sam is 
taller than Fred' is encoded as 'Sam is tall', which does not provide the 
basis for a transitive inference. Trabasso and Riley (1975) showed that 
training children on the premises, enabled them to produce transitive 
inferences. 
Smith, Sera and Gattuso (1988) argue that children do not often 
make transitive inferences in their everyday lives. This is unlikely to 
be independent of their encoding of relationships. If you don't tend to 
encode in this way, then such relations vvill not be apparent. It is a 
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matter of knowledge that the phrase 'X is taller than Y' implies more 
than that X is tall - in fact it does not imply that X is 'tall' - it could be 
said of two midgets. It is a complex understanding and children do not 
encode relational information, unless it is made explicit. 
The general conclusion from these studies indicates the importance 
of encoding in success on these tasks. We will review the idea of 
development of encoding with reference to the adult literature. 
3.2 Metaphor 
Keil (1984) has argued that the development of understanding of 
metaphors reflects the development of knowledge in a domain, rather 
than the development of a general reasoning ability. Thus, young 
children can understand metaphors between vehicles and animals, e.g. 
"the car is thirsty", but not between eating and reading, e.g. "he gobbled 
up the book", the latter being interpreted literally. This relationship 
between knowledge and metaphor continues into adulthood, there is a 
need to understand the relationships within a semantic field before 
comparisons can be made between semantic fields. In the terminology 
of chapter 9, this means that the semantic field must have been 're-
represented' to provide a new conceptual space. An adult who does not 
understand anything about computing will not appreciate 
computational metaphors about cognition. This would not reflect any 
general lack of 'metaphorical abilities'. 
3.3 Chess 
It is difficult to compare the processing capacities of children and adults 
directly. Obviously, any behaviour is the result of the interaction of 
both knowledge and processing. There are few domains where the 
kno\vledge component is isolated enough for some kind of comparison 
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to be made. But, one such domain is chess. Chase and Simon (1973) 
have shown that experienced chess players exhibit superior memory for 
chess-game positions than novices. However, they clearly 
demonstrated that this was not due to any superiority in general 
memory capacity, but just to an ability to 'chunk' the information. The 
difference has been shown to persist between child -chess experts and 
adult novices, indicating that it is purely a function of knowledge, not 
affected by 'developmental level'. 
4. Knowledge restructuring during development. 
As knowledge develops, it must be restructured, otherwise experts 
would take longer to search their memories than novices. In terms 0 f 
knowledge format in children: the more that is known, the more 
differentiated the representation of that knowledge becomes. Carey 
(1988) has shown that conceptual hierarchies have more levels in adults 
than they do in children. 
4.1 The 'characteristic-to-defining' shift 
Keil (1984, 1986), has identified the 'characteristic-to-defining' shift in 
concept representation. This is a general developmental progression 
from typical features to clearer definitions of concepts. For example, 
young children initially rely on typical features, e.g. that Grandmothers 
have grey hair, rather than the defining features (i.e. parent's mother). 
Keil and Batterman (cited in Keil 1984, 1986) tested this progression by 
asking children for judgements of category membership. They 
presented children with stories in which atypical instances "vere clearly 
defined as category members (e.g. for 'uncle': a 2-year-old infant who is 
your father's brother) and stories where typical examples 'were 
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definitionally excluded (e.g. for 'uncle': a man similar to your father 
who gives you birthday presents, but is not related in any \vay). 
Younger children accept typical examples as category members, and 
reject the atypical ignoring the definitions. Older children, in contrast, 
give priority to the definitions. The shift from characteristic to defining 
features occurs at different ages for different domains. It is, thus, a 
domain specific phase model which Keil (1984) contrasts with 
Vygotsky's (1962) domain-general stage model of the complex to concept 
shift. 
Keil (1986) argues that this representational shift seems to be related 
to purely to knowledge development, and may continue into 
adulthood. Chi, Feltovich and Glaser (1981) have illustrated the 
characteristic-to-defining shift with adults (although not using that 
term). They asked physics experts and relative novices (1st year 
undergraduates in physics) to sort a set of physics problems into 
categories. The novices sorted on the basic of superficial features, and 
the experts extracted the essence of the problem, and sorted according to 
the laws of Physics. 
In a training study, Keil (1986) found that acqUIrIng unfamiliar 
cooking terms (e.g. baste) required a background of other cooking terms. 
It is only when the child understands what the relevant dimensions are 
that they can assimilate the definitions. 
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"What you learn influences or exerts constraints upon what you will 
learn next, not only in terms of the process of learning itself but in terms 
of how it comes to be represented. If one has a rich knowledge of 
cooking terms, for example, then one will have different representations 
of novel cooking terms than a novice, differences that may be striking 
and qualitative in nature. These constraints are products of the structure 
of what is learned, and their restrictiveness and generality depend on 
the knowledge involved. It is assumed here that the various areas of 
expertise that exist in our world have many unique structural properties 
that become all the more pronounced with increasing expertise. Thus, 
novice-to-expert transitions may frequently represent qualitative shifts in 
manner of processing and representation." 
Keil1986 (p.l56) 
It is not clear where the proposed structural and qualitative shifts 
come from. It is perhaps a feature of knowledge content rather than a 
qualitative differences in structure. 
5. Against the knowledge development view. 
Peverly (1991) has argued that knowledge-based explanations of 
development do not account for the evidence of domain-independent 
strategy development. He conflates the idea that knowledge develops, 
with strategies developing. The same cognitive processes will operate 
differently over a different knowledge base. However, the acquisition of 
learned strategies is a matter of knowledge development; domain 
general strategies may be formed by redescription of domain specific 
ones. 
Peverly has argued that researchers have been wrong to use single 
level tasks, as these don't tax the experts, and may be too hard for the 
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novices. He argues that to look at problem solving processes each 
should be presented with a task which poses each with equal difficulty 
for themselves. He argues that for experts physics problems, for 
example, may just be retrieval, but this is to miss the point. The experts 
will not have retrieved the exact problem - they are unlikely to store 
specific examples. The fact that a new example of a familiar problem 
poses no difficulty is precisely because they have the knowledge stored 
in such a way as to be able to encode a new problem in such a way that 
the solution is trivial (see chapter 7). They may well use the same 
domain general processes and strategies in a complex domains - the 
difference in encoding and performance relating to knowledge. 
6. Expertise 
Adults are novices in some domains, while children are nOVIces ill 
almost all domains, including basic general knowledge (and language). 
As we have said, the younger the child the less they know. The results 
above indicate that this lack of knowledge in itself would lead us to 
predict age related differences in the ability to form problem 
representations and in performance in most domains. 
It is obvious that experts have more knowledge than novices, but 
their performances show that there is more to it than that. They differ 
in the way that the knowledge is structured. The domains that have 
most commonly been studied are chess, mechanics problems in physics 
and mathematical problem solving (see Chi, Glaser and Rees 1982). 
Evidence of the different approaches to tasks indicate that (a) novices 
have different beliefs - 'no motion \vithout a force" rather than 'no 
acceleration \vithout a force (Clement 1982 - quoted in Carey 1988). 
Although Clement's novices has completed a first year undergraduate 
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course on Newtonian mechanics, they did not have that knowledge 
integrated in such a way that it could be produced in response to the test 
question. Naive physics persists - it could be that the breakthrough is in 
realising that the two systems are separate, and differentiating them. 
And this may happen when some unifying knowledge allows the 
Newtonian Physics to form a complete system quite apart from 
everyday behaviours. The problem is not one of conceptual 
modification, but ultimately of building a new conceptual system: the 
initial stages may come by appending the new knowledge to existing 
structures, but this is decidedly unhelpful. 
There is an extensive literature on the problems of getting 
conceptual change in science. Part of the problem here, is that it is not 
conceptual change that is required, but the temporary suspension of an 
'everyday' conception of the world, and the adoption of a 'scientific' 
approach. Even graduate scientists can be found to operate with 
'everyday' concepts, and this is because they have not dropped their 
everyday concepts, they have just learnt a separate system which is 
adopted when appropriate (i.e. in the work context). Those that try to 
integrate the scientific perception into their everyday life will be lost. It 
just is not helpful to go about your daily life perceiving the world as 
though everything was in constant motion, for example. This is equally 
true for logicians, who leave formal logic behind in everyday reasoning 
tasks (e.g. Johnson-Laird and Wason's card turning reasoning task 
(Johnson-Laird 1990). 
7. Chapter summary 
The RR model has been criticised in earlier chapters although we have 
not rejected the basic idea of representational redescription. An 
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underlying assumption of representational redescription is tha t 
cognitive flexibility is the result of the development of knowledge 
representations, rather than the result of the development of cognitive 
processes. To continue developing representational redescription into a 
more general development model it was necessary to justify the idea 
that cognitive development is knowledge development. The idea that 
development can be explained purely in terms of increasing knowledge 
has been suggested by Carey (1985). Chi and Ceci 1987) also stress the 
importance of knowledge development, arguing that the acquisition 
and restructuring of content knowledge can provide an explanation of 
apparent developmental changes in memory. 
It has been argued that children are not 'fundamentally different 
thinkers' from adults. They differ in knowledge, but not in higher 
cognitive processes. Domain knowledge, strategies, heuristics, and 
'metaconceptual knowledge' will differ, and these will cause marked 
differences in performance. However, the knowledge development 
approach makes a clear prediction about where to look for 
development. It IS in content and knowledge structure. A 
representational redescription account of knowledge development will 
be presented in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 9 
Recursive Re-Representation: towards a new theory of 
representational redescription and cognitive flexibility 
Chapter Abstract 
In this chapter a new model of representational redescription is 
presented, called the Recursive Re-Representation (3R's) model. This 
model views representational redescription as a creative process, and is 
based on Boden's (1992) computational analysis of creativity. Recursive 
Re-Representation creates new levels of knowledge or conceptual 
spaces, which allow things to be thought which could not have been 
thought before. 
The 3R's model involves the recursive operation of the perceptual 
analysis process responsible for creating the original representations in 
infancy (Mandler 1988, 1992). Perceptual analysis, which involves 
perception, analogical reasoning and evaluation, creates re-
representations in exactly the same way as it creates initial 
representations. Re-representation results in increasingly compact 
representations which allow increased cognitive flexibility in a domain. 
This is achieved through either the chunking of knowledge vvithin a 
conceptual space, or the creation of a higher level conceptual spaces, 
allowing an overview of lower levels and a more dramatic shift in 
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flexibility. Recursive re-representation results in different level of 
'mapping' of domains, in a basically hierarchical fashion. 
Cognitive flexibility is attributed to the contents of working memory, 
the latter being capacity-limited in terms of 'chunks'. Recursive Re-
Representation will create different levels of knowledge, or conceptual 
spaces. These levels of knowledge and awareness are related to the 
three levels proposed in Activity theory. The developing model of 
Recursive Re-Representation is briefly related to the BAIRN system, 
which provides a potential formalism for specifying the model in more 
detail. 
1. Introduction 
In previous chapters the details of Karmiloff-Smith's (1986) model have 
been questioned, but the underlying principle of representational 
redescription remains a plausible developmental mechanism. 
Following from the rejection of 'behavioural success' in chapter 5, the 
3R's model is proposed as a general, recursive, representational-
development mechanism. It will be argued that it is a genera I 
developmental mechanism with wide application, but not that it is 
necessarily the only developmental mechanism. 
Representational Redescription (Karmiloff-Smith e.g. 1986, 1992) was 
initially proposed as an explanation of the development of cognitive 
flexibility, and this remains a central concern of the 3R's model. 
Development is explained by representational change, rather than the 
development of any 'flexible thought processes'. This approach was 
suggested by the empirical evidence from Isaev's planning task 
presented in chapter 7. It was argued that planning ability ,"-'as a 
function of domain kno,,,,ledge. The general kno''''ledge development 
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approach was defended in chapter 8. The 3R's model is purely one of 
knowledge development, in contrast to Karmiloff-Smith's RR model 
which also had a structural element. She proposed that kno\l\'ledge 
development involved redescription into qualitatively different 
representational formats which, presumably, do not exist at birth (prior 
to 'success' in any domain). The 3R's model will drop the structural 
element (a structural approach is, in any case, hard to pursue with a 
recursive model). It will maintain Karmiloff-Smith's conception of 
domain general redescription processes, but with each 'level' 0 f 
redescription differing in terms of increasing compactness of the 
representations rather than the format. The compactness is achieved 
through Re-Representing several chunks of knowledge as a single 
chunk. Cognitive flexibility is then explained through the liberation of 
central processing capacity by chunking in a domain. Chunking is an 
ill-defined process, but Recursive Re-Representation provides one 
possible explanation of the process of compacting representations. 
Karmiloff-Smith's conception of Representational Redescription 
was of the development from specific representational codes, to more 
general, more accessible ones. That directional constraint will also be 
removed from the 3R's model, which will also allow for redescription 
from general linguistic representations into more specific 
representational codes. This will explain the development of 
'automatic' motor skills from linguistic instructions, and such processes 
must be included in a general developmental mechanism. This "will be 
possible in the 3R's model because each level of re-representation 
involves a 're-perception' and re-encoding' and can therefore take any 
form that an original encoding could take. 
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Representational redescription generates entirely new 
representations, as such, it is fundamentally a creative process. Boden 
(1992, 1993) has provided a computational approach to creativity, and 
her analysis of creative processes will organise much of this chapter. It 
will be argued that the explanation offered for adult creativity can also 
contribute to explaining development. The 3R's approach uses Boden's 
(1992, 1993) concept of the mapping and transforming of conceptual 
spaces. 
The 3R's model is more interactive (influenced by socio-cultural 
approaches) than the RR model which emphasises endogenous 
redescription processes. The planning and block balancing experiments 
(chapters 7 and 4) highlighted the importance of 'encoding' and 
problem representation: the interaction of top-down and bottom-up 
information. Mandler's (1988, 1992) idea of 'perceptual analysis' in 
concept formation which she has applied to development in infancy, 
provides the basis for a general representational mechanism in the 3R's 
model. 'Perceptual analysis' will be generalised as a mechanism for 
creating new representations based on the observation of the 
individual's behaviour. 
The 3R's account will not be developed to the level of specificity of 
Karmiloff-Smith's (1986) RR modeL As such it is decidedly 'soft core' 
(Klahr 1992). However, it will be related to a rare 'hard core' model of 
cognitive development: the BAIRN system (Wallace, Klahr, and Bluff 
(1987). This model, though based on a production system architecture, 
includes an atypical hierarchical knowledge structure (based around 
'nodes'). Crucially, for the 3R's account, development in BAIRN 
involves the creation of new nodes, on the basis of the observation of 
the performance of productions. The 3R's account "",ill not be 
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developed to the level of describing representations, it focuses instead 
on the processes involved. As a consequence, this chapter \vill not 
argue for or against the psychological validity of either BAIRN'S 
production system architecture or Mandler's (1992) 'image schemas'. 
2. Representational redescription as a creative process 
Representational redescription generates entirely new representations 
for the individual. It is, therefore, a creative process. In the RR model, 
each new representation contains information which has been extracted 
from analysing lower level representations and is entirely novel to the 
subject. In RR theory the new representations were novel both in terms 
of content and in qualitatively different formats. The representations 
were redescribed from modality specific representational codes into a 
domain general accessible format. The 3R's account like the RR model 
proposes the creation of new representations. However, it drops the 
limitation of a progression towards a domain-general, accessible code, in 
favour of the recursive progression to 'compactness'. 
Boden (1992) has described and demystified various aspects of 
creativity from a computational perspective. Boden (1993) broadly 
characterises creativity as the mapping, exploration and transformation 
of conceptual spaces. Mapping and exploration involve elaborating the 
conceptual space, filling in gaps either in the personal conceptual space, 
or historically. More dramatic changes involve transforming the 
conceptual space, in fundamental ways, so that a new conceptual space 
is created. Ideas which could not have been conceived within the 
previous conceptual space now become 'thinkable', an example of this 
(quoted by Boden 1992, 1993) being Schoenberg's creation of atonal 
music, opening up a ne,,, musical space, and allo\ying ne\\T 
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compositions which were inconceivable within the prevIous tonal 
music space. 
Boden (1992) distinguishes between 'p-creative' ideas, those which 
are psychologically new to the individual and 'h-creative' ideas, which 
are historically new to humanity and have never been conceived 
before. Furthermore, the latter could not have been thought before as 
they require the creation of novel conceptual spaces. 
Representational Redescription has been seen as a prerequisite of 
creativity. Karmiloff-Smith (1992) includes creativity in the flexible 
activities which, she claims, require redescribed knowledge. Boden 
(1992, 1993) also uses the concept of Representational Redescription. On 
her conception, higher levels of creativity involve the manipulation of 
'mental maps' of conceptual spaces, and she suggests that 
Representational Redescription may be the method by which these 
maps are generated. 
Unfortunately, there is a problem of circularity in using RR theory to 
explain creativity, because representational redescription is a creative 
process. It involves generating representations, ex nihilo, which had 
not existed previously in the mind of the individual. The 'chicken and 
egg' nature of the problem is revealed in the following quotation: 
"It is the capacity for creating different representational formats of the same 
knowledge which enables inter-representational links that form the seeds 
of human creativity. II 
Karmiloff-Smith 1993 (p.29 emphasis added) 
The circularity has emerged because both Boden (1992, 1993) and 
Karmiloff-Smith (1993) are concerned to account for the more advanced 
types of creativity. Boden (1992) is largely concerned to account for 'h-
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creative' productions, as these are more generally thought to defy a 
computational analysis. However, she does ackno\'vledge, in a general 
way, the role of p-creative processes in children: 
"All human infants spontaneously transfonn their own conceptual space 
in fundamental ways, so that they come to be able to think thoughts of a 
kind which they could not have thought before. Their creative powers 
gradually increase, as they develop the ability to vary their behaviour 
in more and more flexible ways, and even to reflect on what they are 
doing." 
Boden 1992 (p. 63) 
The circularity of requtnng representational redescription for the 
operation of creativity, collapses if representational redescription is 
defined as a creative process. There is then only a single phenomenon 
to explain and - although this is no easy task - this is the approach 
adopted in this chapter. 
2.1 Creative processes 
Boden (1992) distinguishes creativity from novelty. A generative 
system such as language can be used to produce an infinite number of 
novel utterances, but these are not creative as they could have been 
generated at any time. Creativity involves thinking something that 
could not have been thought by that person before, i.e. it involves a 
conceptual shift in thinking, a redescription of their representation. 
The generative system may then move up a level, and may generate the 
same output lvith a different level of understanding and different 
flexibility (e.g. a poetic conception of language, still allo\\"s the 
generation of everyday language). Different levels of knoldedge \\"ill be 
discussed further in section 5. 
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2.2 Creativity in Development 
Boden's (1992, 1993) insight that creativity involves thinking something 
that could not have been thought before, is illuminating for a 
developmental account. Adopting this approach means that children 
will be unable to understand or conceive certain things without Re-
Representation. Children who have problems with Piaget's question 
(cited by Carey, and in chapter 8), "which word is longer snake or 
caterpillar?", are able to use words, but they don't know that they are 
using words. The children need to create the linguistic concept in order 
to understand the question, they need to re-represent the knowledge 
which is implicit in their language behaviour, and this may not become 
necessary until they learn to read. 
Importantly for the 3R's model, Boden (1992) explains creativity 
without invoking qualitatively different processes in 'h-creative' people 
than in ordinary people. It is knowledge, and motivation, which are 
implicated. Adopting creativity as the basis of a representational 
redescription process, the 3R's model argues for just a knowledge 
differential between infants, children and adults. They could be 
employing the same basic Recursive Re-Representation process, 
although the domains to which they are applying them will obviously 
differ dramatically. 
Stage theories of development argue that children of certain ages 
cannot think things that older children can. This is explained by Piaget 
(e.g. 1983) as a lack of logical operations in younger children. However, 
this developmental difference would also be predicted by Boden's (1992, 
1993) approach to creativity. Creativity, involving the creation of ne,,· 
conceptual spaces, \I\"ould predict discontinuities in development. 
Creativity allo\l\"s children to think things which they could not think 
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before. Stages in understanding may well be an emergent property of 
knowledge development, when certain Re-Representations (e.g. those 
involving domains such as 'theory of mind') have widespread 
implications in a number of other domains. 
2.3 Conceptual maps 
Boden's (1992, 1993) concept of creativity as the 'mapping, exploring, 
and transforming' of conceptual spaces (abbreviated as METeS) is 
illustrated with isolated examples. There is no detailed analysis of what 
a 'map' of a conceptual space might be in cognitive terms. There seems, 
also, to be no overt distinction between cases where 'h-creative' people 
are operating on their conceptual spaces using their maps to guide 
them, or cases where they are operating directly on the maps 
themselves. Her initial definition of the concept is different again: 
'''Maps' of conceptual spaces are internal representations, or descriptions, 
of the creator's thinking-skills" 
Boden 1993 (p.23, emphasis added) 
This definition seems to imply some representation of the cognitive 
processes involved in creativity, although this does not seem to be what 
she intends when she provides examples of creativity. Following the 
presentation of some transformations of conceptual spaces uSIng 
heuristics she claims. 
In these ways, and others, our maps of conceptual space can be explored, 
and even transformed. 
Boden 1993 (p.23, emphasiS added) 
and later in the same article 
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"We have seen that creativity involves METCS: mapping the structures 
in one's mind, and using those maps to negotiate and transform the 
conceptual spaces concerned." 
Boden 1993 (p.24, emphasis added) 
In a developmental approach, it is important to define whether 
developments involve changing the conceptual spaces (using the maps 
as a guide), or changing the maps themselves. Boden (1992, 1993) would 
probably argue for changes at both levels, but as she does not elaborate 
the 'map' analogy in any great detail, it is not clear how the changes at 
different levels would relate. The differences are not important for her 
descriptions of h-creativity, but will be significant in a developmental 
model. 
A further distinction, which needs to be made is the difference 
between an objective, and subjective conceptual space. The objective 
conceptual space will be the space of, for example, arithmetic. The 
subjective conceptual space, indicated by the individual's map, may be 
limited to say addition and subtraction. The 3R's model will extend the 
mapping analogy in section 5, from a developmental perspective. 
However, this extension may not be the conception of the process 
envisaged by Boden (1992, 1993). The 3R's model will view the child as 
operating in an objective conceptual space, using and extending her 
(higher level) map which indicates her subjective conceptual space. Re-
Representation allows significant modifications to the map, and / or the 
creation of new maps. 
2.4 Elements of creativity 
Boden's (1992, 1993) focus was not on development, and she has not 
applied her analysis of creativity to developmental issues, (apart from 
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representational redescription). In the following sections the general 
aspects of creativity which she has raised in relation to 'h-creativity' 
will be related to developmental issues and the empirical data from this 
thesis. Boden has identified a number of influences on the mapping of 
conceptual spaces, which she illustrates with examples of h-creativity. 
These are evaluation, constraints, analogical reasoning, and memory. 
Every stage of development and learning seems to require the creation 
of psychologically novel representations for the individual. If p-
creative processes are central to development, then the fundamental 
features of creativity identified by Boden must be present from infancy. 
In the next sections we will describe the various processes which are 
implicated in adult creativity, and relate them to developmental data as 
far as possible. 
In the following section Mandler's process of 'perceptual analysis' is 
described, which provides the basis for a representation creation process 
involving the elements identified in this section. 
2.4.1 Evaluation 
"Creativity, whether in children or adults, involves exploration and 
evaluation. The new idea must be compared to some pre-existing 
mental structure, and judged to be 'interesting' by the relevant criteria" 
Boden 1992 (p. 63) 
A computer could create novel combinations by just combining ideas in 
an exhaustive fashion, but this would be a generative rather than a 
creative system. What is essential for creativity, is having a basis for 
evaluating which of the combinations are worthwhile. 
The importance of the evaluative component in creativity, is 
demonstrated, in the following anecdote. In 1992 a Manchester artist 
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submitted a painting produced by his 6-year-old grand-daughter to the 
Royal Academy. This was a largely fortuitous production, of five blobs 
of colour, which had merged and run down the page, the end result 
resembling 5 trees. The grand-daughter evaluated this production as a 
failure: her dots had run. The grandfather appreciated the pleasing 
image, and provided an evocative title to support his interpretation. 
The painting was duly exhibited amid a joyful outcry in the local media 
about the Art Establishment having been 'fooled'. However, this was 
not really the case. The creativity did not rest with the child: the 
production process was largely random. The creativity lay with the 
grand-father who, as an accomplished artist, recognised the qualities of 
colour and composition in the result. The grand-daughter must have 
produced a large number of paintings that she would have evaluated 
more favourably, but which the artist-grandfather did not bother to 
submit to the exhibition. 
Boden (1992) stresses the point, that solutions to problems, or 
creative ideas are not solutions or creations unless they are recognised 
as such. In terms of h-creativity, there will be no basis for comparing 
the solution, in order to evaluate it. The solution must just fit in with 
the relevant background knowledge, and the subject's representation of 
the problem. Boden (1992) quotes the example of both Kepler and 
Copernicus who considered and rejected the idea of elliptical orbits. 
However, at a later stage Kepler re-evaluated the idea and came to see 
that this was the solution: Copernicus, however, did not. This 
illustrates that evaluation is relative to a state of knowledge in the 
individual, and it does not relate to the intrinsic merit of the idea itself. 
A knowledge-based evaluation process means that children cannot 
create \vhat they are not ready to create. They \\'ill not be able to extend, 
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or transform their conceptual spaces unless they can evaluate the ne,,' 
idea positively, regardless of the correctness of the idea itself. The 
evaluation component depending on the elaboration of the background 
knowledge of the subjects. In Copernicus' case, a good idea was 
considered, rejected, and abandoned. In terms of p-creativity, good ideas 
are unlikely to get lost. A good idea which is not appreciated by the 
child, will be presented again and again, until the child recognises its 
value. There will be a lot more direction of p-creativity, particularly in 
the school context. 
If it were possible to assess the 'evaluation' component, it would 
indicate a child's 'readiness to Re-Represent', and might predict their 
future ability to create a new conceptual space. This idea is equivalent 
to Vygotsky's (1978) 'Zone of Proximal Development' which 
distinguished between children who produced the same level of 
performance when working alone. The differences in their likelihood 
to progress in the near future, was indicated in the extent to which they 
could benefit from adult guidance. 
Evaluation of performance seems to be a continual cognitive 
process, comparing actual behaviour against anticipated behaviour. 
The drawing studies (chapter 3) indicated that even the youngest 
children tested were critical of their drawing productions relative to 
their expectations. The block balancing case studies (chapter 4), 
indicated that even when a child was bored, there was a continual 
prediction of behaviour which could lead to a 'surprise' observation. 
2.4.2 Constraints 
In addition to an evaluative component, Boden (1992) argues tha t 
constraints are essential to creativity. 
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" ... far from being the antithesis of creativity, constraints on thinking are 
what make it possible." 
Boden 1992 (p. 82) 
Creativity may result from 'playing around', and combining unusual 
ideas. However it will never be entirely undirected, otherwise the 
creative idea would not be recognised as such. There may be a lot of 'ill-
defined' elements involved in creativity, for example the goal may be 
expressed in very general terms e.g. to write a symphony, or to discover 
the chemical structure of a problematic molecule. However, there will 
always be a specific domain of concern, and possibly a specific question. 
There has been a lot of recent interest in constraints in infancy. The 
general problem for infancy researchers is to explain how development 
initially gets started. The solution has been to suggest there are inbuilt 
constraints on learning (Gelman 1990a, 1990b). Keil (1990) argues that 
even the most hardened empiricist now has to accept that without 
constraints, learning would be impossible. It is generally acknowledged 
that infants are not faced with the 'blooming buzzing confusion' 
described by William James. Spelke (1990), for example, argues for a 
'thingness' assumption, i.e. that the infant initially perceives 'things' in 
the world, and as a result can then associate movement patterns with 
them. The nature of the constraints hypothesized may vary, but there is 
general agreement that the infant is not a tabula rasa. 
An important general constraint on the infant's perception is in 
terms of a limited central processing capacity. The limited ability of the 
infant to 'chunk' her perceptions will allow her to attend to only small 
portions of information and thus focus her experience. Newport (1990) 
appeals to absolute capacity limitations, as an influence on improved 
language learning in children. However, this may be equally explained 
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In terms of relative capacity limitations (different content of the 
chunks), and the latter position will be argued in the 3R's model (see 
section 4 below). 
Another type of constraint on creativity is the use of heuristics. The 
majority of heuristics will be domain specific, and learned, and so may 
will be more applicable to adult creativity than to infancy. Some very 
general heuristics which include generalisation and specialisation may 
be operative from birth, however these will be closely linked to 
analogical reasoning processes (see section 3.3.3). One of Boden's (1992) 
general heuristics for exploring a conceptual space is certainly evident 
in young children, though, and that is the 'vary the variable' heuristic. 
This is used constantly in children's pretend play, for example, using a 
bottle top as a cup, is just a matter of varying the variable (trying 'bottle-
top', in the 'cup slot' of a 'drinking schema'). Pretend play, may well be 
useful mapping out conceptual spaces, allowing young children to 
generalise their 'drinking schema', for example, and to extract out the 
essential elements. This kind of generalisation of the cup to a 'cup like 
object', may provide the basis for later analysing the ways in which the 
bottle top is like a cup. This will be the essential background elaboration 
for the subsequent creation of a more general concept of 'container'. 
There are clearly plenty of constraints in infancy, which could provide 
the basis for creative processes. 
A large number of heuristics may be used consciously, by adults. 
Boden (1992) gives the example of a designer using a 'focus on the 
function' heuristic for generating ideas. This is a high level explicit 
strategy, which may be consciously communicated during training and 
will always have been used with awareness. Similarly, the child's 'vary 
the variable' heuristic may be explicitly represented. This use of 
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heuristics is less important developmentally, as their acquisition or 
progression to awareness will not differ from knowledge in any other 
domain. 
2.4.3 Analogical reasoning 
Recognising analogies is a crucial element of creativity, and also in 
learning from experience, and concept formation. These fundamental 
reasoning processes seem to be operating from birth. 
Goswami (1991) has argued that young children can solve analogies, 
if they have the relevant knowledge bases. She argues that previous 
studies fail to find analogical abilities in children, because the children 
fail to understand the content of the problem, rather than because they 
lack any reasoning ability. Brown (1990) has shown that 20 month old 
children were able to reason by analogy. They could select an 
appropriate tool from a set to retrieve a distant toy, based on a previous 
analogous experience. Goswami (1991) argues that there is no evidence 
of the development of the reasoning componentl . This is compatible 
with the previous arguments in chapters 7 and 8. 
Analogical reasoning requires the ability to analyse the vanous 
components of the domains in question. This has been demonstrated 
by Keil (1984) who argues that the ability to comprehend metaphors 
does not develop. He has found that children can understand 
metaphors if they have sufficient knowledge of both the domains, to be 
able to see the analogies between them. Othenvise they interpret them 
literally. The child needs a level of overview of the relevant 
1 Goswami does argue for the development of 'metaknowledge', but we have explained 
this a knowledge development in chapters 2 and 8 
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knowledge, to extract the relevant elements, before analogies can be 
understood. 
2.4.4 Memory, Reminding and Prediction 
A fundamental feature of cognitive activity is long term memory. It 
seems unlikely that memory processes develop, but what can be 
remembered, will develop, as it depends on what can be encoded, which 
in turn will depend on background knowledge or perceptual 
constraints. Memory will clearly be much enhanced by the 
development of a system of symbolic representation, such as language. 
Memory IS not under conscious control. With knowledge about 
memory, it becomes possible to actively search for some piece of 
information, or indeed consciously not to bother searching for that 
piece of information, also to employ strategies to induce better 
remembering. However, the underlying process of 'reminding' is not 
under direct control. It involves memories springing into awareness, 
through association with something perceived in the environment or 
something else in awareness. There is no reason why this kind of 
reminding process would not be operating from the moment there is 
something in long term memory to associate a stimulus with. 
Similarly, experience of any type will lay down some kind of trace in 
memory. This again is not under conscious control, it is not possible to 
refuse to remember an event, traces are laid down automatically. 
Boden (1992) in a parenthetical comment states that 
"reminding is a common source of creativity" 
Boden 1992 (p.54) 
In infancy, reminding may be the essential stage in creating the initial 
representations. As soon as the infant is reminded of anything, there is 
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a basis for representing the experience in some more general fashion. 
Reminding must involve unconsciously recognising some analogy 
with previous experience. Identifying the commonality, and 
representing this will provide the first 'concepts', which 'will in turn 
influence perception and subsequent behaviour. 
The automatic process of memory and reminding leads to a constant 
expectation of what will happen next, based on the triggering of these 
memories. Mandler (1992) quotes an experiment by Watson (1972) 
indicating that 2 month infants could make a mobile move by pressing 
their heads on a pillow. After a number of repetitions, the infant began 
to expect the behaviour of the mobile and they produced more head 
presses than the control group because they had related the two events. 
These infants clearly have to have memory of both their own 
behaviour and the behaviour of the mobile to achieve this. 
Mandler (1992) argues that the operation of a long term declarative 
memory is evident by 8 months of age (Baillargeon, De Vos, and Graber 
1989, cited by Mandler 1992). There is no reason to suppose tha t 
memory is not operating even earlier than this. The acquisition of sign 
language has been shown to begin at 6 or 7 months of age, so that 
children at this age have associated a symbolic gesture with a meaning. 
This connection is earlier than for spoken language (Mandler 1988). 
This provides evidence that experience is being represented from a very 
young age, and that its onset does not require the development of 
qualitatively different conceptual structures. 
2.4.5. Creativity and problem solving 
As a slight aside, the connection between planning and problem-
solving made in chapter 7, can equally be extended to creativitv. 
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Boden's characterisation of creativity as a heuristic exploration of a 
conceptual space is very similar to Simon's characterisation of problem 
solving. Creativity could be thought of as problem solving in an ill-
defined domain, and most problem-solving involves the creation of p-
novel solutions. Isaev's planning task, reported in chapter 7, was novel 
for subjects and the solution would have been something 'which ,yas p-
creative. Creativity could be conceptualised as ill-defined problem 
solving particularly with an ill-defined goal state, although the starting 
state and operators may also be ill-defined. 
3 Re-Representation through Perceptual Analysis 
In the previous section the elements identified by Boden (1992, 1993) as 
essential to creativity have been demonstrated in infants or young 
children. In this section, a mechanism which incorporates these 
elements, 'perceptual analysis' (Mandler (1988, 1992), is introduced. 
This account is of particular interest because it creates new 
representations, and because it was proposed for development in 
infancy. It will be shown that, in as far as the perceptual analysis process 
has been outlined, it incorporates very general cognitive process which 
can be generalized up the lifespan to form a recursive developmental 
mechanism. 
3.1 Mandler's model 
Nlandler (1988) was concerned to explain the development of accessible 
conceptual representations in infancy. She argues that there is plenty of 
evidence for conceptual abilities in infants as young as six months, and 
consequently she rejects Piaget's idea of infancy as a pure I y 
sensorimotor stage in development. She suggests that there must be a 
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conceptual representation system in addition to a sensorimotor s:ystem 
in infancy, to explain the evidence of recall in infancy. Mandler (1988) 
has proposed that a conceptual representation system operates from 
birth, alongside the sensorimotor representational system. She also 
rejects Piaget's idea that conceptual knowledge is the result of a late 
developing ability to directly access the original sensorimotor 
representations. Instead she suggests that a perceptual analysis system 
creates new representations which are, by virtue of their conceptual 
nature, accessible. She proposes her theory of 'perceptual analysis' to 
explain how first concepts are formed. 
Mandler's (1992) development of her original perceptual analysis 
account (Mandler 1988) concentrates on elaborating the initial 
representational format, which she claims are 'image schemas'. The 
3R's account (at this stage in its development) will not align itself with 
any particular representational formalism, but will concentrate on 
generalising the processing element in relation to Boden's (1992, 1993) 
account of creativity, and concerns with cognitive flexibility. 
Mandler (1988, 1992) does not elaborate the process element beyond 
the following description of perceptual analysis as: 
" ... a process in which a given perceptual array is attentively analyzed 
and a new kind of information is abstracted. The information is new in 
the sense that a piece of perceptual information is recoded into a 
nonperceptual form that represents a meaning. Sometimes perceptual 
analysis involves comparing one object with another, leading to 
conceptualising them as the same (or different) kinds of thing, but often 
it merely involves noticing some aspect of a stimulus that has not been 
noticed before." 
Mandler 1992 (p. 589) 
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Mandler's (1988, 1992) model of perceptual analysis is conceived as a 
conscious process for creating symbols. She argues that there is 
evidence of symbolic activity in infants, if a symbol is defined as a 
vehicle of thought, rather than as a means of communication or 
external referencing. The initial symbols may be images rather than 
propositions, but crucially for her, they are interpretations and 
summaries of experience rather than just 'percepts'. The results of a 
'perceptual analysis' are encoded as a new representation. Mandler 
(1988) stresses that this is an interpretation rather than a literal 'image' 
of the world, although it will be argued that this is an accepted feature of 
perception in general (see section 5.3). Perception is always a matter of 
interpretation, it is the balancing of top-down and bottom-up 
hypotheses. 
Mandler's (1992) concept of the 'perceptual analysis' process, 
described in the above quotation, involves more than the interpretation 
of data through normal perceptual process. New conceptual 
representations are created by comparing two objects, either both 
perceived simultaneously or one currently perceived and one in 
memory. A new representation is created from the result of the 
companson. This requires supplementing the normal perceptual 
processes with an ability to recognise analogies. Analogical reasoning 
was one of the basic features identified by Boden (1992) as necessary for 
creativity. There must also be some evaluation process, to prevent the 
construction of strange concepts based on irrelevant analogies, as not all 
the possible analogies will be represented. The whole process IS a 
conscious one, and presumably occurs in working memory. 
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3.2 Perceptual analysis and RR metaprocesses 
Perceptual analysis, in the 3R's model, plays the role of the endogenous 
metaprocesses in Karmiloff-Smith's (e.g. 1986) RR model, 'which 
generated the increasingly flexible representations. In the RR model, 
successive redescriptions of representations were produced by 
'metaprocesses' operating directly over representations. The 3R's 
account needed to replace the RR 'metaprocesses' as they were phase-
specific and linked to the different representational formats, ,,,,hich 
have also been dropped. The 3R's model adopts a parsimonious 
approach, suggesting that whatever processes account for the creation of 
the first representations will also account for the creation of later Re-
Representations. Perceptual analysis is thus defined as a recursive 
creative process. 
The empirical studies in chapters 4 and 7, indicated the importance 
of the perception and encoding of tasks, in allowing flexible 
performance. These elements are clearly central to the perceptual 
analysis process. In chapter 5, the purely endogenous nature of the RR 
metaprocess was rejected along with the notion of implicit information 
in representations. The perceptual analysis process overcomes these 
objections because it is an interactive process which extracts regularities 
from behaviour rather than from the representations themselves. 
Karmiloff-Smith's definition 
n ••• representational redescription is a process by which implicit 
information in the mind subsequently becomes explicit knowledge to the 
. d " mm ... 
Karmiloff-Smith 1992 (p. 18, emphasis in original) 
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can, thus, be paraphrased as: Recursive Re-Representation is a process 
by which implicit information in behaviour becomes explicitly 
represented. 
3.3 Perceptual analysis as recursive constraint creation 
The basis of 'perceptual analysis' is perception. Neisser defines 
perception as "where cognition and reality meet." (Neisser 1976, p. 9). 
He stress the interdependence of mental and environmental process. 
Perception is an active, interpretative process for understanding the 
world. It is constrained by the external reality (bottom-up information), 
and the perceiver's past experience and anticipations (top-do'\vn 
information). The understanding which is achieved is the result of co-
ordinating top-down and bottom-up information, and ,,yill necessarily 
be an interpretation, simplification and summarisation of the objective 
world. 
The external world is not perceived in an objective way. There are a 
variety of filtering and selection systems which limit the information 
which enters the central executive. The physical perceptual systems 
limit the way in which a person interacts with the world. The size of 
human hands and the organisation of nerve endings limit the range of 
objects we can hold or feel, setting both upper and lower limits. The 
human eye is sensitive to certain wavelengths of light, so that it 
perceive patterns of colour (in contrast to a snake's eyes, for example, 
which perceive patterns of heat), and so on. Even after these initial 
structural filters, there would still be too much raw informa hon 
entering though the sense organs. There needs to be further selection, 
based on the cognitive processor. Working memory has a limi ted 
capacity, and directs attention to the most important aspects of the 
stimulus, relative to the subjects goals. These kinds of selections of 
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information are variable (unlike the physical ones), based on goals and 
are under conscious control, for example, a person may choose to look 
at a lecturer or choose to look at other members of the audience. People 
are always purposive, even when the purpose is to relax and do 
nothing. In infancy there will be also be goals, although they may be 
very general, for example, distress-avoidance. 
Top-down constraints also set up expectations of what is about to be 
perceived. These expectations are constantly operating and they depend 
on past experience and background knowledge. In infancy, the initial 
top-down expectations will be operating from birth. There is evidence 
of a disposition to attend to faces, (for example Johnson and Morton 
1991). Spelke (1991) argues that the infant's expectations of objects 
include, for example solidity and continuity at least by 21/2 months. 
People always have some kind of expectation, allowing for the planning 
of activities towards a goal. The importance of knowledge in generating 
these expectations was demonstrated on the planning task (chapter 7), 
when Adam could not initially anticipate accurately the results of his 
actions, and could not plan to achieve his goals. 
The constant prediction of experience is important in development, 
as it provides the basis for comparison. A mismatch between prediction 
and experience will generates a response (e.g. surprise) when the 
prediction (even the default prediction of 'no change ') is not fulfilled. 
This will causes attention to be focussed on analysing the comparison to 
sort out the problem. If a new understanding is reached, it ,vill 
stimulate a re-representation of the problem, changing the know"ledge 
base so that future predictions vvill be different. The top-dovvn 
component of perception will change ,vith experience. This is "That ,,'as 
observed in the planning task, differences in the problem 
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representation, not in the representational processes themselves. The 
content of the constraints differed with age and experience, but not the 
process of integrating background knowledge with bottom-up 
information to reach a perception. 
The perception will be modified through the development of 
constraints: as knowledge increases, different constraints on perceptions 
will be created, allowing different things to be perceived, in a recursive 
fashion. To take an anecdotal example, Sophie (22 months) began using 
the phrase 'try again' to comment on her failure to fit a puzzle piece, 
and to anticipate her repetition of the puzzle-fitting behaviour. Prior to 
using the phrase, Sophie did keep trying when she failed to locate a 
piece correctly, however, having acquired the phrase, she now knows 
that she is 'trying again'. She has identified and labelled this aspect of 
her pre-existing behaviour, such that 'trying again' exists for her 
(initially in the single context), and she is able to recognise analogous 
instances of 'trying again' in other contexts, e.g. putting on shoes. 
This is the notion of perceptual analysis in the 3R's model, that the 
observation of behaviour creates new constraints which in turn allow a 
new conception of behaviour. In the above example, the recognition 
was clearly prompted by the presence of the verbal symbol, but this will 
not always be the case. The new representation allows Sophie to 
perceive aspects of her behaviour that were not distinct prior to 
acquisition of the 'concept'. 
3.4 Representational formats and codes 
Mandler (1988, 1992) envisaged, 'perceptual analysis' as comparable to 
Karmiloff-Smith's Representational Redescription approach, although 
they are concerned with different developmental stages. Mandler's 
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(1992) model, like Karmiloff-Smith's contains qualitatively different 
representational formats, she suggests that initial symbolic 
representations are in the form of 'image schemas' which are a halfway 
stage to a full conceptual representation. The different representational 
formats are necessary because Mandler 'wishes to maintain the idea of a 
separate inaccessible sensorimotor representational system. 
"My sense is that most psychologists believe that there must be more 
than one representational format to the human mind. Reaching for an 
object is fundamentally different from having an image of that object ... " 
Mandler 1988 (p. 131) 
However, it is possible to have a number of different representational 
codes, without positing a separate sensorimotor format for infancy. 
There may be a number of different codes in memory, e.g. motor, 
linguistic, but these could still be developed through the same process 
of perceptual analysis. Scaife (1987) argues that the continuity between 
motor and cognitive processes is often overlooked in anglophone 
psychology. Recursive Re-Representation argues for a continuity of 
process, over different representational codes. 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) argues that the initial representation of 
knowledge is in a modality specific code. Later representational 
redescriptions extract information from the modality-specific codes and 
represent that information in a more general, and ultimately a 
linguistic code. The 3R's model will not be developed to the level of 
suggesting a representational format, it is equally compatible \vith a 
single representational format, or a set of parallel formats. However, 
the model will assume that there will be no qualitative changes in 
representational format \\Tith development and that whatever formats 
are proposed are present, and operative from birth. Recursive Re-
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Representation processes operate through perception, and focus on 
behaviour rather than representations. The process can, thus, Re-
Represent information generated by representations in one code into 
any other code. 
Accessibility will not be attributed to one code or another, but to the 
level of description of the content (see section 5) Early concepts, the 
content of which will be mainly motor and sensory, may become 
automated, because they provide the basis for other concepts to be 
developed on top of them. Some early concepts may disappear because 
they are Re-Represented in a fundamentally different way. For 
example, some psycho-analytical approaches would argue for an early 
'mother-self' concept, from which the 'self' has to be later differentiated 
(Sheila Spensley, personal communication). This concept of a 'mother-
self' unit dearly has no place in the conceptual repertoire of adults, 
other than psycho-analysts. The latter would have a linguistic 
representation of the concept which would be quite different from the 
sensation-emotion-based concept they would have possessed as infants. 
The Re-Representation in terms of two separate 'mother' and 'self' 
concepts would eliminate the need for the original representational 
content, and would be independent of representational format. 
Acquisition sequences in the 3R's model may involve decreasing as 
well as increasing flexibility. Re-Representation in a modality specific 
code or format, from a linguistic one will result in an automated, less 
accessible representation. This sequence happens in the acquisition of 
motor skills learned through originally verbal instructions e.g. typing. 
This relationship between Re-Representation and awareness is 
described further in subsequent sections, section 5 describing a\\'areness 
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and section 6 relating knowledge levels to awareness. The next section 
briefly discusses surprise as the stimulus to redescription. 
4. Motivations for redescriptions 
Karmiloff-Smith has proposed that the stimulus to representational 
redescription is the internal stability of the relevant level of 
representation. As was noted in chapter 5, this is a problematic notion. 
Instead, it is suggested on the basis of observations from the block 
balancing and planning tasks that 'surprise' might be an alternative 
motivation. A surprising event would be the result of a mismatched 
comparison between the subjects prediction of events and the actual 
event (which might either be success or failure). This would then direct 
attention to the situation, stimulate perceptual analysis and ultimately a 
Re-Representation of the behaviour. The affective response would 
indicate the occurrence of a Re-Representation opportunity, but would 
not necessarily be causally implicated2. This is not to reject Karmiloff-
Smith's idea that 'success' may be a stimulus to representational 
change, but to broaden the claim so that each occasion subjectively 
perceived as a success may stimulate a Re-Representation. In the 
drawing domain, for example there will be many such perceived 
successes. 
Boden (1992) states that creative ideas are essentially 'surprising', but 
she distinguishes the surprise of the unexpected, from the surprise of 
the unpredictable. Re-Representation could be triggered by the latter 
type of surprise, which would be associated with a re-perception of a 
situation. The new perception would elaborate or transform the 
2 There might be a causal role in a physiological account of the process or 
representational redescription. 
301 
conceptual space, which in turn would allow different expectations to be 
set up in the future. 
5. Awareness 
RR theory states that knowledge is available to higher cognitive 
processes and awareness, only after redescription. A wareness only has 
access to knowledge re-coded into the E-ii or E-iii (linguistic) formats. 
Awareness itself is not explained. The 3R's account will take a different 
approach to the relationship between awareness and knowledge, 
focussing initially on characterising awareness rather than the 
knowledge representation. The first sub-section will describe the 
relationship between awareness and cognitive flexibility, as conceived 
in the 3R's model. The second sub-section discusses the development 
of 'automatic processes', which it will be argued develop beyond 
awareness. 
5.1 Cognitive flexibility and awareness 
The 3R's account assumes that the basic cognitive processlng 
mechanisms are operative from birth, the central structure being 
working memory. Working memory is conceived as a system for 
actively allocating attention (Baddeley 1990). The most important 
component of the working memory system is the central executive 
which is involved in all conscious cognitive processing, i.e. all the 
activities which require 'cognitive flexibility' such as, reasonlng, 
problem solving, and planning. The important features of the central 
executive, from the 3R's perspective, are (a) that it has a limited 
capacity, and (b) that its contents are not restricted to any specific 
modality. The central executive functions to control behaviour, 
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maintain goals and to focus attention, filtering out distractions. It 
provides the arena within which knowledge can be manipulated. It 
relates background 'top down' information, goals and expectations to 
the incoming 'bottom-up' information which is coming in through the 
sensory systems and is the channel for inputting information into long 
term or semantic memory. 
Awareness, on the 3R's account, will be attributed to the focus of 
attention, i.e. the contents of the central executive. It follows from this 
approach, that if the child or infant has a central executive, then she 
will be aware of something, whatever it is that the central executive 
contains. In infancy, this awareness will obviously not be verbal, and 
may not be much organised. At best, the initial contents of awareness 
will be limited to the perception of 'things' (Spelke 1990). It most 
certainly will not contain linguistic representations, although it will be 
argued, with Mandler (1988), that very early on it will contain symbolic 
representa tions. 
As knowledge develops through recursive re-representations, the 
infant is increasingly able to organise her perceptions. She will 
perceive, and become aware of her activities, such that she can think 
things which she could not think before. For example, the sensations 
associated with 'feeding' will be differentiated into components of 
'sucking' and 'nipple'. This development occurs through sensations 
being categorised (using perceptual analysis) and being 'recursively re-
represented' into increasingly compact 'chunks'. The contents of 
awareness or the central executive will then effectively increase In 
terms of the objective amount of information it contains (see section 5.1 
for more on chunking) and this information will allow flexibility at a 
higher level. In adulthood, the contents of a,vareness \\'ill 
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predominantly relate to verbally encoded knowledge, as it is obviously 
the most compact method of representing information. This will not be 
the case in infancy, although the infant's concepts will develop through 
the same Recursive Re-Representational mechanisms. 
The central executive has a major role in the 3R's conception of 
cognitive flexibility. It will be argued that higher cognitive processes 
such as planning, which require flexible representations, can operate 
only over the contents of the central executive. These processes in 
adulthood will often operate over linguistic representations, but it will 
be argued that the same higher cognitive processes also operate more 
generally over the contents of awareness whatever the representational 
code. In keeping with the working memory conception, the central 
executive is not modality specific. 
RR theory involves four levels of knowledge, with only the two 
highest levels being available to awareness, accessibility being a feature 
of the formats themselves. Following from the equation of awareness 
with the central executive in working memory model, the 3R's account 
characterises the accessibility of knowledge in terms of its level of 
'chunking'. The concept of chunking in the 3R's model is described in 
more detail in section 6.1. 
5.2 From Awareness to Automaticity 
In the 3R's account, awareness is restricted to chunks of a specific 
'granularity' in the knowledge hierarchy. As an activity is 'chunked', it 
can be executed with less attention to the constituent parts. As layers of 
representation are created on top, the lower levels are Re-Represented 
in a summary form where awareness will not attend to their execution. 
This simplification/ generality trade off was also a feature of Karmiloff-
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Smith's conception of Representational Redescription. If the original 
lower levels of detailed representations are no longer accessed they may 
simply decay. The representations then become opaque, this process 
may account for the inaccessibility of many motor skills. The recursive 
process of 'chunking' will create sub-levels which then slip belo,v the 
level of awareness, and become automatic. 
6 Levels of knowledge 
In this section the progression through levels of knowledge and their 
relationship to awareness is described. Cognitive flexibility is associated 
with a certain level of chunking, and domain elaboration, such that an 
overview, or map can be created. Re-Representation can occur within 
levels (elaborating or extending the conceptual space), or it can create 
new levels, creating new conceptual spaces. The latter potentially 
leading to developmental discontinuities. 
The basic developmental progression is one of chunking, and this 
process is described in the first section. In the second section different 
levels of knowledge are described, in terms of their relationship to 
awareness, this being similar to the distinction proposed in Activity 
theory (Leont'ev 1981). In the third section, the interaction of levels of 
knowledge will be demonstrated by extending Boden's (1992, 1993) 
mapping analogy. 
6.1 Chunking process 
The concept of 'chunking' is well established, although underspecified, 
within Cognitive Psychology, however, it does not often appear within 
the developmental literature (but see Klahr, Langley and Neches 1987 
for exceptions). The initial concept was proposed by Miller (1956), ,vho 
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discovered that the capacity of short term memory is limited, not in 
terms of an absolute quantity of information, but by some unit of 
information organisation: a 'chunk'. Thus, adults who can remember a 
sequence of 7 random letters of the alphabet, could also remember a list 
of 7 words (which obviously contain many more letters) because these 
letters are organised into meaningful 'chunks' in long term memory. 
In the same way, many more letters would be recalled if they were 
contained in a list of well known phrases. Proverbs, for example "a 
stitch in time saves nine", "a bird in the hand is worth two in the 
bush", would each be familiar enough to form a single chunk for most 
people. It is not clear how the 'chunking' process operates, but it is 
clearly a recursive process. 
Chunking is a feature of expertise, which can be most convincingly 
demonstrated in a restricted domain such as chess. De Groot (1966) and 
Chase and Simon (1973) have shown that experienced chess players 
exhibit superior memory for the positions of chess pieces than novices 
when they are presented on a chess board in arrangements taken from 
real chess games. This improvement in memory was not due to any 
superiority in the experts' memory capacity, as the difference between 
novices and experts disappeared when random arrangements of chess 
pieces were presented. The performance difference was due to the 
experts ability to 'chunk' the information into meaningful strategic 
groupings, which enabled them to recall the position of more pieces. 
The difference has been shown to persist between child-chess experts 
and adult novices, indicating that chunking is purely a function of 
knowledge, and is not affected by 'developmental level' (as argued in 
chapter 8). 
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It is generally accepted that there is a limit to the amount of 
information that can be held in 'working memory', the limit being set 
in 'chunks' rather than any objective measure of information. There is 
some confusion about what the actual capacity in chunks is. i\1iller 
(1956) suggested that the capacity of the central processor was limited, to 
seven (plus or minus 2) 'chunks' of information. Simon (1981) has 
argued that the range of capacities which have since been suggested by 
himself (5 chunks, Simon 1974) and others (ranging behveen 4 and 10) is 
rather too wide for comfort. The 3R's account will remain agnostic as to 
the absolute capacity in chunks as this debate will not affect the 
argument here. The 3R's model will be developed at a level of 
generality which requires merely that there is a limit. In absolute terms, 
the quantity of information which will be in awareness will depend on 
how the person is able to encode the environment. This, in turn, will 
depend on the level of 'chunking' of the relevant knowledge, which 
provides the top-down constraints on perception. 
Chunked knowledge is hierarchically structured, the higher levels 
encompassing more knowledge in absolute terms than the lower levels. 
On the 3R's account, the (recursive) chunking of knowledge will thus 
increase the contents of awareness, allowing larger portions 0 f 
knowledge to be in awareness. An important consideration for the 3R's 
account is that 'chunking' is always into units of meaning for the 
individual. There are no examples of people being able to chunk 
arbitrary parts of experience, or random number sequences without 
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imposing some meaning on them3. Re-Representation of nel\' chunks, 
then must include an evaluation component. The operationalisation 
of 'chunking' will be discussed in section 8 in relation to a production 
system model of development: the BAIRN system (Wallace, Klahr, and 
Bluff 1987). 
6.2 Levels of knowledge and awareness 
The RR model included different representational formats lyhich 
differed in terms of their accessibility to awareness. In the 3R's model 
there is no qualitative difference between levels of redescription, but the 
interaction with capacity limitations will lead to differences in the 
contents of awareness. Levels of knowledge description relative to the 
capacity of awareness will then explain cognitive flexibility in a domain. 
Chunking, as was argued above is always into units of meaning. 
These meanings will largely be shared between individuals, as they are 
interpreting similar environments through the same encoding and 
processing mechanisms. In the initial stages of development there will 
be a predictable sequence of development, as initially the infant must 
represent her own body, and because the 'top-down' perceptual 
component will be limited. It is literally not possible to run before you 
can walk. At higher levels it will not be possible to predict rigid 
sequences, although at a general level within a domain there will be a 
natural progression in knowledge development, it is necessary to know 
the rules of chess before you can understand chess strategies. 
In this section, a division into three main levels of chunking of 
knowledge will be distinguished. These are subjective divisions 
3 Neisser (1981) presents a collection of examples of mnemonists capable of great 
memorial feats. All subjects had a great deal of domain specific knowledge andl or 
strategies for making random material into meaningful images. 
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differing in terms of the relationship between the individual's 
knowledge and awareness. The three levels are basically those described 
by Activity theory (Leont'ev, 1981; Draper4 1993), and the 
characterisation of the levels in terms of the allocation of attention is 
very similar to it. However, because the 3R's model is concerned with 
the role of information processing and representational change, the 
distinction will be used quite differently. To avoid confusion with an 
Activity theory account, a different terminology will be adopted. 
The focus of awareness in normal functioning will be called the 
taskS level. If a person was asked what she was doing, this would be 
what she would generally report. To take an example from cookery, a 
task might be 'chopping an onion'. The task will generally be 
contributing to some higher level goal, in this example making a pasta 
sauce. Although the goal level will organise the task level, providing a 
'map', it will not itself be the constant focus of attention. Goals direct 
the activity, and may also be part of a hierarchy of goals, in this example 
a higher level goal might be 'produce a nutritionally-balanced meal'. 
Below the task level will be the constituent level. These lower level 
actions will generally be executed automatically without awareness. In 
this example, a constituent would be 'holding the knife'. The 
constituent level might, temporarily, be brought to the focus of 
awareness if something went wrong. For example, if the execution of 
the chopping task was disrupted by an oily knife which was hard to grip. 
However, once the problem had been remedied, attention would once 
again focus at the task level. 
4 I thank Dr. S. Draper for directing me towards Activity Theory, although he bears no 
responsibility for this interpretation. 
5 Italics wil1 be used to distinguish references to the specific definition of these terms 
from the more general usage of the words. 
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In a developmental context, the 3R's model will argue that "vhat is a 
constituent for an adult may well be a goal or a task for a younger child. 
For some adults, 'getting dressed' might be a task serving the higher 
goal of getting off to work in a hurry. Little thought will be given to the 
motor processes, or the sequencing of items once the clothes have been 
selected. For other adults getting dressed might be raised to the level of 
a goal, when concerns about appropriateness, colour-coordination and 
achieving a 'look' are added to purely functional considerations. ~Iore 
attention will then be directed to certain tasks, e.g. putting on sheer 
tights without laddering them. In contrast, for a toddler, putting on 
your socks is a considerable problem, and would probably constitute a 
goal. Putting on your socks, requires holding the socks so that there is 
an opening at the top, orienting the sock so that the heel is pulled over 
the sole of the foot etc. all of which require conscious attention. For an 
adult these aspects would form constituents, or even sub-constituents 
which are automatically executed without awareness. The constituents 
for the young children would be gripping the sock with the finger and 
thumb, for example. Consequently, the complete 'getting dressed' 
process has to be scaffolded by an adult, because it does not exist as a goal 
for the child. There would be no continuation to the next dressing step 
without direction. At a developmentally earlier stage, even the task of 
putting on you socks would be entirely out of conceptual range, when 
the grasping of any object was the goal. 
As development proceeds, and new goals are created, there "vill be 
constituents which drop below the awareness window as knowledge 
levels are created above them. The gripping constituent in the above 
example for a young child will be a sub- or a sub-sub-consti tuen t' for an 
adult and so on. The lowest levels will operate automatically, and their 
execution will not place any load on working memory capacity. In the 
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example of gnp pIng an object, there will have to be continuous 
adjustments made between the hand and the object to get the grip right, 
but in the adult, all of these processes will operate entirely without 
awareness. The argument is that, however, in infancy, these processes 
did require attention, at some stage 'gripping a particular object was a 
goal. Here again it is argued, with Scaife (1987), that there is a continuity 
between motor and cognitive development. Many of the motor skills 
are fundamental building blocks of other activities, and have therefore 
become constituents, with the result that they are inaccessible. 
Although they will initially have been acquired with awareness. 
In the RR model, Karmiloff-Smith claims that lower levels of 
procedural representation are not lost, but can be accessed \vhen 
required. This is not a feature of the 3R's model, an old representation 
will be replaced by a redescribed one, unless there is a distinct reason to 
maintain it. At this point, though, the RR model is talking about much 
higher levels of knowledge than the 3R's model. An example of the 
loss of earlier representations is the process of tying a bow. Bow tying is 
a constituent, of many activities and is executed automatically. At some 
stage, though, it must have been consciously learned, in all probability 
with some verbal instruction. This verbal description is lost, as the bow 
tying process becomes automatic. As in skill acquisition, the process has 
been represented as an automatic, non-verbal motor procedure. On the 
3R's account this is because it has been re-represented in a compact 
motor format which will allow the original linguistic representation to 
decay with lack of use. If an adult is asked to describe how they tie a 
bow, the process has become opaque and they have to carry out the 
operation and describe the resulting actions. If they have no string with 
which to tie a bow, they gesture with their hands. If made to sit on their 
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hands, they are compelled to move their heads6 . Levels below the 
constituent may be considered to have become compiled, and many 
motor skills will be in this category. However, if required attention can 
always be focussed on the detail of the constituent through the 
execution and observation of the behaviour, as in the bow-tying 
example. 
The description of levels in this section is clearly an idealisation, 
particularly for more complex knowledge domains. There will not be a 
neat hierarchical progression from one level to another. Tasks under 
anyone goal may be 'automated' to become operations at different 
times. The interaction between levels will be described in the next 
section. 
6.3 Interaction of knowledge levels 
The interaction of levels can be indicated by extending Boden's 
mapping analogy. In terms of attention an individual operates at the 
task level, which exists in an objective conceptual space. The 
individual's map, indicates their subjective conceptual space and 
provides the context for their goal. The goal level itself, mayor may not 
be mapped, depending on whether the individual is directing attention 
to the highest level of conceptual space which she possess, or to a lower 
level. Flexibility requires having a map of the domain, an overview, 
but this does not preclude operating (relatively inflexibly) at higher 
levels where no map yet exists. 
Recursive Re-Representation involves the creation of new 
conceptual spaces, and the elaboration of existing ones, both types of 
6 This claim is made on the basis of a small study carried out in 1983 by the author as 
research assistant to Prof. J. Annett. The interpretation, however, is the author's. 
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change will be illustrated in the following hypothetical example. An 
infant might have a map of a room or several isolated rooms in a 
house, marked for example with 'places I can pull myself up'. This will 
enable her to get from any place within that room, to a place \yhere she 
can pull herself up. However, this is the limit of her flexibility. This 
does not disbar the infant from recognising routes between rooms, e.g. 
up to the bathroom or to the bedroom, but she would not either 
conceive of goals such as 'get to the bathroom' or have her kno\·vledge 
represented in terms of 'rooms' such that the relationships between the 
rooms in the house would make any sense. 
An older child would have dispensed with 'places to pull yourself 
up', and would have marked different items on her maps of the rooms 
with the locations of toys, television etc. instead. She would also have 
maps of the various other rooms, at various levels of detail, and a 
selection of routes between the rooms. At some stage, this elaboration 
would allow a re-representation of the information, in terms of a map 
of the house (a new conceptual space) which would co-ordinate the 
relationships between rooms. This would allow the child to conceive 
and pursue 'in-house' goals from any starting point within the house, 
i.e. to generate as well as recognise routes within the house. This 
overview does not require that each room is known in the same depth. 
The mother's study might be 'off-limits' and thus known in little detail 
(indeed it might or might not be included in the child's subjective 
house map). However, mapping at this level would entail representing 
the rooms, as 'rooms', taking a global perspective on her previous 
knowledge of the contents of individual rooms. As an infant, she \vas 
objectively operating within rooms, within a house, but did not knO\\' 
that she was operating in a 'room' or, a fortiori, a 'house'. 
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Creating a house 'map' would allow a child to explore other people's 
houses, by analogy, and to predict that they might also contain 
bathrooms and kitchens. This would also allow 'in-house' goals to be 
transferred and executed in other people's houses. Similarities and 
differences between people's houses would allow for elaboration and 
refinement of concepts, e.g. a house with a bathroom downstairs, might 
remove the 'location=upstairs' feature from a bathroom concept, 
stimulating a Re-Representation of the concept, but without the 
creation of a new conceptual space. Such elaborations would, in tum, 
change 'bathroom-seeking-behaviour' in the child. This information 
would be surprising, and would be different from acquiring new 
information which could be perceived in terms of the existing 
bathroom concept. At the same time as the child is creating a 'house 
map' she would not have a map of her village. She might well have an 
entirely flexible (if perhaps faulty) map of her own house co-existing 
with knowledge of specific routes within the village, e.g. to often-visited 
friends' houses and to the sweet shop. She could possibly generate 
these particular routes, in a step by step fashion (indicating a minimal 
context-dependent map), however she would not initially be able to 
generate a novel route, for example from the sweet shop to a particular 
friend's house. However, whilst lacking a detailed map at the level of 
her village, she might also recognise regular trips made between 
villages, although she might be unable to generate these at all (not 
having encoded the relevant landmarks). 
Mapping of domains could continue indefinitely, varying both in 
detail, e.g. between a road map of the area and an ordinance survey 
map. Both maps would allow the holder to get from place to place, 
however, the ordinance-survey-map holder could consider the gradient 
of a potential route, for example, as well as its directness. A higher level 
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of map would place the area within a whole county or country, and so 
on, allowing trips across the world to be considered, which were entirely 
inconceivable to the infant or child. However, when thinking about a 
trip across the world, you do not plan at the level of first 'find the front 
door in your house', this level is just automatic. 
6.4 Flexibility and knowledge levels 
Cognitive flexibility, in the 3R's model, will be influenced by two main 
factors The first is the presence or absence of a map or overviews of the 
relevant domain knowledge, and the second is the level of chunking 
within a knowledge level, and whether it leaves space for other 
elements to be considered in parallel. In this section, examples from the 
empirical work reported earlier in the thesis are described in terms of 
the 3R's model. 
In chapter 3 (section 1), Karmiloff-Smith's 'draw a strange man' task 
was shown to produce different levels of flexibility in children. The 
younger children were able to create 'strange' drawings by deleting 
elements, or changing the shape of the elements in their drawings. The 
older children were also able to add extra elements, either from the 
same or a different category, or to swap elements within a drawing. On 
the 3R's account, the younger children had a map for drawing their 
man, which existed in isolation from other drawing maps, e.g. house 
drawing. This was a map of the task level, but the goal level was not 
mapped. The task map would allow them to appreciate the relationship 
of elements within their drawing of a man, to produce them in any 
order, and to apply their creativity to any of the chunks within the man 
drawing, e.g. 'head'. The drawing production would be using the 
contextual relationships between the elements in the drawing to 
organIse the drawing, however these relationships would not 
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themselves be represented. The older children would have this higher 
level overview of 'man drawing' (a map of the goal level) which would 
allow them to operate with the relationships between parts (e.g. to 
change the orientation of elements) or to compare the relationship of 
elements between two drawings, (e.g. man has legs, pig has a trotters). 
This level of comparison allows them to be flexible at a higher level. 
In the drawing task (Chapter 3, section 6) children were asked to 
make specific modifications, e.g. "draw a man with too many of 
something. ", and were provided with examples of these modifications 
(e.g. a man with two heads). The younger children tested with this task 
were able to produce the appropriate modifications. This task does not 
require the overview as the modifications had been mapped out for the 
children, and the task transformed into one of making a local 
contextual change which they were able to perform. However, the 
youngest children did not create their own variants of the example 
modifications, whereas the older children did (see chapter 10 for a 
suggested further study of this difference). 
The block balancing task illustrates the difference between 
wandering in a conceptual space and having a map. In the block 
balancing task there are complex interactions between weight and 
distance. Full knowledge of the balancing process requires 
understanding of all the interactions between the elements, creating an 
overview or map of the domain. When this is achieved, a prediction 
can be made for a novel problem, which can be encoded in terms of an 
analysis of the appropriate features of the block (ignoring irrelevancies 
e.g. which bit of the bar it is balancing on). 
The fixed idea that things balance in the centre, which may well be 
developed from exposure to salient examples in school, is limiting 
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because it does not map the domain, it provides a single route. 
Kanniloff-Smith and Inhelder (1974) characterised this as a theory, but a 
theory is like a map, which may be wrong but should allow exploration 
in a domain. The centre 'theory' is inflexible because it limits concern 
only to one variable, the 'length' of the block, and prevents 
consideration of other variables. When a map is created, the whole 
system is understood. The response will be more flexible, as the 
relationships between the elements are understood. The child will 
balance the block, and will understand why it balances, allowing the 
principle to be used creatively. 
7. BAIRN system 
The BAIRN system devised by Wallace, Klahr and Bluff (1987) is 
proposed as a complete model of cognitive development. It is a 
knowledge development model, and it includes a number of the 
features which have been identified in the 3R's model above. BAIRN 
relates to the knowledge development aspect of the 3R's model, 
although it is not concerned with the perceptual analysis mechanism. 
However, it might provide a useful basis for further development of 
the 3R's model. The basic approach is one of Recursive Re-
Representation in that new representations are created, and these are 
based on the results of observing performance. 
The points of similarity between BAIRN and the 3R's model are 
raised in general terms this section, based on the verbal description 
provided in Wallace, Klahr and Bluff (1987). A more detailed 
evaluation of the model would require analysis of the program itself, or 
ideally a re-implementation of it. The strength of the BAIRN model 
arises from the complex communications between nodes, and these are 
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difficult to evaluate from a written description. BAIRN is a very wide 
ranging system with many different mechanisms included. Some of 
these will inevitably be operating as 'place holders' rather than 
principled components of the system. Surprisingly, no-one seems to 
have developed this model since the initial report? The system would 
certainly require assessment in more than the single domain, 
'conservation of discontinuous quantity', which has been used to 
describe the model. 
BAIRN uses a production system architecture, but it departs from 
the normal approach of a single level of productions interacting only 
through the working memory. BAIRN uses the 'node' as the basic unit 
of knowledge, rather than the production, and these are arranged in a 
hierarchy. Each node contains a small production system, as well as 
other information which relates it to other nodes. Development occurs 
though the creation of new nodes, either at a more general or a more 
specific level than the originating node. Such learning is based on the 
observation of the results of actions, stored in an episodic memory. 
7.1 Knowledge representation 
A node consists of three elements: a definition list, an experience list, 
and a description list. The definition list contains two parts: the 
activation condi hons for the node, and the production set. The 
activation conditions contains the condition sections of some of the 
production rules from the production set. The production rules whose 
conditions are selected, are those which have formed the first element 
in a successful operation of the node's complete production set. \Vhen 
some of the activation conditions are matched by information in the 
7 A search through the Psychological Abstracts (Silver Platter) and the BIDS citation 
system produced no references to Wallace, Klahr, & Bluff (1987) or to BAIRN. 
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work space, BAIRN searches for information to satisfy the other 
activation conditions. It is an active model, rather than passively 
driven by the contents of working memory. 
The production set contains both procedural and declarative 
knowledge. These co-exist at node level, rather than forming two 
distinct systems (e.g. Anderson 1983). The declarative knowledge is 
envisaged as consisting of rules and semi-rules, the former "short-
circuiting" the procedural productions, by linking specific conditions 
with a final result. The semi-rules, rather than producing a final result, 
produce an intermediate state. Declarative knowledge can be acquired 
either by analysing the results of the procedural productions, which 
leads to context-specific rules, or it can be created directly from linguistic 
input. A progression from procedural to declarative knowledge is 
proposed in the model, and this would accord with Karmiloff-Smith's 
basic intuition about Representational Redescription: a development 
from 'knowing how' to 'knowing that'. 
A large part of the material stored in a node relates to the context of 
execution of the node. This allows for the generalisation and 
specialisation of nodes, based on their functional relatedness and 
temporal contiguity with other nodes. This emphasis on context and 
the relationship to other nodes is entirely lacking in the opaque 
procedures proposed in the RR model (a problem raised in chapter 5). 
In BAIRN the functional relatedness of nodes is crucial to the Re-
Representation of behaviour and is represented within the nodes 
themselves. 
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7.2 Capacity Limitations and Awareness 
BAIRN uses the concept of capacity limitations to limit the processing 
channels to 3 parallel channels, with only one being "focally conscious". 
The other two channels are 'unconsciously processed' with only their 
results being attended to. The central work space is limited: the short 
term memory capacity being 10 chunks, however, both these limitations 
have been determined by implementation considerations rather than 
directly by psychological study - beyond the acknowledgement that there 
are limits. 
In addition to the limitations on central workspace, BAIRN has 
unlimited work spaces for each node. This, it is argued reflects the 
unlimited nature of LTM. However, this seems to be a psychologically 
unmotivated feature of the model: LTM is usually envisaged as 
unlimited in terms of storage rather than allowing additional 
processing. This issue would require critical assessment in any re-
implementation. 
The main capacity restriction in BAIRN, is glossed as relating to 
'focal consciousness', this relation between capacity limitations and 
awareness was also described in the 3R's model. An interesting feature 
of 'focal consciousness' in the model is the spread of attention to the 
level below the node in question. The time line (episodic memory) 
records the results of the operation of the nodes below the focal node, 
and can use this information to eliminate redundancies, or create nevv 
nodes. This has a basic similarity to the knowledge levels described in 
section 6.2, where flexibility, due to the creation of new goals and the 
resultant ability to operate at a higher knowledge level, allows the space 
for lo\ver levels to be re-perceived, and thus re-represented. 
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The two nodes which are unconsciously processed in parallel with 
the focal node do not create an elaborated record, unless they are raised 
to 'focal consciousness' during their processing. 'Focal consciousness' 
does not affected the processing of the node, but is implemented as 
affecting the time line record, and the semantic STM entries i.e. its 
effects are only distinct at the completion of processing. The 3R's model 
has nothing to say about unconscious processing (at this stage in its 
development), but the use of two unconscious channels in BAIRN 
seems somewhat arbitrary. 
7.3 Top down processing 
The influence of top down processing in BAIRN is captured by the fact 
that it can initiate search for elements which are the unsatisfied 
preconditions for a node, rather than just passively responding to the 
contents of the work space. The general effect of experience is captured 
by the notion of spreading activation, following successful execution. 
Spreading activation is achieved by passing information (rather than 
an activation potential) to other nodes, from the results of a processing 
step. BAIRN differentiates three types of spreading activation which are 
operative during normal states of arousal, but these are restricted in 
states of high and low arousal. In high arousal the spread of activation 
focuses on the two 'depth' approaches, following the line of the current 
processing direction. In states of low arousal, the emphasis is on the 
'breadth' approach and switching processing direction. This fits in with 
Boden's (1992) observation that creative combinations often occur in 
states of low arousal, even during sleep. Creativity often results from 
connections being made between apparently diverse domains. 
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7.4 Evaluation 
Evaluation was shown to be a crucial element of creativity (see section 
2.4.1). An interesting element of BAIRN is that it evaluates the 
outcome of a node's execution, as consistent or inconsistent with its 
expectations. The 3R's model includes a continual element of 
prediction of behaviour, with surprise suggested as a stimulus to 
redescription. This finds a connection in BAIRN, where 'surprise' 
seems to be implicit in the recognition of 'unexpected-ness'. However, 
in BAIRN the evaluation leads to a highlighted representation on the 
time line, rather than any immediate representational reformulation. 
The experimental data from the block balancing task, would indicate 
that if immediate processing did not produce some reformulation, then 
the 'surprise' rapidly decayed rather than remaining a feature of the 
time line. 
7.5 Constraints 
The notion of constraints on action and representation is captured in 
BAlRN by 'motive generators' which determine the goals of the system. 
How these elements of the system are implemented is not clear from 
the description provided. However, highly significant motives are able 
to cause new nodes to be created from a single occurrence of a 
behavioural sequence. 
7.6 Knowledge development and learning 
BAIRN has four basic learning processes, all of which use information 
which is recorded in the time line (or episodic memory). Two of the 
learning processes create new nodes, and two update the contents of 
nodes. These broadly correspond to the 'within-level' and 'between-
level' Re-Representations distinguished in the 3R's model. 
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New nodes are created at both higher and lower levels in the 
hierarchy. Higher level node creation occurs through the detection of 
patterns of information re-occurring in the time line. The basis of the 
redescription is the temporal proximity of the operation of two nodes. 
N odes can also be combined if they are found to be functionally 
equivalent. In this case a super-ordinate node is also created. Over-
general initial representations can also be replaced with more specific 
lower level distinctions. 
The 'within level' processes in BAIRN, are redundancy elimination 
and node modification. The former processes modify productions to 
eliminate unnecessary production calls. The node modification 
processes will either add new productions to a node reflecting in regular 
co-occurrence with other nodes or it will review the connections of sub-
ordinate nodes following the creation of a new super-ordinate node and 
will substitute the new super-ordinate node name (where relevant) 
instead of the sub-ordinate node names. 
7.7 Conclusion 
The BAIRN system contains many of the elements referred to in the 
description of the 3R's model. It appears to be an impressive system 
and may provide a useful starting point for formalising the 3R's model. 
However, without a re-implementation is hard to evaluate the system 
in depth. The lack of published replications or developments may 
indicate others have failed to reproduce the system or that BAIRN did 
not generalise to other domains. 
Any current A.1. system necessarily involves a simplification of 
behaviour. The 'creative' processes in BAIRN are much simpler than 
those described by Boden (1992). However, the model is a creative one, 
323 
which in keeping with the 3R's theory, produces a hierarchy of 
structurally similar nodes, rather than the qualitatively different 
formats suggested by Karmiloff-Smith (e.g. 1986). Boden's (1992) 
computational account of creativity would provide a useful direction in 
which to guide the development of BAIRN, if it was found to be a 
sound basic system. 
8. Summary 
In this chapter 'Recursive Re-Representation' was proposed as an 
alternative to the Representational Redescription (Karmiloff-Smi th 
1986). Representational Redescription was criticised earlier in this 
thesis, both on empirical and theoretical ground, and significant 
changes to the theory have been proposed. However, the underlying 
principle of repeated representation is maintained as the explanation of 
increasing cognitive flexibility. Cognitive flexibility, on the 3R's 
account being restricted to the limited capacity central processor, with 
Re-Representation providing new compact knowledge representations, 
or 'chunks'. Recursive Re-Representation is presented as a creative 
process (rather than an explanation of creativity), which operates 
recursively from birth (eliminating the stage of 'behavioural success'). 
The 3R's theory replaces RR theory's endogenous metaprocess and the 
redescription of 'implicit' information represented opaquely wi thin 
procedures, with a perceptual analysis process. Perceptual analysis, re-
represents behaviour rather than representations, making the 3R's 
model more interactive than the RR model. Development "vas shown 
to be the creation of higher levels of knowledge, which allow the child 
to conceive things that could not have been conceived before. The 3R's 
model is proposed both as a lifespan developmental mechanism and as 
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a more parsimonious account of the development of cognitive 
flexibility . 
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Chapter 10 
Conclusions and recommendations for future work 
1. Contributions of this thesis 
This thesis began by analysing cognitive flexibility, and rejecting the 
approaches based on the concept of 'metacognition'. The most 
promising account of the development of cognitive flexibility was that 
of Karmiloff-Smith (1986), whose Representational Redescription (RR) 
model has been analysed in great detail in this thesis. Two of 
Karmiloff-Smith's tasks: children's drawing (1990) and block balancing 
(1984; Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder 1974) were extended and the 
results were not found to support the Representational Redescription 
model (1986). However, both experiments provided evidence of 
developmental changes and useful insights for the development of the 
Recursive Re-Representation model. The conclusions rejected the 
procedural-format of initial representations; queried the concept of 
behavioural success; stressed the importance of encoding; and suggested 
that 'surprise' might be a stimulus to redescription. The empirical data 
were broadly consistent with a knowledge development approach, but 
the development of planning and creativity were also hypothesized. 
A rigorous analysis of Karmiloff-Smith's (1986) most detailed 
account of Representational Redescription was carried out from an 
implementational perspective. Various other aspects of the model \"ere 
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criticised, including the endogenous nature of the redescription 
processes and the concept of implicitly represented information. A 
more interactive approach was proposed, with information being 
implicit in behaviour. It was suggested that the concept of behavioural 
success' might be an unnecessary limitation of the RR approach, 
although dropping this constraint has serious repercussions for the 
model. The four representational formats (which had been criticised) 
have to be dropped, the series of metaprocesses replaced with a 
recursive processes, and the problematic concept of 'stability' as the spur 
to redescription replaced. The promise of this butchery, is that a 
recursive model of representational redescription can then be 
considered as a general cognitive development mechanism. 
The recursive generalisation of representational redescription 
produces a knowledge development account of cognitive development. 
This approach is suggested as the most parsimonious and was 
supported by a literature review. However, the alternative option of 
process development was considered, with an analysis of planning 
development. A review of the literature found only descriptive 
accounts, apart from the socio-cultural approach which suggested 
internalisation as the developmental mechanism. Isaev's (1985) model 
of planning development was pursued with a replication of his 
planning task, however the empirical data were shown to be consistent 
with a knowledge development explanation, performance 
decrementing with increased cognitive load, rather than with age. 
Representational Redescription was approached from various angles 
in this thesis, and the analyses and criticisms provided the basis for the 
development of a new model. The basic concept of representational 
redescription was not rejected. Recursive Re-Representation begins by 
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viewing representational redescription as a creative process, and uses 
Boden's (1992, 1993) computational approach to creativity as a basis, and 
draws on Mandler's (1988, 1992) account of perceptual analysis in 
infancy. Cognitive flexibility is equated with the contents of working 
memory, developing flexibility in a domain is explained through the 
creation of new levels of the knowledge hierarchy and chunking. The 
groundwork has been laid and it is now clear that Recursive Re-
Representation should be fully specified, using the BAIRN system 
(Wallace, Klahr, & Bluff 1987) as a basis and focusing on the creative 
nature of redescriptions. 
In the following three sections general avenues for further research 
are identified, and in section 5 some specific further studies are 
suggested. 
2. Recursive Re-Representation and BAIRN 
The mechanisms of the 3R's model are specified only in general terms. 
Ideally, the model should be implemented as an A.I. program to clarify 
its operation and to develop the account. The BAIRN system (Wallace, 
Klahr and Bluff 1987) was proposed in chapter 9 as a promising starting 
point for developing the model. It was hard to evaluate the 
psychological validity of BAIRN from the verbal description in Wallace, 
Klahr and Bluff (1987). The model has, in any case, only been 
implemented in one domain and it would need to be generalised to 
other domains. Certain elements, such as the capacity limitations, three 
processing channels and unlimited node-level processing were 
somewhat arbitrary, based on the needs of the implementation rather 
than on any psychological considerations. A re-implementation would 
328 
clarify which elements of the theory were principled (an approach 
advocated by Ritchie and Hanna, 1984). 
It is possible that a different representational format, from the 
production system architecture, e.g. Nelson's Generalised Event 
Representations (Hudson and Fivush 1991) would be worth 
considering. The system also needs to be extended to include the 
perceptual analysis mechanism of the 3R's theory. A study to be 
proposed in section 5.2, would allow a more detailed analysis of 
knowledge development in the block balancing task and this might 
provide a useful domain for are-implementation. 
3. Development and Creativity 
Boden's (1992, 1993) computational approach to creativity, is 
illuminating in presenting creativity as tractable. Pursuing the 
relationship between p-creativity in development, and h-creativity in 
experts may actually further both accounts. Adopting a developmental 
perspective on creativity, as was done in chapter 9, where creativity of 
all types is necessary: mapping, exploring and transforming conceptual 
spaces, highlights the need to clarify how they relate to one another. 
Boden's (1992) 'mapping' analogy has not been fully elaborated and 
relating it to an implementation (e.g. the BAIRN extension proposed 
above) would require the specific types of 'creativity' to be more tightly 
defined. The status of the 'maps' would also have to be clarified. It is 
not entirely clear whether the map need to be a separate entity from the 
conceptual space, or whether it just describes the flexibility inherent in 
the subjective conceptual space. 
Accounts of h-creativity could benefit from analysis of 
'transformations' of conceptual spaces In childhood. The 
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developmental discontinuities caused by the creation of a new 
knowledge level in children may provide useful information to explain 
h-creative creative leaps. Boden (1992) and indeed A.I. has more to say 
about the mapping and exploring of conceptual spaces, than the 
transformation of them. 
At various points in this thesis surprise has been suggested as a 
potential stimulus to Re-Representation, and it is associated in 
creativity. Surprise has been found in the animal literature to improve 
learning (Lieberman, Davidson, and Thomas, 1985). The interaction 
between surprise and representational change, whilst merely suggestive 
at this stage, seems to be worth pursuing. 
4. Recursive Re-Representation and Activity Theory. 
A companson between Activity theory and the Recursive Re-
Representation account may be usefully explored, the former being 
dealt with superficially in this thesis. The predictions of the two 
accounts appear to have many similarities, although the explanations 
differ. 
"consciousness and control appear only at a late stage in the 
development of a function, after it has been used and practiced 
unconsciously and spontaneously. In order to subject a function to 
intellectual control, we must first possess it." 
Vygotsky 1%2 (p. 90) 
The 3R's account predicts an increase in awareness with development, 
because the child has the knowledge which enables her to think things 
that she could not think before, rather than because of the 
internalisation of social regulation processes. However, the 3R's 
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modifications had been mapped out for the children, and the task 
transformed into one of making a specified local contextual change 
which they were able to perform. However, the youngest children did 
not create their own variants of the example modifications, whereas the 
older children did, the latter requiring an overview to make their own 
compansons. 
In a further experiment subjects would again be asked to draw a 
'strange man', to test their spontaneous modification type. The 
prediction being that younger children will produce only local changes 
and the older children will produce both global and local changes. The 
spontaneous production phase could be followed up with requests for 
each of the specified modifications, (excepting the one the child 
spontaneously produced), however without providing the specific 
examples which were given in the original study. In this case the 
youngest children should have more difficulty producing the 
modifications which require an overview. 
5.2 Block balancing 
Karmiloff-Smith's block balancing experiment produces an interesting 
rigidity in performance, when children are only able to balance evenly-
weighted blocks. However, a longitudinal study would have to be 
carried out to ascertain whether this was a necessary developmental 
stage. It has been suggested that the level 1/ phase 2 rigidity may emerge 
from the knowledge not being integrated with other knowledge, but 
emanating from school experience of balancing. Presenting subjects 
with the unevenly weighted blocks in a building task, for example, 
might allow them to operate differently on the blocks, if the specific 
piece of balancing knowledge was not directly called. 
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A more elaborate and controlled version of the experiment reported 
In chapter 4 would allow further comparison of the subjects 
performance and of their analysis of the blocks. A more detailed 
evaluation of the effect of various block features (e.g. overall weight) on 
performance could also be undertaken. It was found that children in 
the chapter 4 study thought overall weight was a factor before they 
could distinguish this from un-even weight. 
The blocks could be constructed in a systematic fashion, varying two 
perceptual features: overall weight and conspicuous asymmetries. 
There would be two evenly-weighted blocks, although one of these 
should be heavy and the other one light. Blocks with hidden weights 
could be manufactured with centres of balance 10%, 20%, 30% and 40% 
off centre, Two conspicuously-weighted blocks could balance at 20% 
and 40% off centre, thus having direct centre-of-balance counterparts 
with the hidden-weighted block. This would allow an evaluation of the 
effects of the visual features of the block as distinct from the intrinsic 
balancing properties of the blocks. An additional category which would 
prove useful in analysing subject perceptions would be two apparently-
weighted blocks, which contained hidden weights and actually balanced 
in the centre. One of these should be relatively heavy and the other 
light. 
To assess the subject's perceptions of the blocks, they could be asked 
to categorise the blocks into ones which would be 'easy to balance' and 
those which they though would be 'difficult to balance', This could be 
done both before and after the balancing task, to assess any change due 
to the task performance. 
The fl1ain balancing task could be done \vith a computer 
representation of the block, This technique has been used successfully 
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by Joiner et al (in prep.) who compared evenly-weighted with 
conspicuously-weighted blocks. This computerised presentation could 
be criticised in that it eliminates the very proprioceptive feedback which 
is critical to balancing, however it would eliminate problems of manual 
dexterity, and allow accurate quantification of various other aspects of 
the task (e.g. time to achieve a balance). Subjects could be presented 
with each of the blocks on the computer screen, with a pair of hands 
holding each end. They could move the block in small steps with 
cursor keys, and then press another key to 'lift the handstand try a 
balance. In this experiment they would have the physical blocks 
available to refer to, which would allow them to analyse the blocks if 
they so desired. A computerised presentation would provide a record of 
specific points at which subjects expected a balance, because they would 
have to remove the 'hands' and would provide a systematic measure of 
the child's movements of the blocks. Blocks could be colour coded to 
allow easy comparisons between the computer and real blocks, and the 
relevant physical block could be handed to children prior to their 
balancing attempt. The extent to which they analysed the features of the 
blocks could be extracted from video-tapes. As noted in the chapter 4 
study, there may be micro-genetic development with the experimental 
session. This will be apparent in the categorisation behaviour post-test, 
and also from the movement and balancing record, and any 
spontaneous comments. 
5.3 Planning 
Isaev's planning task provided an interesting progression in planning 
performance. It was argued that children's development \vas 
comparable to the decrement in adult performance with increased 
cognitive load. A more systematic study of the performance decrements 
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could be established by allowing adult subjects to stabilise their 
performance at a given level, by providing more examples. The effect 
of cognitive load could be controlled by systematically increasing the 
task difficulty by providing additional carriages and/ or additional tracks, 
extending the task beyond the S-carriage version. 
A further experiment with children could be conducted to 
systematically assess the role of knowledge of the train set on planning 
performance. Matched subjects pairs could used, with only one half 
being given a chance to familiarise themselves with the operation of 
the train set prior to engaging with the task. Protocol data could be 
encouraged by modifying the task so that the children had to explain 
what they were doing to a teddy bear, or by getting them to instruct the 
experimenter who would actually move the train. 
6. Afterword 
This thesis has been built upon the research and insights of Karmiloff-
Smith. I have concentrated on the Representational Redescription 
model, because there are no comparable alternative accounts; it shone 
to me like a beacon in the fog. Much of the discussion has focussed on 
negative assessments of the RR model - science progresses through 
falsification - but it is relatively easy to be critical. It is important to 
acknowledge Karmiloff-Smith's enormous contribution to 
developmental psychology and to cognitive science, the RR model 
being only one small part of that. 
I hope that I have progressed Karmiloff-Smith's ideas; I have, at 
least, risen to her challenge (personal communication, appendix 1) to 
follow my criticisms by providing an alternative account. However, 
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Karmiloff-Smith has a large amount of data against \\Thich my 
Recursive Re-Representation account still needs to be tested 
I have great respect for Karmiloff-Smith's work, which has been an 
inspiration to me. I have learned a great deal from her and look 
forward to learning more in the future. 
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Dear Fiona 
Here are my comments on "Representational Redescription and Children's Drawings" that 
you sent me some time ago. I am sorry I haven't got back to you earlier. 
On page 1 you suggest that the evidence for cognitive development beyond successful 
performance is the existence of U-shaped behavioural curves. This is not accurate and 
it is certainly not a necessary component. My narrative work does not really show the U-
shaped curve in the sense of external behaviour. What I have been stressing is that a 
distinction be drawn between behavioural change and representational change. Thus, 
performance decrement is not the main criteria for phase two. The phases are not defined 
by behaviour. It's just lucky for the observer that occasionally the behaviour does indeed 
show behavioural change, but not always in the fonn of decrement 
Just for your information, the point of balance on Type C blocks is further to the extreme 
of the block. 
Pugc 3, ind\!cd at the bottom of paragraph 2 you stute ui.at behavioural t:viJenct: of 
redescription may not be present for the majority of tasks where redescribed procedures 
continue to produce correct performance in phase 2. Therefore phase 2 cannot be defined 
by decrement in performance. Where you refer to "rigidity of the initial redescription", 
I would replace by a "certain rigidity". My argument is that on the basis on the first 
redesription children can indeed start to introduce changes. The point is that the first 
redescription is more restricted than subsequent redescriptions. Page 5, second para., I 
would stress that the 8 five-year-olds that I tested were carefully selected to be exactly 
within the category that could only introduce certain types of change and not others. 
In general I find your discussion under point 3. that drawings are not Compiled Procedures 
very apt. I was indeed using the term "compiled" loosely, although I did of course 
understand what it meant. I was trying to avoid terms such as "autonomized" so that I 
didn't get linked up with the work of John Anderson whose theory is very different. But 
you are right. The concept "compiled" is very technical and not exactly what I had in 
mind. 
To turn to page 6 now, you really have missed the point here. I am not arguing that the 
modifications introduced by the 4 to 6 year-old children's drawings are based on a 
compiled procedure. On the contrary. My point is that the initial procedures become 
(loosely compiled), but that it is on a redescription of the procedure that the child operates. 
I think that the 4 to 6 year-olds once they have reached behavioural mastery in drawing 
can indeed operate on a redescription of a procedure, not of course the procedure itself. 
Obviously one cannot operate on a procedure, otherwise the notion loses its sense 
completely. So I am arguing that they build up a procedure, this becomes "autonomised", 
(loosely compiled or some such notion), then the components of the procedure are 
redescribed and it is on that redescription that any operation takes place. Obviously I 
agree that this could not be the case with a compiled procedure, but I have never argued 
that. Subsequently the elements are accessible at some level and can be modified, but this 
is via a redescription of the elements embedded in the eariier procedural representation. 
Indeed, deletion of an element, even if it is only the last element in the sequence, 
presupposes the existence of identifiable elements but that is exactly my point. It must 
be on a redescription and not on the procedure itself that this takes place. What I am 
arguing is that there are multiple levels of redescription, all of which are retained, and that 
the first one is relatively rigid compared to subsequent redescriptions. 
To go on with 4., your question is whether drawings are ever "procedures". I think the 
basic point that you are making here is well-founded and that the extension to drawings 
was perhaps an error on my part. However, I would keep stressing, I am not arguing that 
children modify their procedures. I am arguing that they modify a resdescription of their 
procedures, and that this resdescription is sequentially constrained. 
I think that you, and another student at Oxford, who have replicated this work, have shown 
that the sequential constraint on the first level of redescription is considerably weaker than 
I thought. I can now see why this is. You have not actually provided an explanation. 
Because I think that it's a good idea to let you push it further, I will wait until you come 
up with the reason why. It is now extremely clear to me why drawing would be the one 
area that would not have the same constraints as other areas that I have looked at. 
I am still rather surprised by two aspects of your results. One is that the drawings of men 
that did not exist could, without children's verbal explanations, have been mistaken for 
normal men. In my case, and we had three judges look at the results, only 9 percent of 
children failed to draw in any way things that we thought didn't qualify as an X that 
didn't exist and in those cases it was quite clear from their comments that they simply 
were unable to do so. Remember that the vast majority of my subjects were successful. 
That was the whole point in identifying that particular age group. I would not have 
counted (your page 10) the man that does not exist on the right as a successful drawing 
because it still looks exactly like a man. But this never occurred in any of my seven-
year-olds. 
I am also surprised that no drawings fell into changed shaped of the whole category 
because I had lots and so did the Oxford student. 
There is a total misunderstanding on page 10 as to what counts as a modification "mid-
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procedure" and I think some of your statistics in fact gloss over this. If the child changes 
the values on a variable (say, size of ears), this is not what I call "inteITIlption of a 
procedure". Of course, in my study there were modifications mid-procedure on the values 
of variables, but the important point was that order was not inteITIlpted. If I had counted 
changes of values on variables as interruptions, then my results would have looked like 
yours. The point was to show that although young children could of course make some 
changes, (because I am looking at children who are successful in making changes), the 
changes were not of the inteITIlption or change of order sort. 
I am surprised that you got all your deletions being made mid-procedure, because this was 
extremely rare in the younger subjects in my study. 
Your statement on page 11 "All but one of these made their modifications in the middles 
of their 'procedure'" is simply misleading as a comparison to my results, because if young 
children changed the values on a variable, then that happens at any point in the drawing 
process. What I was contending was that the redescribed procedure was more rigid than 
one might have expected and that subsequently the rigidity was relaxed. 
I am also surprised that you got children who changed the order completely, i.e. drawing 
of body before heads and so forth. I didn't have this a single time, so there is something 
about the task instructions in each case which must have induced children in one case to 
do so and in the other case not to. 
I would never have counted the addition of buttons as "core", but we are probably 
addressing this in rather a different way. In any case, it seems to me that one does have 
something sequential like head, face, (then additions to face like beard), body, limbs. Or, 
head, face, body, (stripes on body), limbs. One might say a head/face drawing procedure 
followed by a body/limbs drawing procedure in both cases. 
One of the problems for me is that your account does not explain all the other sequential 
constraints that have been found by a number of other authors in various cognitive domains 
including drawing. You are right about my not accounting for what constitutes 
"behavioural mastery". I have been trying to do so for a long time and it is not easy! 
N a-one has come up with an operational definition. Again on page 16, I am not talking 
about evidence for a procedural representation, I am arguing that initial redescription is 
more sequentially constrained than later redesription. I probably overstated the case in 
the earlier article, but I still think it holds and it may just be that your beards get put in 
at the end of a head drawing subroutine but never between one arm drawing and the other 
arm drawing, for instance. But there's a definite difference between drawing and other 
domains and your work has highlighted that for me although you haven't actually come 
up with the explanation yet. I am not being "cute" in not giving it to you. I just think 
that as a student, (and may I say a very promising rather brilliant one), you ought to find 
it yourself. 
Again on page 17 your conclusion that all children made some of the modifications mid-
procedure (? changing values on variables) simply does not address the point that I was 
making. I agree with you, page 18, that there is a problem of planning (Freeman@s point 
too). You give a very nice example in the middle of that page. 
I am absolutely astounded, page 20, that you had children who began a drawing of a man 
with the legs. Check with Norman Freeman whether he ever found this. It didn't happen 
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once in my huge population, neither during the piloting phase nor during the actual running 
of the experiment. I think to be fair on page 21, middle paragraph, you should add the 
"very specific and testable claims which we have shown cannot be supported in the 
drawing domain." It isn't clear that you show this outside that domain. I agree with 
you that drawings are not produced by executing compiled procedures. They may, 
however, still have a procedural-like component which the strict computer metaphor doesn't 
capture. I think it's difficult to rule out the notion completely because Freeman and many 
others have talked of formula-like drawing processes which was something like the notion 
I was trying to capture with my use of procedure. I just think you're right that the actual 
computational notion is misused in this sense and I agree with you there are probably a 
continuous series of minor modifications to successive productions rather than a stage of 
stable success. 
In general I really liked your paper, I think there are a lot of excellent points in it but I 
do not see what your alternative theoretical account is. A general problem with 
developmental theorising in Britain is the following - I get sent excellent papers with very 
nice experimental designs which show that a previous researcher has been misguided, and 
then I turn over to look for the alternative theoretical account and I find the reference list. 
In your case, you refer very briefly to Vygotsky's theory but make very little of it and I 
think your paper would be immensely improved if you were to use, say, the Vygotskian 
account, to give an alternative account of the data and to link it, which I think you must 
do, to all the work that has shown sequential constraints on phonemic awareness, seriation 
and so forth, that I refer to. 
In any case I think your work has enormous potential and I hope you will continue 
sending me your up-to-date work. I would point out that a student at Oxford, Ceri Evans, 
working under Usha Goswami, also did a replication of my drawing work under the title 
"Flexibility of procedural sequence in children's drawing: A developmental study of 
representational change". He too found that rigidity of the procedural sequence was not 
confirmed and also came up with very similar results to the ones that you present although 
the statistics of his differences between the younger and older age groups were closer to 
mine. He found results much closer to mine so we have to work out why that is. For 
example, he got about 20% changes in shape of whole from both age groups and 43% of 
older age groups made cross category insertions and 9% of the younger age group, which 
is roughly what I found too. His overall results looked closer to mine than yours do. 
He, however, recorded the order of productions on videotape and found that my claim that 
there was such a strong sequential constraint did not hold. I am quite ready to accept that 
I was wrong on this point, from both your studies. But it is important to recall that I am 
talking about interruption for sub-routines and not modification mid-procedure for the 
change of values on variables. You might want to write to Usha and ask her to send you 
a copy of his work. She is now at the Psychology Department in Cambridge. 
Good luck in your future work and do keep me on your mailing list. 
Yours sincerely 
Annett Karmiloff-Smith 
Senior Research Scientist 
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Appendix 2 
Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder (1974) hypothesized 
developmental sequence. 
Action sequence 1: 
"Place block at any point of contact, let go; this was immediately 
followed by a second attempt with the same block:Place at any point of 
contact, push hard above that point, let go." (p.201) 
Action sequence 2: 
"first place more or less symmetrically on the support bar, i.e. close to 
the geometric center, correct in the right direction guided by the 
sensation of falling (adjustments were rarely made in the wrong 
direction), readjust in the other direction (corrections were frequently 
excessive), continue correcting back and forth but gradually more 
carefully until equilibrium is achieved." (p. 202) 
Action sequence 3: 
Place at geometric center, release hold very slightly to observe result, 
correct very slightly, correct a little more, return carefully to geometric 
center, repeat until balance is achieved. Depending on the block, the 
further the child had to move away from the geometric center, the more 
often he returned to it before further adjusting." (p. 202) 
Action sequence 4: 
First place at geometric center, next place at the point of contact 
corresponding to the previous success (irrespective as yet of the 
differences between the two blocks and often far removed from possible 
empirical success ... ), return to geometric center, continue as in previous 
sequence. At this point, some corrections were made away from the 
center of gravity ... " (p. 202) 
Action sequence 5: 
Place carefully at geometric center, correct very slightly around center, 
abandon all attempts, declaring the object as 'impossible' to balance. 
Action sequence 6: 
Place at geometric center, correct slightly, pause, lift object, rotate object, 
pause, place at geometric center, correct position slightly,. release h~ld 
slightly, readjust carefully, pause longer, glance at conspICUOUS weIght 
item, pause, place again slowly at geometric center, shake head, glance 
again at conspicuous weight item, then suddenly corr~ct continuou.s~y 
and rapidly in the right direction until balance is achIeved. RepetItIOn 
of a success was thereafter immediate, even if the object was rotated." (p. 
205) 
,\ction sequence 7: 
1 
To give an indication of of action sequences at the upper level, by 8;7 
years of age children paused before each item, roughly assessed the 
weight distribution of the block by lifting it ("you have to be careful, 
sometimes its just as heavy on each side, sometimes it's heavier on one 
side"), inferred the probable point of balance and then place the object 
immediately very close to it, without making any attempts at first 
balancing at the geometric center." (p. 205) 
2 
Appendix 3 
Isaev Planning Experiment - Instructions to subjects. 
--------------------------------
------------------
: ou are a train driver and here is your train. Some of the carriages are 
In the wrong order and you have to get them back into the right order 
before you can leave. If you look at the example you can see that the 
carriages need to be in the order 1,2,3, [draw attention to model example] 
and yours are in the order 3,1,2. 
The carriages can only move if they are attached to the engine, but 
you can attach as many carriages or as few carriages as you like to the 
engine. So, for example you could just move the first carriage 
[demonstrate the decoupling procedure], or you could move two 
carriages [demonstrate], or you could move all three carriages. 
You are only allowed to touch the carriages to link them together or 
to unlink them. You mustn't pick up the carriages, or move them 
along the track unless the engine is pulling them. 
You can move the engine backwards or forwards but you mustn't 
take the engine off the track. 
You can use the engine to split up the train and put some of the 
carriages onto a different line. For example, I might want to move the 
first two carriages [3.1] onto this line and leave them there [demonstrate] 
and then go back and get the other one [2]. If I then attach number 2 to 
the others I have got the carriages in a new order '2,3,1' instead of the 
'3,1,2' which we started with. This isn't right yet, because we have to get 
the order 1,2,3, so you would need to move the train around a bit more. 
Do you understand how you can move the train? How could I move 
the first carriage onto this line? [ask to demonstrate] Now can you leave 
it there and get the second carriage? [ask to demonstrate]. Very good. 
Do you understand what you have to do? [ask for re-statement of the 
goal]. 
There will always be more than one way of rearranging the carriages. 
For example with this problem [312] you could move the 3, and leave it 
on this track, then go back and get the 1 & 2 and join them to the 3. Or 
you could start by taking off the 3 &1, then go back and get the 2, attach it 
to the 3 but then split off the 2 & 3 from the 1, move them back then go 
back for the 1. [These are both demonstrated]. As you can see both \\Tays 
work, but the first \vay was quicker. You pretend that your carriages are 
full of eggs*, and as you are the train driver you want to move the 
carriages around as little as possible so that none of the eggs they get 
broken. You'll need to think very carefully about ho\\' you are going to 
move the train. Try and tell me what you are thinking about as you 
sort out this problem. 
Are you clear about what you have to do? I'll rearrange the carriages 
and you can start. 
